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Abstract
In this dissertation, I address the question of how to construct scientific theories of
emotions that are both conceptually sound and empirically fruitful. To do this, I offer
an analysis of the main challenges scientific theories of emotions face, and I propose a
meta-theoretical framework to construct scientific concepts of emotions as explications
of folk emotion concepts.
Part I discusses the main challenges theories of emotions in psychology and neu-
roscience encounter. The first states that a proper scientific theory of emotions must
explain all and only the phenomena under the vernacular term ‘emotion’ with a com-
mon set of conceptual resources and under an overarching generic concept of emotion.
The second demands that each emotion category corresponds to well-coordinated sets
of neural, physiological, and behavioral patterns of responses. I argue that none of
the best contemporary theories of emotions in psychology and neuroscience overcomes
these challenges. As a result, a new theory of emotions is required.
In Part II, I develop the meta-theoretical framework to construct a theory of emo-
tions that overcomes the challenges above. First, I propose a pluralistic account of
scientific kinds based on different patterns of projection that various disciplines may
take to justify inductive inferences. These are essentialist, historical, and social pat-
terns. Each of these patterns provides a framework to construct different types of
scientific concepts. Second, I argue that to decide between the different frameworks
of scientific kinds to construct tractable theories of emotions, we must engage in what
Bechtel and Richardson call “reconstituting the phenomena.” I suggest that in the case
of emotions, reconstitution amounts to the explication of folk emotion terms in the
vocabulary specified by the target framework. Lastly, I argue that among the frame-
works for scientific kinds available, the one that is best suited to explicate emotion
concepts is a functional framework. Consequently, I conclude by recommending sci-
entists pursue functionalist theories of emotions over essentialist, historical, or social
theories.
iii

Zusammenfassung
In dieser Dissertation beschäftige ich mich mit der Frage, welchen Anforderungen wis-
senschaftliche Theorien über Emotionen gerecht werden müssen, damit sie sowohl be-
grifflich fundiert als auch empirisch fruchtbar sind. Zu diesem Zweck biete ich zunächst
eine Analyse der wichtigsten Herausforderungen, mit denen wissenschaftliche Emotion-
stheorien konfrontiert sind. Anschließend schlage ich einen metatheoretischen Rahmen
vor, in dem wissenschaftliche Konzepte von Emotionen als Begriffsexplikationen von
Alltagsemotionskonzepten konstruiert werden können.
Teil I diskutiert die wichtigsten Herausforderungen für Theorien der Emotionen in
der Psychologie und den Neurowissenschaften. Die erste Herausforderung ist, dass eine
wissenschaftliche Theorie der Emotionen alle und nur die Phänomene unter den Allt-
agsbegriff „Emotion“ subsumieren sollte, die durch gemeinsame begriffliche Ressourcen
erfasst werden können. Die zweite Herausforderung ist, dass jede Emotionskategorie
gut koordinierten Gruppen neuronaler, physiologischer und verhaltensbezogener Reak-
tionsmuster entsprechen sollte. Ich behaupte, dass keine der derzeitigen Theorien der
Emotion in Psychologie und Neurowissenschaft dieser Anforderung entspricht. In-
folgedessen ist eine neue Theorie der Emotionen erforderlich.
Teil II entwickelt den metatheoretisches Bezugssystem für eine Theorie der Emo-
tionen, die den oben genannten Herausforderungen entspricht. Erstens schlage ich
eine pluralistische Darstellung der Kategorien oder „scientific kinds“ vor, die induktive
Schlussfolgerungen begründen können. Jedes dieser Muster bietet einen Rahmen, um
verschiedene Arten von wissenschaftlichen Konzepten zu konstruieren. Zweitens be-
haupte ich, dass wir uns, um zwischen den verschiedenen wissenschaftlichen Bezugssys-
temen wissenschaftlicher Kategorien zu entscheiden, mit dem beschäftigen müssen, was
Bechtel und Richardson „reconstituting the phenomena“ nennen. Im Falle von Emo-
tionen muss die Rekonstitution in der Explikation von Alltagsbegriffen der Emotion in
demjenigen Vokabular erfolgen, welches das relevante Bezugssystem bereitstellt. Ab-
schließend argumentiere ich, dass das funktionale Bezugssystem für wissenschaftliche
Kategorien oder „scientific kinds“ am besten zur Erläuterung von Emotionskonzepten
geeignet ist. Folglich schließe ich mit der Empfehlung, dass Wissenschaftler*Innen
funktionalistische Theorien von Emotionen anstelle von essentialistischen, historischen
oder sozialen Theorien in ihren Studien benutzen sollten.
v
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Introduction
Emotions have been an object of both scientific investigation and philosophical thought
for centuries. The first attempts to offer a scientific theory of emotions can be traced
back to the efforts of Wundt (1897) and, perhaps most famously, James (1884). In turn,
philosophical thinking about the emotions can be found, pace the possible anachro-
nisms, since Aristotle (n.d./2009, n.d./2018), going through Descartes (1649/1985),
Spinoza (1677/2018), and Hume (1738/2000), to mention a couple.
Even though these two histories (the philosophical and scientific ones) might have
occurred in a somewhat independent manner, recent decades have seen their integra-
tion. Specifically, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to inform
their thinking by empirical findings. Conversely, scientists have become aware of the
need of conceptual clarification if they are to be successful at understanding what
emotions are. This work situates itself in this interdisciplinary area, connecting in-
sights from psychology and neuroscience into a philosophical framework that, in turn,
expects to contribute to scientific enterprises.
The exact problem this work intends to contribute to can be summarized—albeit
too generally—under the question posed by Scarantino (2012): how can we define
emotions scientifically? In the past years, a growing amount of philosophical thinking
and empirical literature has suggested that a scientific definition of emotions, at least
as traditionally attempted, is a project that is bound to fail. The main reason behind
this pessimism is that emotions, it seems, do not constitute natural kinds. If this is so,
pessimists argue, emotions cannot be legitimate objects of scientific study, or if they
can, it cannot be under a common theoretical framework that explains all emotions
and only the emotions. In any case, formulating a unified, scientific theory of emotions
seems implausible.
As I explained above, the sources of this pessimism come both from philosophy
as well as from scientific literature. In philosophy, the most influential defense of this
pessimism can be found in Griffiths (1997). According to Griffiths, none of our best
theories of emotions captures all of the phenomena we call emotions in our everyday
lives. Instead, these theories suggest that the overarching concept of emotion includes
different kinds of phenomena, each explained by its own theory. If this is true, efforts
to offer a unified theory of emotions are futile. Emotions, Griffiths argues, are just
too heterogeneous to fit into a common theoretical framework. The best we can do is
work in different theories, each explaining only a subset of the phenomena captured
by the overarching concept.
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On the side of empirical literature, the most ardent defense of pessimism comes
from psychological constructionists, particularly in the work of Lisa Feldman Barrett
(2006; 2017; 2018a). For constructionists such as Barrett, empirical research has al-
ready found that emotions do not form a natural kind. Evidence from neuroscience
and psychology shows, according to them, that emotion categories are too heteroge-
neous, and that rather than finding unity, “variation is the norm” (Barrett, 2018a, p.
23). As a result, they propose a theory of emotions which does not demarcate between
emotions and other affective phenomena, and that makes distinctions between emotion
categories a matter of concepts rather than facts.
These two lines of arguments for pessimism raise important issues for emotion re-
search. First, they call into question the possibility of studying emotions scientifically.
Second, they invite a philosophical but empirically informed investigation into what
is it that scientists are after when investigating emotions. This dissertation takes an
important step towards offering answers to these problems. It intends to resist these
forms of pessimism and argue that we can formulate a scientifically meaningful theory
of emotions.
To do so, this work makes two important contributions to the existing debate on
emotions and their scientific study. On the one hand, this work provides an analysis
of the challenges scientists face when proposing scientifically meaningful theories of
emotions. On the other hand, and with this analysis in hand, this work proposes
a strategy to overcome the aforementioned challenges. Specifically, here I propose a
meta-theoretical framework from which scientists can formulate what I think can be
successful scientific theories of emotions. This framework invites scientists to construct
scientific emotion concepts as explications of folk emotion concepts in functional terms.
While I shall not fill in the blanks and propose a specific theory of emotions here, the
desiderata I present as part of this framework are intended to direct science in a
direction that avoids the pitfalls of previous theories.
The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I focuses on the challenges men-
tioned above, the challenges scientists face when proposing scientific theories of emo-
tions. These are what I call the Theoretical Challenge and the Empirical Challenge.
The Theoretical Challenge stems from Griffiths’s arguments mentioned above. It
puts constraints on the scope and extension of scientific theories of emotions, claim-
ing that a satisfactory theory must provide a systematic theoretical framework that
is empirically tractable and that includes all and only the phenomena under the ver-
nacular term “emotion.” Chapter 1 is devoted to an update and examination of this
challenge from the perspective of contemporary emotion research in psychology and
neuroscience. It discusses the best theories of emotions to this day, and argues that as
the literature stands, no theory yet has succeeded in meeting the challenge.
The Empirical Challenge, in turn, stems from constructionist arguments and em-
pirical findings. Specifically, I trace this challenge back to what Scarantino (2015)
calls the Problem of Variability, and which I call the Variability Thesis. The Variabil-
ity Thesis claims that emotions are naturally disjoined phenomena. It is supported by
empirical findings showing that there are no coordinated patterns of responses corre-
2
Introduction
sponding to emotions, and if there are, that there are no one-to-one correspondences
between these and emotion categories. In chapter 2, I examine this thesis in detail.
First, I argue that as it stands, this thesis is problematically ambiguous, and that fur-
ther clarification is required in order to understand its empirical import and thus for
it to be useful in the interpretation of empirical evidence. After I propose an analysis
of this thesis, I examine empirical findings in its support. I conclude that while there
are good reasons to accept this thesis, much of its empirical import still depends on
our theoretical commitments regarding how to individuate neural, physiological, and
behavioral patterns.1
In chapter 3, I discuss the two challenges together. In this interlude, I examine
some points of convergence and divergence between these challenges, and examine their
presumed consequences. In particular, this chapter raises the question of what follows
from past failures to meet these challenges. I reject the eliminativist conclusion that
emotions should be taken out of the set of legitimate objects of scientific investigation,
and suggest a revision of some of our meta-theoretical assumptions regarding how we
think about emotions in the scientific domain. This revisionist suggestion sets the
agenda for the second part of the dissertation.
Having analyzed the problem in detail, Part II sets out to propose the afore-
mentioned meta-theoretical framework to formulate a scientific theory of emotions.
Broadly construed, the claim I will defend is that a viable strategy to meet the afore-
mentioned challenges is to explicate folk emotion kinds into scientifically meaningful
functional kinds. This makes it possible to overcome the Theoretical Challenge by
enabling the formulation of a satisfactory theory of emotions while dissolving the Em-
pirical Challenge as traditionally understood by allowing the postulation of multiply
realizable but empirically interesting kinds.
To develop this strategy, Part II is divided into three main steps. First, I suggest
that part of the problem leading to the challenges above is an overly restrictive account
of natural kinds. In chapter 4, I examine the history of the notion of natural kinds
leading up to this restrictive account, and argue that what is important about natural
kinds in science is how they answer questions about how to justify inductive inferences
and projectibility. I distinguish four types of what I call scientific kinds, each corre-
sponding to different ways in which scientific disciplines justify inductive inferences
and projectibility. These are essentialist, historical, functional, and social kinds. With
this pluralistic account of kinds in place, I claim that questions about whether emo-
tions form natural kinds or not should be reframed in terms of what type of model
of scientific kinds allows us to capture the phenomena more accurately while allowing
the formulation of projectible categories. In other words, the question becomes what
type of kinds do emotions form.
To answer this question, I suggest that we must take a step back and recharacterize
the phenomenon that a scientific theory of emotions must explain. Put differently,
we must recharacterize our explanandum. To do this, I submit, we must engage in
what has been called in the literature on mechanistic explanations reconstituting the
1 Parts of this chapter were published in Loaiza (2020).
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phenomena. What is reconstitution and how it can apply to the case of emotions is the
subject of chapter 5. I propose an account of reconstitution consisting of two steps.
In the first step, scientists must find concepts to make reference to the phenomenon of
interest. These concepts, which may be pretheoretical, play an ostensive role, allowing
scientists to agree on the explanandum phenomenon. Once these concepts are in play,
the second step is to find a framework to construe the explanandum as a scientific kind.
In the case of emotions, I submit that the concepts that aid in fixing the explanandum
are folk emotion concepts, and the task of finding a framework to construe them in
terms of scientific kinds takes the form of explicating folk emotion concepts.
Lastly, in chapter 6, I apply the strategy above to evaluate which framework or
model of scientific kinds best fits our pretheoretical concepts of emotions. I argue
against essentialist, historical, and social models, and defend that emotions are best
understood as functional kinds. Put differently, I claim that emotions are best expli-
cated in terms of relations between inputs, outputs, and other mental states, rather
than in terms of an essential property, a common causal history, or as intrinsically
social practices. This way of cashing out emotion kinds functionally has clear advan-
tages over other models, including allowing for multiple realization while preserving
the unity of emotion categories. As a result, I submit, functional models can help
scientists overcome the Theoretical Challenge by offering a framework that preserves
conceptual and explanatory unity. Simultaneously, functional models allow for a dis-
solution or a reinterpretation of the Empirical Challenge, since theories following this
framework can integrate variability without running into the issues previous theories
of emotions faced. If this approach is correct, then the best way for scientists to define
emotions scientifically is by adopting a functional approach.
Before closing this introduction, let us go over some clarificatory notes about the
scope and target of this dissertation. As I explained above, this work does not offer a
specific theory of emotions, nor does it defend a pre-existing theory. All of the claims
presented and defended here are intended as meta-theoretical claims, that is, as claims
about how to propose theories in general. While I will discuss specific theories in
various points of this work, I shall only do so to point out past problems or to clarify
why the framework I am proposing offer a more promising route for scientific research
on emotions. Only in closing will I consider the prospects of current theories in the
light of the framework I will propose.
It is also worth pointing out that this work will not discuss philosophical theories
of emotions such as those defended by Solomon (2003), Nussbaum (2001), and others.
This is because I am interested in theories of emotions in psychology and neuroscience
specifically. While some philosophical theories might have bearing on scientific work
(see e.g. Prinz, 2004), I will treat philosophical work on emotions as a separate subject
matter from scientific theorizing. It remains an open question to which extent the
framework developed here has an impact on these theories or whether these theories
have a role to play with regards to work in psychology and neuroscience.
4
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Chapter 1
The Theoretical Challenge
The Problem of Disunity
There is a huge variety of theories of emotions. Different theories naturally raise
different expectations. Some theories take emotions to be hardwired circuits ingrained
in our biology, whereas for others claim they are constructions of our psychological
makeup or our social environment, with little to nothing biological to them. Some
theories expect emotions to be neatly organized into a finite set of categories, while
others submit that there are potentially infinite possible ways to categorize them.
There are even theories that reject the view that emotions form an interesting scientific
kind in the first place, while others hold on to this view and stress the epistemic value
of emotion categories.
In the introduction of this work, I presented what I called Griffiths’s challenge, the
challenge of finding a theory of emotions that presents emotions as scientific kinds.
In this chapter, I will examine this challenge in detail. I will explore the question of
whether any of the main current theories of emotions meets the challenge, updating
Griffiths’s arguments and evaluating their status in today’s landscape. To do this,
we must first go over the main theories on the market and evaluate whether they
implicitly or explicitly present emotions in a scientifically interesting way. I will claim
that none of the current theories meet the challenge completely, but some of them do
offer important clues in that direction. Hence, even though we need a new theory of
emotion kinds, there is still hope in this project.
Evaluating the different theories of emotions involves a number of steps. First, I
present Griffiths’s original argument and introduce what I call the Theoretical Chal-
lenge. Broadly construed, the theoretical challenge consists in offering a theoretical
framework that explains all emotions and only the phenomena we call emotions with
the same conceptual framework. In its original formulation, the theoretical argument
considers only a subset of current emotion theories. Hence, in the second section, I
update the challenge by considering contemporary empirical theories of emotion in
psychology and neuroscience. These are basic emotion theories, appraisal theories,
and psychological constructionism. I will explain the main tenets of each one of these
views, along with their most salient variations. I then evaluate whether these theories
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meet the theoretical challenge, arguing that none of them do the job. As a result, a
new theory of emotions is required if we are to study emotions scientifically.
1.1 The Theoretical Challenge: Griffiths’s eliminativism
Debates on the natural kind status of emotion date back to Griffiths’s (1997) influential
work. In his book, Griffiths claims:
My central conclusion is that the general concept of emotion is unlikely to
be a useful concept in psychological theory. It is meant to be a kind of
psychological process that underlies a certain range of human behaviors.
But there is no one kind of process that underlies enough of this behavior
to be identified with emotion. (Griffiths, 1997, p. 14)
In Griffiths’s view, the concept emotion is comparable to other concepts in science
which have proved unfruitful, such as supralunary object. Concepts of this sort
have nothing scientifically meaningful in common, thus precluding them from figuring
in interesting inferences and research agendas. Just as with other concepts of this type,
Griffiths concludes that we must eliminate emotion from scientific projects altogether.
According to Griffiths, a successful theory of emotions would be one that refines or
replaces emotion concepts “so that the categories corresponding to emotion concepts
have strong causal homeostasis” (Griffiths, 1997, p. 228). By identifying mechanisms
subserving causal homeostasis (the co-occurrence of observable properties; see Boyd,
1999a), science would be able to account for what grounds inferences across emotion
categories. For instance, if the best theory of emotions identified them with activity in
specific brain regions, this would enable us to infer properties from observed instances
of a given emotion to unobserved instances in virtue of this common mechanism.
This would provide the foundations of a scientifically tractable theory of emotions.
Nonetheless, Griffiths argues, such project is bound to fail.
Griffiths’s reasons to be pessimistic about the scientific status of emotions lie in the
heterogeneity of the phenomena that fall under this category. In our folk-psychological,
pretheoretical vocabulary, emotion is a category that ranges from instinctive re-
sponses like fearing a snake to complex ones such as feeling ashamed that we have
failed to meet a moral norm. As mentioned above, any successful theory of emotions
must explain all of these phenomena under the same framework. Yet, Griffiths argues,
none of our best theories can do so. In all cases, some subset of phenomena are left
unaccounted for.
Griffiths identifies two natural classes of emotions. One is the range of phenomena
explained in terms of affect programs. As Griffiths understands them, affect programs
are emotional responses that exhibit three properties: complexity, coordination, and
automaticity. Complexity means that there are different elements constituting these re-
sponses, such as facial expressions, musculoskeletal responses, vocal changes, hormonal
changes, and autonomic activity. Coordination means that these different elements oc-
cur together in specific patterns. Lastly, automaticity means that this coordination
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occurs involuntarily and without conscious control. Furthermore, affect programs also
exhibit a modular structure, i.e. they are informationally encapsulated in order to
provide quick responses and to support their automaticity. Canonical examples of
emotions of this type include instances of surprise, fear, anger, disgust, sadness, and
joy, among others. In the next section, I present this view in detail.
The second type of phenomena under the concept of emotion is what Griffiths
calls the “higher cognitive emotions.” Unlike the emotions explained as affect pro-
grams, higher cognitive emotions demand a more complex cognitive architecture that
escapes the conceptual resources of the first class. As Griffiths puts it, higher cognitive
emotions do not involve the “brief, highly stereotyped emotional reactions” (Griffiths,
1997, p. 100) that affect programs do. Additionally, these emotions are neither infor-
mationally encapsulated, nor are the actions that unfold automatic and involuntary.
Nonetheless, they deserve their place under the category of emotion, given their inclu-
sion in the corresponding vernacular concept. As a result, emotion encompasses two
different kinds of phenomena lacking mechanistic unity. Hence, emotion, as a general
category, does not constitute a natural kind.
We can understand Griffiths’s analysis of the concept of emotion and his elimina-
tivist thesis as posing a first challenge to emotion research. I propose the following
initial construal of this challenge:
Theoretical Challenge (1): Provide a scientifically meaningful theoretical frame-
work that explains all and only the phenomena under the vernacular term “emo-
tion” under the same explanatory resources and under an overarching generic
concept of emotion.
This construal requires some clarification. First, what characterizes a scientifically
meaningful theoretical framework? The literature on the structure of scientific theories
is vast, and a proper discussion of this subject matter requires a detailed investigation
on its own. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this work, I believe a general working
definition of theories can suffice. In my view, Griffiths has in mind an empirical theory,
that is, a theory which enables the formulation of empirical hypotheses and that offers
clear criteria for its testability. Additionally, I suspect that the theory Griffiths has in
mind is also characterized by its systematicity. A theory in this sense is a systematic
body of statements which yield predictions and explanations. This working definition
allows us to clarify the Theoretical Challenge as follows:
Theoretical Challenge (2): Provide a systematic theoretical framework that pro-
vides empirically testable hypotheses and explains all and only the phenomena
under the vernacular term “emotion” under the same explanatory resources and
under an overarching generic concept of emotion.
This construal fares better than the initial construal, but two points needs further
discussion. First, how can we determine what are the phenomena under the ver-
nacular term “emotion”?2 Answering this question is paramount to determining the
2 I am grateful to Diana Pérez for raising this problem.
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scope of our candidate theory. The problem is that the vernacular concept of emotion
is a fuzzy concept, and our folk-psychological vocabulary often times cashes out as
emotions phenomena that, upon examination, differ significantly from the phenomena
traditional theories of emotions have in mind. Consider for example the case of love.
For many, love would count as an emotion. Yet, upon close inspection, love is better
characterized as a disposition to have certain emotions regarding a loved one (e.g.,
happiness that they are around, sadness that they leave). Determining whether or not
our theory must account of these cases is thus a problematic endeavor. How can we
go about defining the scope then?
As in the case of what counts as a scientific theory, we can adopt a working def-
inition of the set. In my view, there are clear cases that the theory must include
under its scope: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and the like. Conversely, there are
also other mental (perhaps affective) phenomena that our theory must exclude from
the set of emotions: (physical) pain, hunger, difficulty doing complex calculations,
executive functions, and so on. By considering these clear cases, we can start approx-
imating the scope of our theory. A theory of emotions must explain phenomena such
as happiness, sadness, and fear, and distinguish them from other mental phenomena
such as feeling pain, hunger, etc. When it comes to problematic cases such as love,
the discussion must be more detailed. However, if a theory fails to explain clear-cut
cases or provides a wide construal that includes clear non-emotional cases, we can be
sure that theory is not a satisfactory one. Hence, I will stick to clear cases as much
as possible in this chapter, and steer clear of more fuzzy, gray cases. In chapters 5
and 6, I will revisit the role of folk emotion concepts in the construction of a scientific
theory of emotions. For the time being, I will adopt the aforementioned explananda
and evaluate the theories under consideration accordingly.
As for the second point of clarification, as I will argue in Part II, I believe that
part of the problem in the emotions and natural kinds debate lies in assuming one
particular account of natural kinds, as Griffiths does. There are a number of accounts
of natural kindhood and their relation to scientific meaningfulness. Moreover, this
heterogeneity of accounts signals a lack of consensus on what natural kinds are and
what their connection is to scientific concepts. This introduces an important issue
into the debate, as it is unclear what criteria emotions must fulfill in order to qualify
as natural kinds and as scientifically meaningful constructs. Even though Griffiths
assumes Boyd’s (1991; 1999a) homeostatic property cluster (HPC) account of natural
kinds, I will discuss this issue in detail later on, when I discuss the issue of natural
kinds and their relationship to scientific concepts (see chapter 4). For now, I will
leave this issue aside, and grant Griffiths that a satisfactory theory of emotions must
formulate kinds in terms of the HPC account.
To analyze the prospects of overcoming the Theoretical Challenge, we must first
rehearse Griffiths’s argument from the perspective of current emotion research. In
other words, Griffihs’s original argument, proposed a little more than two decades
ago, deserves an update. As it is framed, the argument only considers a subset of
current theories of emotions. Therefore, in order to update the challenge, we must
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evaluate the best current theories in the market. In order to evaluate them, we must
ask whether these theories can successfully explain all emotions and only the emotions
under the same framework, and examine the role folk-psychological terms play in these
theories.
1.2 Updating the Theoretical Challenge
In order to update Griffiths’s argument, two further clarifications are in order. First,
I will consider this an update of Griffiths’s most general argumentative strategy, leav-
ing aside some of the details of Griffiths’s particular line of argument aside. As I
understand Griffiths’s point, the idea is to examine the best theories of emotions and
evaluate whether they are (1) satisfactory theories according to internal criteria of
consistency and validity, and (2) they cover clear cut cases of what we would call an
emotion and leave out those that we would uncontroversially exclude from this class.
In this sense, I follow Griffiths.
Where I don’t follow Griffiths, however, is in the choice of the theories I will con-
sider. As I explained above, the theories chosen by Griffiths are no longer the most
discussed theories in the literature, hence the diagnosis of his argument as outdated.
In my view, the best candidate theories nowadays are Basic Emotion Theories3, Ap-
praisal Theories, and Psychological Constructionism. The reason why I pick these
there theories–or more precisely, families of theories–also responds to Barrett’s (2006)
review on emotions as natural kinds. In this review, Barrett discusses the two former
views, and in later publications (see Barrett, 2012, 2017, 2018a) she defended the lat-
ter. Hence, this division reflects the current state of the art and provides a good basis
to update Griffiths’s argument.
Second, even though much of the current literature has distinguished these three
families of theories, this classification is fragile upon close inspection. It is difficult to
pinpoint a thesis that separates these three views, and there are a number of arguments
that call for integration between theories of different families (e.g. Moors (2017) calls
for an integration between dimensional appraisal views and psychological construc-
tionism). I will not discuss these merges in detail at the moment. I will assume this
taxonomy of theories is roughly correct and that we can make these distinctions, at
least to certain degree. What I am interested in is in the scope of these theories as
they have been understood in the literature so far. This also implies that I will leave
possible amendments to these theories for now. Later, in subsequent chapters, I will
discuss some possible amendments and modifications of these theories. For the pur-
poses of this chapter, however, I intend to present them as they have been presented
in the debate and as they form part of the state of the art.
3 Here I do follow Griffiths slightly, since he does include Basic Emotion Theory in his argument.
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1.2.1 Basic Emotion Theory
In general terms, Basic Emotion Theory (BET) aims at explaining emotions in terms
of a set of so-called basic emotions. The criteria for an emotion to be called ‘ba-
sic’ vary across different versions of BET, and therefore it is difficult to pinpoint an
overarching characterization. This also implies that the question of which emotions
are basic and which are not (if any, as we will see later) are not consistent among
the different theories that fall under the BET umbrella. Given this heterogeneity of
theories that fall under BET, I will present BET in a somewhat historical manner.
First, I will start with Darwin’s work on emotional expression as a precursor of BET.
Afterwards, I will present four variations of BET: Affect Programs Theory (defended
by Tomkins), Ekman’s BET (which I will call Traditional BET ), Differential Emotions
Theory (defended by Izard), and Panksepp’s affective neuroscience.
Darwin and Expression in BET
In 1872, Darwin published The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872/2009). Darwin’s main contribution in Expression is, in a nutshell, the view
that emotional expression in humans is not disconnected from expressions in animals,
but rather that the former has evolved from the latter. In this sense, Darwin’s theory
is not a theory of emotions as such, but a theory of emotional expression. Neverthe-
less, this theory did inspire a number of theories a century later, and thus is still an
important starting point to understand more contemporary theories of emotion.
As mentioned above, Darwin’s main claim is that emotional expression in humans
has evolved from expressions in animals. Hence, a proper study of the former involves
a study of the latter. This implied a shift in how we thought, not only about emotions,
but also about the mind. Historically, dominant theories of the mind viewed animals
as devoid from inner lives. At the time of Darwin, Charles Bell, one of Darwin’s
inspirations, had claimed that emotions were unique to humans and given to us by
divine design (Bell, 1844; see also Richards, 2009, p. 114).
Given this historical framework, the shift towards an evolutionary, continuous view
of the mind and of emotions was revolutionary. In Darwin’s words:
The community of certain expressions in distinct though allied species, as
in the movements of the same facial muscles during laughter by man and
by various monkeys, is rendered somewhat more intelligible if we believe
in their descent from a common progenitor. He who admits on general
grounds that the structure and habits of all animals have been gradually
evolved, will look at the whole subject of expression in a new and interesting
light. (Darwin, 1872/2009, p. 19)
Studying emotional expression as gradually evolved, as Darwin suggested, implied
looking for its origins both in phylogeny and ontogeny. Regarding its phylogenetic
origins, Darwin invited us to look at homologous and analogous traits in other species
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that may be linked to our own emotional expressions.4 As for the ontogenetic origins,
Darwin proposed studying infants to see the development of emotions, as well as
different cultures to see whether there were expressions universal to all human groups.
These suggestions, as I will explain later, served as the background of different variants
of BET.
Darwin’s theory of emotional expression rests in three principles, namely:
Principle of serviceable associated habits Some complex actions are directly or
indirectly serviceable under mental states. Whenever the same mental state is
induced, there is a tendency formed by habit to make the same movements, even
if they are no longer of use.
Principle of antithesis Given the associations between certain movements and a
given mental state (as per the first principle), there is sometimes a tendency
towards opposite movements when the opposite mental state is induced.
Principle of direct action of the nervous system Some actions are the product
of strong nervous system excitation, depending on the connection of nerve-cells
and of habit.
Darwin uses these principles to explain the origins of different expressions. For
example, he explains the expression of astonishment—characterized by raised eyebrows
and open mouth—as formed by habit when our ancestors opened their eyes to expand
their visual field and move their eyes quickly to catch the presence of an object in the
environment, and hypothesizes that the open mouth comes from disregarding other
muscles to focus our attention on the object (which causes the jaw to drop) or as a
response to breathe deeper in case we need to flee (see Darwin, 1872/2009, ch. XII).
Another example is showing the canine teeth in expressions of anger, which he ties to
habits formed in non-human animals to prepare for battle (see Darwin, 1872/2009, ch.
X).
Even though many of Darwin’s specific claims would be falsified down the line
(starting with the inheritance of acquired characters), Darwin’s contributions remained
an important part of psychology and biology. In the case of emotions and basic emotion
theories, Ekman (2009) summarizes Darwin’s main theoretical contributions towards
BET as follows:
1. Darwin treated emotions as discrete entities, rather than as dimensionally defined
as contemporaries like Wundt (1897).
2. Darwin focused on the face as a primary site for evidence about emotions.
3. Darwin thought of emotional expressions as universal, i.e. present in all cultures.
4 Darwin’s theory of expression, even though it was evolutionary, did not make use of the theory
of natural selection. Instead, when it comes to expression, Darwin thinks of it as an acquired
trait that is inherited to descendants of an organism even if it has no use for its survival (and
hence is not a selected trait). See Darwin (1872/2009, pp. 49-54).
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4. For Darwin, emotions are not unique to humans but found in many other species.
Regarding the first contribution, Darwin’s view of emotions as forming discrete
categories is indeed one of the central tenets of different variants of BET, as we will
see below. Concerning the second, along with the third contribution, we will see that
it is one of the main inspirations of Ekman’s later work on emotional expression, which
I will present below. Lastly, as for the fourth contribution, this is what I identified as
the main theme of The Expression and the basis for an evolutionary theory of emotions
which BET intends to provide.
As I will show below, all of these themes come up again and again in different
variations of BET. In one way or another, every BET is committed to some or all of
Darwin’s claims as presented by Ekman. It is for this reason that Darwin is commonly
known as the precursor of BET.
Affect programs theory (Tomkins)
Ninety years after the publication of The Expression, Silvan Tomkins published the
first volume of Affect Imagery Consciousness (1962/2008, hereafter AIC). In this and
the other volumes making up the whole of AIC, Tomkins proposed a theory of affects
that updated Darwin’s claims and that is still present today in many of our current
theories.
Just as Darwin, Tomkins’s main interest were not emotions as such. Instead,
Tomkins was interested on emotions as leading to motivation. Tomkins’s aim in AIC
and most of his work is to come up with a satisfactory theory of motivation that is
both theoretically sound and empirically productive (Tomkins, 1981/1995). However,
Tomkins does come closer than Darwin to proposing a proper theory of emotions.
Tomkins’s theory of affects does provide, not only the inspiration, but the background
and framework for current basic emotion theories.
As Tomkins himself formulates it, the main question he set out to answer through-
out his work was: “What do human beings really want?” (Tomkins, 1981/1995, p.
27). He claimed that humans, as any other organism, want to duplicate themselves,
that is, to self-maintain and reproduce. To do this, humans have evolved a number of
mechanisms that “inform and motivate the individual to incorporate into the organ-
ism the raw material from the environment which it must have to remain alive, and
informs and motivates the individual to excrete the waste products of the assimilated
material” (AIC, p. 18). These mechanisms make up what Tomkins called the ‘drive
system.’
The drive system, in Tomkins’s view, is not sufficient to generate action though.
He asks us to consider avoiding being physically hurt. Animals, including humans,
have a drive to avoid getting hurt. However, according to Tomkins, this drive itself
would not be sufficient to make us avoid getting hurt before we actually do. The
reason for this is that the drive system registers being hurt as painful, but the memory
of pain itself is not painful. What we need is a way to track how negative previous
instances of being hurt have been. This, Tomkins thinks, is done by the affect system.
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For Tomkins, the affect system amplifies the drives in order to motivate action.
Affects in this account are “sets of muscle and glandular responses located in the face
and also widely distributed through the body, which generate sensory feedback which
is either inherently ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’.” (AIC, p. 135). These sets of facial
and bodily responses endow drives with motivational urgency such that we remember
and keep track of acceptable or unacceptable stimuli. Without them, drives would
not be efficient in keeping us away from harm or forcing us to explore for food and
reproduction.
There are three points worth highlighting regarding affect in Tomkins’s view. First,
Tomkins identifies a set of affects he labels the primary affects. These are affects that
are activated by different types of neural activity.5 Which and how many are the
primary affects is an empirical question. In Tomkins’s words:
[How many primary affects there are and which are they] is a basic question,
primarily biological in nature, that is treated more and more as though it
were a psychosocial question. Affect mechanisms are no less biological than
drive mechanisms. [...] If each innate affect is controlled by inherited pro-
grams that in turn control facial muscle responses, autonomic blood flow,
respiratory, and vocal responses, then these correlated sets of responses
will define the number and specific types of primary affects. (Tomkins,
1981/1995, p. 58)
The criteria for primary affects are, thus, empirical, biological criteria. It is not
a conceptual question which affects turn out to be primary, but an empirical matter
concerning our brains and bodies.
Besides proposing biological criteria for primary affects, Tomkins thought that
affect is primarily facial behavior. Only secondarily does affect involve bodily, outer
skeletal, and visceral behavior (AIC, p. 114). He contrasts his view with the James-
Lange (James, 1884) theory of emotion, according to which emotion is the perception
of bodily states. For Tomkins, bodily states are part of an affective or emotional state,
but only a minor part in comparison to the face. In his view, internal bodily states
are slow and gross, whereas the face is rapid and complex (AIC, p. 113). Hence, the
primary site for the affects, and consequently the main object of study for a science of
emotion, is the face.6
Lastly, affects are activated by what he called affect programs. An affect program
is a set of instructions that “control a variety of muscles and glands to respond with
5 For Tomkins, there are three distinct classes of affect activators corresponding to different pat-
terns in terms of neural firing density (understood as the product of the intensity times the
number of neural firings per unit of time)(AIC, p. 139). These patterns are stimulation (i.e.
density) increase, level, and decrease. Each of these patterns contains two or three corresponding
affects. Startle, fear, and interest are activated by increasing density patterns; anger and distress,
by leveling ones; and laughter and joy, by decreasing ones. For each of these classes, affects are
distinguished from one another by the rate of increase or decrease, or by the starting levels of
stimulation.
6 In the next chapter, I will argue against this view. I will claim that evidence on emotional
expression is heuristically interesting at best, but cannot decide questions about emotion kinds.
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unique patterns of rate and duration of activity characteristic of a given affect” (AIC,
p. 135). These affect programs are stored in inherited subcortical structures. They are
activated by the presence of a stimulus that has been either innately set up to activate
the program (e.g. pain activating a crying response) or that has been associated with
the program through learning (e.g. crying because your favorite sports team lost).
Each primary affect has a specific affect program that activates it. Consequently,
the question of which and how many affect programs are there is also an empirical
question.
The idea of there being affect programs corresponding to each type of affect hints
at a view that would be central in today’s debate, namely, the view that emotions must
correspond one-to-one onto some kind of neural structure which instantiates something
like an affect program. In the next chapter, I will discuss this idea in detail. For now,
it suffices to see where some of the commitments of later versions of BET come from.
Most versions of BET expect this sort of correspondence, even using Tomkins’s notion
of affect programs explicitly. To see this, let us move on to the contemporary versions
of the theory.
Ekman’s Basic Emotion Theory
Ekman’s views derive directly from Tomkins’s work. In particular, Ekman’s aimed
to investigate whether emotional expressions were universal, as Tomkins and Darwin
hypothesized. If emotional expressions turned out to be universal, this would presum-
ably provide evidence for the claim that emotions are biologically determined, and
thus for an evolutionary theory of emotions along the lines that Tomkins had devel-
oped. As we will see below, Ekman’s view is premised on the alleged confirmation of
such universality of emotional expression. Hence, we can interpret Ekman’s BET as
an effort to explain and explore the consequences of universality.
Ekman was trained as a psychoanalytic clinical psychologist but a behaviorist
researcher. Due to his dissatisfaction with psychoanalysis and his behaviorist leanings,
he undertook to investigate behavioral methods of approaching emotional states. He
decided to study the face. As he tells his story, his idea of examining the universality of
emotional expression was met with resistance from a number of scholars who thought
that the issue was already settled against universality and in favor of relativism. Yet, in
the midst of such resistance, Ekman found Tomkins, who defended a theory predicting
universality and who supported the studies Ekman was to conduct later in his career
(Ekman, 1996/2009).
Ekman started by studying emotional expressions across cultures. In the next
chapter (2.2.4), I will discuss these experiments in detail. For the time being, I will
present the general idea. Ekman and colleagues conducted experiments comparing
how emotion expressions were produced and, more importantly, interpreted in differ-
ent cultures. In his view, these experiments support the hypothesis that there are
expressions that are produced and interpreted universally as the same emotions. If
this is the case, Ekman argues, there is good reason to believe that there are a number
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of emotions present in all cultures. These universal emotions constitute his set of basic
emotions.
Since basic emotions in Ekman’s construal are independent of culture, they must
have biological determinants. In Ekman’s view, there are a number of markers that
indicate that an emotion qualifies as basic. Ekman (1992) presents the following:
1. Distinctive universal signals.
2. Presence in other primates.
3. Distinctive physiology.
4. Distinctive universals in antecedent events.
5. Coherence among emotional response.
6. Quick onset.
7. Brief duration.
8. Automatic appraisal.
9. Unbidden occurrence.
According to Ekman, the adjective ‘basic’ in the basic emotions serves to underscore
the fact that these emotions form discrete categories, as well as highlighting their
biological and evolutionary role. Let us expand on each of these claims.
First, Ekman defends a theory committed to the claim that all emotions form
discrete categories. These categories constitute what Ekman calls emotion families. An
emotion family is a group of emotions that have common characteristics, particularly
a common theme. Each of the basic emotions forms one such family. Ekman and
Cordaro (2011) present their updated version of the list of (now seven) basic emotion
families7 and their themes as follows:
Anger: the response to interference with out pursuit of a goal we care
about [or] someone attempting to harm us (physically or psychologi-
cally) or someone we care about.[...]
Fear: the response to threat of harm, physical or psychological [which]
activates impulses to freeze or flee. [...]
Surprise: the response to a suddent unexpected event.[...]
Sadness: the response to the loss of an object or person to which you are
very attached. [...]
Disgust: repulsion by the sight, smell, or taste of something [or] people
whose actions are revolting or [...] ideas that are offensive.
7 Ekman and Cordaro think that there may be more than seven basic emotions. These are only
the emotions that they think are confirmed as basic.
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Contempt: feeling morally superior to another person.
Happiness: feelings that are enjoyed, that are sought by the person.[...]
(Ekman & Cordaro, 2011, p. 365)
According to this list, for example, fear of snakes and dread may fall under the
general family of fear reactions. In Ekman’s view, all fear reactions share the same
expression, physiology, antecedent events, and all of the other markers presented above.
Furthermore, they all share the common theme of being a freezing or fleeing response
to a threat. The only aspect in which these emotions differ is in the way in which they
may be experienced by different subjects. For example, dread may be understood as a
particularly intense form of fear, where as fear of snakes may be thought of as a more
primitive instance.
Second, Ekman emphasizes the biological and evolutionary role of basic emotions.
In his view, emotions have adaptive value and help us deal with what he calls funda-
mental life-tasks. These fundamental life-tasks include situations in which an organism
must act rapidly to find solutions to problems they may encounter in the environment.
To use the example of fearing snakes, having a rapid reaction to an encounter with a
snake may help us avoid death and find refuge promptly.
One interesting but problematic aspect of Ekman’s BET is that it doesn’t allow
for non-basic emotions. For Ekman, there are no non-basic emotions whatsoever. If a
candidate to emotion does not satisfy the criteria for basicality, then it does not count
as an emotion at all. Rather, it would be cashed out as a mood or as an attitude
accompanying one of the basic emotions. This raises the question of the utility of the
adjective ‘basic’, a criticism that has been raised in several occassions (see e.g. Ortony
& Turner, 1990). Nevertheless, Ekman has repeatedly defended this use in the sense
specified above, namely, as a way to highlight the discrete nature of emotion categories
as well as their evolutionary role. This distinguishes Ekman’s BET from other forms
of BET that allow for non-basic emotions, and will become an important point of
discussion later on.
Differential Emotions Theory (Izard)
Besides Ekman, another one of Tomkins’s successors was Caroll Izard. Izard’s theory
resembles Tomkins’s and Ekman’s in that all of them subscribe to the idea that there
are some emotions that are primary or basic. In contrast, however, Izard’s view em-
phasizes the role of feelings in defining emotions. Furthermore, contra Ekman, Izard
allows for non-basic emotions, although with some important qualifications which I
will present below.
Izard distinguishes between basic emotions and emotion schemas. Basic emotions
are “affective processes generated by evolutionarily old brain systems upon the sensing
of an ecologically valid stimulus” (Izard, 2007, p. 261). Emotion schemas, in turn,
are dynamic interactions between emotion and cognition and may involve complex
appraisals (Izard, 2007, p. 265). Emotion schemas are the most common experiences
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in adults and older children, and they usually correspond to folk-psychological labels
like “fear” or “anger.”
Izard’s list of basic emotions includes interest, joy, sadness, anger, and fear. These
emotions, he thinks, have been shown to have certain properties that warrant their
membership to this list. These properties are:
(a) They depend on the perception of an ecologically valid stimulus, but not on
complex appraisals or higher-order cognition;
(b) They have more specificity of functions;
(c) They largely derive from bio-evolutionary processes;
(d) They continue to retain relatively more evolutionarily derived features, such as
expressive and social signals;
(e) They emerge earlier in ontogeny than emotion schemas; and
(f) They constitute a set of motivational processes important to survival and well-
being. (adapted from Izard, 2007, pp. 262-263; Izard, 2011, pp. 371-372)
Basic emotions, as defined by Izard, share a number of features with Ekman’s
basic emotions and Tomkins’s primary affects. All of these are thought of as deriving
from evolution and having some adaptive value. Moreover, as we will se below, they
are relatively simpler than emotion schemas in the sense that they do not require
higher cognitive processes, even though they may interact with them at a later stage
in development.
As explained above, emotion schemas are interactions between emotion and cog-
nition. More specifically, an emotion schema is “an emotion interacting dynamically
with perceptual and cognitive processes to influence mind and behavior [and are] often
elicited by appraisal processes but also by images, memories, and thoughts, and var-
ious noncognitive processes and periodic changes in levels of hormones” (Izard, 2009,
p. 8). Emotion schemas share the same qualitative aspect with their corresponding
basic emotion. For example, an emotion schema based on fear feels the same way
as the basic emotion of fear. Such an emotion schema, however, would include other
components that the basic emotion does not include. Feeling afraid of failing an exam
would involve a complex cognitive process whereby someone judges such a failure as
an important loss. Yet, such episode would count as an emotion schema given its
complexity.
Just as Ekman’s account, Izard’s holds that all emotions form discrete categories.
According to him, emotions form feeling categories that children learn to capture with
the acquisition of language (Izard, 2007, p. 267). Yet, they interact with each other
constantly to produce complex behavior. As Izard puts it:
[...] all emotions are discrete, yet they are highly interactive with each
other as well as with cyclical affects (e.g. hunger, sexual arousal) and
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with perceptual and higher order cognitive processes including deliberative
thought. (Izard, 2011, p. 374)
Even though Izard emphasizes this sort of general discreteness, it is not entirely
clear how Izard thinks discrete emotions are individuated. He thinks of emotions as
comprised of neurophysiological, neuromuscular, and phenomenological aspects (Izard,
1971, p. 185). He also stresses the fact that neurophysiological aspects have been
shaped by evolution to produce discrete patterns of activation (Izard, 2007). On the
surface, it may seem as if emotions were individuated by their neural and physiological
patterns.
However, Izard claims that feelings, i.e. the phenomenological aspect, are the key
component of emotion. For Izard, each basic emotion has a distinct feeling component
which “(a) derives from evolution and neurobiological development, (b) is the key psy-
chological component of emotions and consciousness, and (c) is more often inherently
adaptive than maladaptive” (Izard, 2009, p. 3). Second, it is the feeling component
that primarily make emotions motivational, leading to different patterns of behavior.
Lastly, emotion feelings are specific to each basic emotion, and are shared with emotion
schemas based on a given basic emotion. For example, emotion schemas for sadness
(e.g. sadness for the loss of a relative and sadness for failing an exam) all share the
same feeling corresponding to the basic emotion of sadness. In this sense, it seems
that it is feelings, rather than neural or physiological processes, which individuate
emotions.
This tension is resolved—at least in part—once we go deeper into Izard’s view of
conscious feelings. Izard subscribes to a dual-aspect, monistic account of conscious
feelings according to which feelings are a phase of neurobiological activity.8 In other
words, conscious feelings for Izard are aspects of neural activity, not different entities
that result from the latter. This, of course, invites classical problems regarding monism
in philosophy of mind which I will not explore here. Regardless of these problems, these
observations make it clearer how Izard might be thinking about emotion individuation:
both neurobiological and phenomenological aspects of emotion are candidate criteria
for individuation insofar as both are aspects of the same state.
In any case, like his predecessors, Izard claims that emotion feelings, being an
aspect of neural activity, are innate and evolutionarily determined. These also consti-
tute the primary motivational component of emotions and are shared across different
instances of basic emotions and emotion schemas. Hence, I take it that in Izard’s
theory, it is feelings that determine whether an episode is an episode of one given
emotion or another, and since these feelings are constituted by neural states, we can
also individuate emotions at the neural level.
8 Izard takes this definition from Langer (1967). Langer argues that feelings are phases of neuro-
biological activity in the sense that they are “modes of appearance” of such activity (see Langer,
1967, p. 21). This position thus amounts generally to a dual-aspect monistic view of conscious
feeling.
20
1.2. Updating the Theoretical Challenge
Panksepp’s Affective Neuroscience Perpsective
One last important view among the different variations of BET is Jaak Panksepp’s
affective neuroscience. Even though Panksepp’s work did not stem from Tomkins’s as
Ekman’s and Izard’s did (Panksepp, 2008), it is still considered among the classical
variations of basic emotion views. As we will see below, many of the themes present
in these other views are echoed in Pankepp’s own account, allowing its membership to
this class of theories.
Panksepp’s view is premised on the idea that in order to characterize emotions,
we must look for homologies in other animals at the neural level (Panksepp, 1998, p.
9). He claims that even though behaviorism banned emotions as scientific constructs,
animal research did not, and therefore made progress to find the brain mechanisms
responsible for emotional behavior. By importing these findings into human psychol-
ogy, we can better understand our own emotional lives. This involves integrating the
study of behavior, which can be applied to non-human animals, with a neurobiolog-
ical pespective that tells us about the mechanisms subserving emotional behavioral
tendencies.
According to Panksepp, in order the reach a taxonomy of emotions, we must include
(1) major categories of human affective experience across individuals and cultures
(i.e., folk-psychological categories), (2) a concurrent study of the natural categories of
animal emotive behaviors, and (3) a thorough analysis of the brain circuits from which
such tendencies arise. Let us examine each of these ideas in turn.
First, Panksepp defends the use of folk-psychological terms in scientific theory. In
his view, folk-psychological terms are not gratitious, since they characterize patterns of
behavior that can be then studied at a lower level. Put differently, folk-psychological
terms serve a heuristic function in emotion research, providing a first glance at a
possible taxonomy of affective systems.
Nevertheless, Panksepp is careful to note that some degree of mismatch is to be
expected between our folk taxonomies and their underlying biological systems. He
recognizes that there is good reason to suspect that folk-psychological terms alone
cannot offer a scientific taxonomy. This is partly because it is difficult to define folk-
psychological terms in a clear-cut fashion, hence precluding scientists from using these
terms fruiftully in generalizations. What is required, argues Panksepp, is a neutral,
common ground to define these terms, one that overcomes these difficulties.9
In Panksepp’s account, it is the neural level that provides such a neutral ground.
By defining folk-psychological terms in neural terms, we obtain experimental, neutral
criteria on which to ground scientific generalization. Otherwise, he argues, all scientific
definitions of emotions would be circular. In his words:
We cannot say that animals attack because they are angry and then turn
around and say that we know animals are angry because they exhibit at-
9 The account of reconstitution and explication I offer in chapter 5 resembles this position. How-
ever, contra Panksepp, I do not endorse the view that we can individuate emotions at the neural
level.
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tack. We cannot say that humans flee from danger because they are afraid
and then say we know that humans are afraid if they exhibit flight. Such
circular word juggling does not allow us to make new and powerful pre-
dictions about behavior. However, thanks to the neuroscience revolution,
we can begin to specify the potential brain mechanisms that are essential
substrates for such basic emotions. When we do that, we begin to exit
from the endless rounds of circular explanations. (Panksepp, 1998, p. 13).
Panksepp’s agenda then starts with the use of folk-psychological terms and at-
tempts to ground in them in neural systems. How do we go about this? I have already
mentioned the general spirit of Panksepp’s view: we must study how these terms apply
to non-human animal psychology. When we observe non-human animals, we make use
of folk-psychological terms to describe some of their behavioral tendencies. We say
that cats get angry, that dogs are sad, that rats are afraid, and so on. By noting these
uses of language, we can then identify which systems underlie these emotional reac-
tions in other species. The guiding hypothesis is that the mechanisms subserving these
functions will correspond to brain circuits that may be homologous to structures in
human brains. If this is so, then we can ask which systems are the most evolutionarily
ancient and hence more “basic.” Panksepp explains this as follows:
Once we can specify distinct brain systems that generate emotional behav-
iors, we can also generate biologically defensible taxonomies of emotions.
[...] The main criterion here for an emotional system will be whether a
coherent emotional response pattern can be activated by localized electri-
cal or chemical stimulation along specific brain circuits, and whether such
arousal has affective consequences as measured by consistent approach or
avoidance responses. (Panksepp, 1998, p. 14)
With this agenda in mind, Panksepp proposes a scientific definition of emotion.
For Panksepp, emotions are “the psychoneural processes that are especially influential
in the dynamic flow of intense behavioral interchanges between animals, as well as
with certain objects during circumstances that are especially important for survival”
(Panksepp, 1998, p. 48). This definition repeats the themes present in other versions of
BET: emotions are evolved responses that aid in survival. Furthermore, this definition
stresses the importance of brain processes in individuating emotions.
In a more detailed construal of this view, there are a number of criteria to define
emotion in neural terms. These criteria are:
1. The underlying circuits are genetically predetermined and designed to respond
unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life-challenging circumstances.
2. These circuits organize diverse behaviors by activating or inhibiting motor sub-
routines and concurrent autonomic-homornal changes that have proved adaptive
in the face of such life-challenging circumstances during the evolutionary history
of the species.
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3. Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory systems that are relevant for
the behavioral sequences that have been aroused.
4. Neural activity of emotive systems outlasts the precipitating circumstances.
5. Emotive circuits can come under the conditional control of emotional neutral
environmental stimuli.
6. Emotive circuits have reciprocal interactions with the brain mechanisms that
elaborate higher decision-making processes and consciousness. (Panksepp, 1998,
pp. 48-49).
The list of systems satisfying these criteria constitute what Panksepp calls the
“blue ribbon” emotion systems. These are the systems involved in SEEKING, RAGE,
FEAR, PANIC. In a later list, Panksepp added LUST, CARE, and PLAY (Panksepp,
2007, p. 286).10
One last important idea in Panksepp’s account is that emotions form discrete
categories that correspond to natural kinds. On one hand, each of these systems
constitutes a specific type of emotional response with clear-cut distinctions. Again,
this echoes the commitments present in other versions of BET. On the other hand,
Panksepp makes explicit his commitment, not only to a discreteness claim, but to
the stronger claim that these discrete categories correspond to natural kinds. As he
states, given that emotions are individuated by primary processes in the brain, there is
a sense in which emotions are bound by something like an essence. More precisely, he
thinks of affective natural kinds as akin to species in the sense that projections made
across both are made in virtue of their evolutionary history (see Panksepp, 2008). In
chapter 4, I will argue that this approach conflates two ways of individuating kinds,
namely, via essences and via causal histories. For the moment, it is important to note
that Panksepp’s view is strongly committed to the idea that emotions do form natural
kinds, and thus that emotions can be explained in terms of basic emotion systems.
Problems with BET
At a theoretical level, basic emotion theory is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, it is difficult to define criteria for basicality. Different versions of this view
use heterogeneous criteria, leading to confusion determining which emotions count as
basic. Second, even if this problem were addressed, basic emotion theories still have
problems explaining higher order, cognitively complex emotions. Given its focus on
evolutionarily ancient, automatic mechanisms underlying emotional responses, basic
emotion theories leave out emotions that require more sophisticated mechanisms.
Regarding the first concern, the most influential construal of the problem is offered
by Ortony and Turner (1990). In their paper, Ortony and Turner point out that there
are at least three notions of basicality at play in traditional construals of the view. As
10 In the next chapter (see §2.2.1) I will discuss some further implications of this view regarding
the problem of whether emotions can be individuated at the neural level.
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a result, it is questionable whether the concept of basic emotion is even a useful one.
Scarantino and Griffiths (2011) summarize these notions of basicality as follows:
Conceptual basicality An emotion category is conceptually basic (basicC) just in
case it occupies the basic level in a conceptual taxonomy.
Biological basicality An emotion is biologically basic (basicB) just in case it has an
evolutionary origin and distinctive biological markers.
Psychological basicality An emotion is psychologically basic (basicP ) just in case
it does not contain another emotion as a component part. (Adapted from
Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011, p. 446)
Basic emotions in the conceptually basic sense, as presented above, are those cap-
tured by basic-level concepts. This requires an account of concepts that allows for
a hierarchy between basic-level and non-basic-level concepts, an account that is not
without problems. Even if this account were offered, the problem is that it is unclear
whether basic-level concepts refer to basic-level phenomena. For instance, even if con-
ceptually the concept of fear were unanalyzable, the phenomenon it refers to might
still depend on lower level mechanisms.
Consider an analogy with color concepts such as red. It might be true that
concepts such as red are unanalyzable in more basic terms. Yet, the phenomenon
of color perception, as a psychological and neurobiological phenomenon, depends on
mechanisms that are analyzable (e.g. reflection and refraction of light, stimulation of
cells in the retina, etc.). For a scientific research program that intends to determine the
underlying systems responsible for these responses, the fact that a concept belongs to
the basic-level is of limited interest. It might inform theories of psychological concepts,
but they might be of little use when studying the underlying phenomena themselves.
In response to these issues, one might adopt a criterion of biological basicality
instead. This is the criterion that seems most salient in the theories presented above,
with its most explicit formulation stemming from Darwin’s views. As Ortony and
Turner argue, there are two problems with this criterion. First, as I will explain
in detail in the next chapter, evidence for neural or physiological basic mechanisms
corresponding to the so-called basic emotions is at least controversial. As far as we
know, emotions do not map one-to-one onto mechanisms in the brain or the body,
casting doubt on the usefulness of the biological basicality criterion.
Second, Ortony and Turner argue, it is unclear what type of evidence would count
to find the biologically basic emotions.11 Mainly referring to Ekman’s account, Ortony
and Turner claim that most evidence for biologically basic emotions comes from stud-
ies on the universality of facial expressions. Yet, even if we find a set of universal
expressions, mapping these expressions onto biologically basic emotions is problem-
atic. Expressions are influenced by cultural factors, to the point that it is difficult
to see a “pure” expression of a biologically basic emotion. Ekman tackles this objec-
tion by invoking “display rules,” socially determined norms whereby subjects supress
11 In the next chapter, I discuss empirical evidence in depth.
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these natural expressions and display their emotions in other ways. According to this
argument, whenever we see an expression that does not neatly map onto biologically
basic mechanism, we can infer that the pure expression has been suppressed. This
move, however, introduces ad-hoc explanations akin to the introduction of epicycles in
Ptolemaic astronomy: in the presence of counterexamples (expressions that cannot be
easily mapped one-to-one onto biological mechanisms), we introduce a ceteris paribus
clause into the theory, arguing that these are not normal cases.
Lastly, we find the psychological basicality criterion. Ortony and Turner distinguish
two types of psychological basicality, both presented in the formulation above. One is
the idea that an emotion is psychologically basic in case we can reduce the eliciting
factors of each emotion to a single type. This amounts to explaining, for instance, fear
in terms of responses to a threat. This leads, on one hand, to count as basic emotions
phenomena that might not be emotions at all. Ortony and Turner mention the case of
courage. Courage, arguably best described as an attitude than as an emotion, can be
described in terms of specific eliciting conditions such as the presence of an undesirable
object that is difficult to avoid. Furthermore, it is plausible that all emotions, even
canonically non-basic ones such as shame or embarrassment, can be described in the
same way, e.g. as responses to the failure of oneself to meet a moral or a social norm,
respectively. This risks making the distinction between basic and non-basic emotions
meaningless.
This leads us to a final problem with defining clear criteria of basicality. Any inter-
esting criterion of basicality must distinguish between basic and non-basic emotions,
otherwise making the category useless. Ekman (1992), however, argues that in his
account, all emotions are basic. He argues that he uses the adjective “basic” to stress
the evolutionary role emotions play in solving fundamental life tasks. Yet, if this is
true, then the adjective itself says nothing. A category is only useful insofar as it
distinguishes the cases that fall under it from those that do not, but if all emotions
are basic, then basicality is trivial.
In spite of Ortony and Turner’s objections, Scarantino and Griffiths (2011) de-
fend these notions of basicality. In their view, there is evidence for conceptually
basic emotion, citing Fehr and Russell’s (1984) and Shaver et al.’s ’(1987) studies.
These studies show that some emotion categories such as “happiness” or “pride” ex-
hibit greater prototipicality, shorter names, faster recognition, and other markers of
conceptual basicality.
Yet, they recognize that we must distinguish between studying emotion concepts
and emotions themselves, in line with Ortony and Turner. Following Scarantino (2012),
they distinguish two projects in emotion research. The first, which Scarantino calls
the Folk Emotion Project, studies emotion concepts as present in our folk-psychological
vocabulary. It is in this project where conceptual basicality matters. Nevertheless,
the Folk Emotion Project is taken to be a descriptive project with no import on a
scientifically tractable account of emotion kinds. This second task is relegated to the
second project, the Scientific Emotion Project. As Scarantino and Griffiths argue,
there may be some mismatch between the categories that the Folk Emotion Project
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detects as conceptually basic and the phenomena that the Scientific Emotion Project
identifies as biologically and psychologically basic. As a result, they claim that there
is an interesting sense of conceptual basicality, but one that we must keep separate
from the other types.
Regarding biological and psychological basicality, Scarantino and Griffiths claim
that insofar as these are interesting constructs for the Scientific Emotion Project, they
can be saved. In their view, objections against these notions of basicality make the
mistake of assuming that whatever emotion kinds turn out to be basic in the biological
and psychological sense, they must map one-to-one onto folk terms. By distinguishing
the aforementioned projects, Scarantino and Griffiths reject this assumption. If we dis-
tinguish these two projects, we can keep talking about biologically and psychologically
basic emotions even in presence of evidence that they do not map onto folk emotion
terms. From this move, they conclude that “from being a mere article of faith, belief
in basic emotions still constitutes an empirically promising basis for the conduct of
emotion research” (Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011, pp. 452-453).
I am sympathetic to Scarantino and Griffiths’s arguments. Yet, as we will see
in chapter 5, there are important refinements to be made to Scarantino’s distinction
between the Folk Emotion Project and the Scientific Emotion Project if we are to
find any use for it. To hint at what I will discuss below, I believe that distinguishing
these two projects leads to a risk of changing the subject. Assuming that there can
be a mismatch between the categories we find in the Folk Emotion Project and the
Scientific Emotion Project, we can raise the question: when it comes to the kinds
involved in the second project, are we still talking about the same phenomena we call
“emotions”? Without criteria to connect folk categories with scientific ones, we run
the danger of proposing taxonomies that, while scientifically useful, do not refer to
the same set of phenomena, i.e., changing the subject of scientific emotion research.
But let us assume for the time being that Scarantino and Griffiths have offered good
reasons to believe that a notion of basicality can be offered with this distinction in
mind and move on to the second problem regarding basic emotion theory.
Assuming we obtain an account of basicality that is scientifically tractable, it is
still difficult for basic emotion theory to explain higher order emotions. The reason for
this is that basic emotion theory takes emotions to be automatic, low level processes
in the brain and the body. This is especially true for version of BET that characterize
emotions in terms of affect programs, such as Ekman’s and Panksepp’s.
On one construal, affect programs are understood as “pancultural syndromes en-
abled by inherited biological capabilities” (DeLancey, 2002, p. 3). A syndrome in
this sense is a collection of coordinated responses. These syndromes exhibit what
Fodor (1983) takes to be characteristic of modular systems. As Griffiths (1997, p. 93)
presents them, these features are:
1. The systems’ operation is mandatory in that it is involuntary.
2. The system is opaque to our central cognitive processes, that is, we are not aware
of the processes that take place inside the system, only to its outputs.
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3. The system is informationally encapsulated, i.e., it only has access to information
inside the system.
If affect programs are modular systems, then it is hard to see how basic emotion
theory could explain cognitively complex emotions. As Griffiths puts it:
The affect program system creates brief, highly stereotyped emotional re-
actions. It has only limited involvement with the cognitive processes which
control longer-term action. The stimulus appraisal which initiates an affect
program reaction is to a large extent informationally encapsulated. The
subsequent complex set of actions unfolds automatically, and it is diffi-
cult to interfere with these actions voluntarily. There are a large number
of emotions which do not conform to this model. In many instances of
guilt, envy, or jealousy the subject does not display a stereotypical pattern
of physiological effects. In addition, these emotions seem more integrated
with cognitive activity leading to planned, long-term actions than the affect
program responses. (Griffiths, 1997, p. 100)
Stieg (2007) offers a similar argument. In his view, given the modular structure
of affect programs, BET has problems explaining emotions that are deeply connected
with social norms. In his view, this is the case of some emotions in non-human animals
such as aggression bouts in chimpanzees. These reactions are entrenched in a social
context that involves social hierarchies between members of a group. If affect programs
are modular, it is unclear how these programs could access information about the
social context and other cognitively complex representations that may be required to
understand the emotional response. Hence, even in the case of other organisms, BET
is not without problems.
There may be some avenues to respond to this objection. On one hand, one
may reply, as Ekman arguably would, that these cognitively complex cases are not
normal cases of emotions, but rather of emotions coupled with other processes. For
instance, one may claim that jealousy is the instantiation of an anger affect program
along with thoughts involving a particular situation and social context. However, as
I argued above, this introduces ceteris paribus clauses into the theory that constitute
ad hoc moves. We can generalize this argument to cover other kinds of replies, such
as invoking Izard’s emotion schemas. In both cases, higher cognitive emotions are not
“pure emotions,” but some blend or coupling of thep presumed “pure” emotion with
other processes.
As a result of these objections, it is clear that basic emotion theory, although an
interesting candidate, runs into obstacles when explaining all of the phenomena we call
emotions. Either it makes it unclear which emotions count as basic and non-basic, or it
excludes from the category instances that we have good reason to include. This is not
to say that there are no possible ways to mend the theory though. At the very least,
this is to say that as the theory currently stands, it requires important refinements to
overcome the theoretical challenge. Let us then consider other views, and see what
other problems arise.
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1.2.2 Appraisal Theory
Appraisal theories claim that emotions are processes rather than states, contrasting
with basic emotion theories. More specifically, they claim that emotions are processes
of coordinated changes in different subsystems in an organism in response to the eval-
uation of a stimulus as relevant to the organism’s concerns (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer,
& Frijda, 2013; Scherer, 2005). In other words, these theories see emotions as processes
that involve, first, an organism’s appraisal of a stimulus as related to its concerns (e.g.
survival), and second, the activation of other subsystems that help the organism react
according to the appraisal.
Moors and Scherer (2013) hold that a theory of emotions is an appraisal theory in
case the theory holds that:
1. Appraisal is a typical cause of emotion or of emotion components; and
2. Appraisal is the core determinant of the content of feelings. (adapted from Moors
& Scherer, 2013, p. 135)
On this construal, appraisal theories are those that take appraisal to be at the
center of emotion processes. As I will explain below, this can obtain in two ways:
(1) appraisal individuates emotions, or (2) appraisal triggers processes involved in
emotions. In any of these cases, it is the process of appraisal which determines, at
least partially, the ensuing emotion.
So far, appraisal theory has been defined without a proper definition of the ap-
praisal process. On Moors and Scherer’s (2013) view, we can define appraisals by
their function. So defined, an appraisal is a process which “takes a stimulus (as its
input) and produces (as its output) values for one or more appraisal factors (e.g., goal
relevance, goal congruence, coping potential, expectancy)” (Moors & Scherer, 2013, p.
137). Depending on which values the function outputs, a set of reactions are triggered
in the brain and body to produce the emotion.12
Besides their emphasis on appraisal, appraisal theories hold that emotions are
built up from a number of components. In spite of the multiple variations among
these theories, most agree on the subsystems involved in emotion processes. These
subsystems are:
Appraisal component Evaluations of the environment and its relation to the or-
ganism.
Motivational component Action tendencies and action readiness.
Somatic component Physiological responses.
Motor component Expressive and instrumental behavior.
12 On this construal of appraisals, appraisal theories are ontologically neutral regarding the mecha-
nisms underlying appraisals. Moors and Scherer recognize this as an advantage of the view (see
2013, p. 137). While I also take this to be advantageous, I will offer reasons to resist Moors’s
and Scherer’s accounts of emotions below.
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Feeling component Subjective feeling.
Among the variants of appraisal theory, Moors (2014; 2017) distinguishes two types.
The first are theories that hold discrete emotion categories to be the explananda of
emotion research. She calls these Flavor 1 or Discrete Appraisal Theories. The second
are those that hold these explananda to be, not discrete categories, but the different
subcomponents themselves. These are Flavor 2 or Dimensional Appraisal Theories.
Discrete Appraisal Theories (Flavor 1)
As their label implies, discrete appraisal theories subscribe to the claim that emotions
are distinguished by clear boundaries rather than along a set of dimensions. According
to these theories, the patterns constituted by the interaction of the different subsystems
involved form discrete patterns corresponding to each emotion. In turn, each pattern
is individuated and triggered by its corresponding appraisal. Two such views are
Lazarus’s (1991) and Roseman’s (2011; 2013).
In a nutshell, Lazarus’s view can be summarized in six principles:
System principle The emotion process involves an organized configuration of many
variables: antecedent, mediating process, and outcome of response. No single
variable is sufficient to explain the emotional outcome, and all variables are
interdependent.
Process principle Emotions are psychological consequences of adaptational strug-
gles (processes), and they demonstrate great variation across time and diverse
encounters, because rapid changes in relational meanings are apt to occur at
different moments in an encounter and in different encounters, each of which has
its own distinctive demands, constraints, and resources (or opportunities).
Structure principle There are stable person-environment relationships that result
in recurrent emotional patterns in the same individual.
Developmental principle The biological and social variables that influence the emo-
tions develop and change from birth. The emotion process is not the same at all
stages of life.
Specificity principle The emotion process is distinctive for each individual emotion.
Relational meaning principle Each emotion is defined by a unique and specifica-
ble relational meaning. This meaning is expressed in a core relational theme
for each individual emotion, which summarizes the personal harms and bene-
fits residing in each person-environment relationship. The emotional meaning
of these person-environ-ment relationships is constructed by the process of ap-
praisal. (cited and adapted from Lazarus, 1991, pp. 39, 425)
Put together, these principles amount to the claim that emotions are processes
that involve a number of variables, none of which is sufficient for an emotion to ob-
tain, that involve adaptational process that, although variant across different instances
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and throughout development, form recurrent patterns that are specific to each emo-
tion, patterns which are described by person-environment relationships (core relational
themes) constructed by appraisal.
Unsurprisingly, the role of appraisal is key to this theory. As Lazarus construes
it, the appraisal process creates evaluative patterns that individuate each emotion.
During appraisal, the organism evaluates specific features of the objects in its en-
vironment along a set of variables. There are, according to Lazarus, three primary
appraisals (goal relevance, goal congruency, and type of ego-involvement) and three
secondary appraisals (blame or credit, coping potential, and future expectations). De-
pending on the outcome of these appraisal processes, a set of coordinated responses
is triggered. These responses include action tendencies, subjective experiences, and
physiological reactions.
One important aspect of Lazarus’s view is that even though physiological responses
(including those in the brain) are triggered and involved in appraisal processes, they
do not map clearly onto folk emotion terms. Lazarus discusses the case of sadness,
which can have either a deactivating effect or an activating one (Lazarus, 1991, p. 57).
What individuates one emotion from another, in this view, is its relational meaning,
the core relational theme it expresses. This contrasts with the views presented above,
which expect at least some degree of individuation to occur at the physiological level.
Drawing on the work of Lazarus and others, Roseman also proposed a similar dis-
crete appraisal view. Roseman takes emotions to be syndromes in Averill’s (1980)
sense, i.e. “[sets] of responses that covary in a systematic fashion” (Averill, 1980, p.
307, emphasis in original). In this sense, Roseman’s view is similar to those presented
above under BET. However, this account differs in that it does not include only neu-
rophysiological responses. Instead, the responses Roseman includes are the same as I
mentioned above for other appraisal theories (albeit with slightly different names)13:
Emotivational (Appraisal) component Evaluations of the environment and its
relation to the organism.
Behavioral (Motivational) component Action tendencies and action readiness.
Physiological (Somatic) component Physiological responses.
Expressive (Motor) component Expressive and instrumental behavior.
Phenomenological (Feeling) component Subjective feeling.
According to Roseman, the coordination between these types of responses (i.e. the
presence of a syndrome) constitutes a strategy to cope with a situation. These strate-
gies are shaped by evolution, aiding in the survival and reproduction of an organism.
For instance, fear is the coordination of an appraisal of danger along with physiolog-
ical, behavioral, expressive, and phenomenological responses that lead the organism
to flee or freeze. Moreover, this need not occur consciously or voluntarily, akin to an
affect program.
13 I include the original name in parentheses.
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Table 1.1
Roseman’s emotion families.
Emotion
family
Strategy Emotions
Contacting
emotions
Increase proximity to and/or interaction
with impersonal, interpersonal, or intrap-
ersonal stimuli.
Positive emotions.
Distancing
emotions
Increase distance from stimuli, thus reduc-
ing contact and/or interaction with them.
Distress, sadness, fear, in-
terpersonal dislike, and
regret.
Rejection
emotions
Move something away from the self. Disgust, contempt, and
shame.
Attack
emotions
Move against objects and events in general,
against other persons, or against the self.
Frustration, anger, and
guilt.
Note: Adapted from Roseman (2011, p. 437).
The different strategies that constitute emotional responses, in Roseman’s account,
form four contrasting emotion families.14 These families are presented in Table 1.1.
Each one of these families includes variation upon the general theme which specify the
particular emotion in question.
In Roseman’s view, there are categorical differences between each one of these
emotions. At a first glance, there are discrete distinctions at the level of strategies.
Each strategy constitutes a distinct functional pattern that describes the correspond-
ing emotion. There is also discreteness in terms of appraisals or the emotivational
component. An object may be appraised as motive-consistent or motive-inconsistent,
but there is no continuum between these two values. Similarly, objects may be ap-
praised as involving either low or high control potential, self-caused or other-caused,
and so on (see Roseman, 2011, p. 143). For Roseman, and in contrast to Lazarus,
we can even find discreteness in the physiological, expressive, and behavioral levels as
well.
Dimensional Appraisal Theories (Flavor 2)
Dimensional appraisal theories, just as discrete appraisal theories, accept a view of
emotions in which emotions emerge from a set of coordinated responses that involve the
appraisal of a situation. However, in contrast to discrete appraisal views, dimensional
appraisal theories claim that emotions are not separated discretely from one another,
but rather constitute a continuum along the set of variables involved. For example,
14 Notice the similarity, again, with BET, particular with Ekman’s version. See section 1.2.1 above.
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the difference between fear and anger, for dimensional appraisal views, lies in that fear
is more of an avoidance emotion but anger is more of an approach emotion. Yet, there
are emotions that lie in the spectrum between these two types of action tendencies,
precluding a clear cut distinction between the two emotions mentioned.
As Moors (2017) phrases it, the crucial difference between dimensional appraisal
theories and their discrete counterpart stems from a difference in what each view takes
to be the explananda of emotion research. For discrete appraisal theories, emotion
research ought to explain how whole patterns of responses emerge from appraisal
processes, as captured by folk emotion terms. Dimensional appraisal theories, in turn,
shift the explananda to a lower level. For these theories, emotion research must explain
how specific responses emerge from appraisal, regardless of whether they map onto folk
emotion terms. In Moors’s words:
[...] instead of trying to explain anger or fear, [dimensional appraisal the-
ories] try to explain the tendencies to dominate, attack, freeze, or avoid,
without linking them to anger and fear, and ultimately even, without wor-
rying about whether the components under study are emotional or not.
(Moors, 2014, p. 303)
This shift in explananda has important consequences for appraisal theories. Con-
trary to discrete appraisal theories, which try to map folk emotion terms onto sets
of responses and appraisals, dimensional appraisal theories claim that appraisal influ-
ences each component independently and that components may influence each other
to produce all kinds of reactions. This dynamic, interactive structure between com-
ponents leads dimensional views to reject the idea that folk emotion categories map
onto particular patterns of systemic activation, leading then to skepticism about the
scientific status of such categories. In her words:
Dimensional appraisal theory assumes that there are an infinite number of
appraisal patterns that give rise to an infinite number of action tendencies,
somatic responses, and experiences, which combine into an infinite number
of subsets of emotional episodes. Some of these subsets may fit the profile
of vernacular subsets, but most of them do not. (Moors, 2017, p. 7)
Given this skepticism about folk emotion categories, dimensional appraisal theo-
rists claim that we should classify emotions as points in a dimensional space where
each dimension corresponds to a component value. For example, an episode of fear
may be an constituted by an appraisal that an object is dangerous, a fleeing reac-
tion, increased heart rate, and so on, whereas another may involve a similar appraisal
accompanied by a freezing reaction.
An example of this type of theory is Scherer’s Component Process Model (CPM)
(Scherer, 2009a, 2009b). In Scherer’s CPM, an event is appraised along a multi-level
set of criteria including novelty, pleasantness, discrepancy of expectation, and the like.
This multi-level appraisal causes changes in the motivational, motor, and somatic
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components. These are then integrated in a central area and, when above a certain
activation threshold, reach consciousness in terms of a feeling with its own qualia.
According to Scherer’s CPM, since appraisal is multi-leveled and emotions divide
into several components, there may be infinite different combinations of appraisal
values and activation patterns. As a result, “emotion differentiation is the result of
the net effect of all subsystem changes brought about by the outcome profile of the
[stimuli evaluation checks]” (Scherer, 2009a, p. 1314). Additionally, these subsystem
changes influence one another in a number of ways, producing recursive structures and
feedback effects that affect the net outcome that determines the emotion.
Two aspects of this model are worth highlighting. One is that, according to it,
there are as many emotions as there are possible net effects of subsystem changes.
These net changes, in turn, depend not only on the appraisal itself but also on the
activation patterns of other components and their interaction. As such, emotions
are best described in a high-dimensional space where each dimension corresponds to
each component’s value. Naturally, appraisal plays a causal role in triggering different
components, but it does not completely determine the resulting emotion.
A second important aspect of Scherer’s CPM is that, according to the author, it
does not constitute a ‘natural kind’ model of emotion. given its rejection of Discrete-
ness and its expectation that emotions form fuzzy sets determined by the net action of
different subsystems, the CPM does not commit itself to the idea that emotions form
specific, consistent, or unique kinds of phenomena. Rather, emotion is taken to be
an emergent phenomenon. In this regard, Scherer’s CPM distances itself from basic
emotion theories and discrete appraisal theories.
Problems with appraisal theories
Appraisal theories offer a promising, interesting view. In contrast to other theories,
appraisal theories highlight the different aspects involved in emotions while providing
a framework that makes visible what is common to emotional responses. Furthermore,
given the compatibility of appraisal theories with functionalist views, problems regard-
ing heterogeneity in the underlying mechanisms of emotions are not as pressing as for
other views like BET.
Although I am fairly optimistic about appraisal theories, there are some obstacles it
must hurdle if it is to overcome the theoretical challenge. First, it is unclear whether we
can map appraisals onto emotional reactions one-to-one. Frijda and Zeelenberg (2001),
for instance, claim that not all fear is caused by the anticipation of danger, but can be
elicited by novelty or unexpectedness. More recently, Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits,
De Boeck, and Ceulemans (2007) have shown that anger can be triggered by a variety
of appraisals, including appraisals of accountability and unfairness which may or may
not be present in a given instance. This affects especially discrete accounts which hold
that emotions are individuated in terms of appraisals.
One possible response is to claim that the link between appraisals and emotions
is a conceptual rather than an empirical one. According to this line of argument, fear
is just that reaction that occurs in the anticipation of danger; other reactions such as
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those elicited by novelty or unexpectedness might be related, but do not technically
do not constitute instances of fear. What is contingent on this view is the relation
between appraisals and reactions such as physiological or phenomenological responses.
It is here where emotions are home as objects of scientific study.
This way of replying to the objection above shows a second problem appraisal
theories face. If the relation between emotions and appraisals is conceptual, then
many of the presumed empirical results confirming the theory are trivial. Smedslund
(1992), commenting on Frijda’s (1988; 2007) account of emotions, puts forward this
sort of argument. In his view, Frijda’s account, which cashes out emotions in terms
of the awareness of relationships of importance to an individual’s concerns, makes
pseudoempirical claims. The main reason is that the link between the relationships
of importance and emotions is conceptual, hence noncontingent and not suitable for
empirical verification. Taking the example above, fear is defined as the awareness of
something as dangerous to us, for instance. This makes any finding of this relation
trivial.
Smedslund’s argument can be generalized to appraisal theory, or at least discrete
appraisal theories. By relying on appraisal for individuation, the theory risks collapsing
into triviality. I do not think this is a finishing blow against the view, however. In later
chapters (see chapter 6), I will argue that we can formulate a theory of emotions where
relations between the organism and its environment can be empirically interesting
while playing a central role in the individuation of emotions. For now, it suffices to
point out that in order to meet the theoretical challenge and offer a scientifically sound
framework for emotions, appraisal theories must clarify the relations between appraisal
and emotions so as to avoid triviality.
Besides these worries, which are more pressing for discrete appraisal theories, there
are other concerns that affect dimensional appraisal views. One is that for dimensional
appraisal theories, there are potentially infinite types of emotions, as many as there
are possible combinations of appraisal and subcomponent values. This makes any
classification of emotions arbitrary, since what distinguishes one emotion from an-
other is nothing regarding the projectibility of an emotion category. In other words,
what makes each emotion—understood folk-psychologically—that emotion is nothing
beyond an arbitrary border drawn between points in a continuous space of infinite
emotions. Such arbitrariness is not only problematic in itself, but leads to deeper
issues.
One issue with the arbitrariness of emotion taxonomies for dimensional appraisal
views is that, methodologically, emotion categories have proven fruitful in the scientific
study of emotions. Elsewhere I have argued for this claim, along with Eickers and Prinz
(Eickers, Loaiza, & Prinz, 2017). Discrete categories have been used in a number of
successful studies and, as I will argue in detail in the last chapter, they can be accounted
for functionally. If this is so, the skepticism that characterizes dimensional appraisal
theories is unwarranted.
But even leaving this issue aside, dimensional appraisal theory’s skepticism has
a deeper consequence for our current discussion. If emotion categories are rendered
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arbitrary by said skepticism, then there is a sense in which dimensional appraisal
theories are not theories of emotion at all. This is because, given the arbitrariness of
emotion categories, there is no interesting sense in which relations between appraisals
and reactions explain what we call “emotions.” As with Scarantino’s Scientific Emotion
Project above, dimensional appraisal theory risks changing the subject by drifting too
far away from what emotion resarch ought to explain. Hence, the theory is unable
to overcome the Theoretical Challenge, since it does not offer a framework to study
emotions proper. Put differently, if differences between emotion categories are left
unexplained, the theory does not meet the Theoretical Challenge. It does not explain
the phenomena under the vernacular term “emotion,” as it renders taxonomies of
emotions arbitrary.
1.2.3 Psychological Constructionism
Psychological constructionism about emotions is the claim that emotions are not
atomic entities, but rather are composed of other building blocks, as it were. More
specifically, constructionists claim that emotions are not ready-made phenomena inde-
pendent of ourselves, waiting to be felt by subjects and perceived by others. Instead,
they submit that emotions are actively built by us every time we feel them and act on
them.
Constructionists reject many of the claims basic emotion theories subscribe to.
These theorists think that emotions have no neural or bodily fingerprints to which
they correspond one-to-one. Moreover, they claim that there is no interesting sense
in which emotion categories could map onto bodily or neural states, given that one
such state can instantiate a variety of emotions depending on external variables such
as context and history. Instead, constructionists think that this variability is not only
established but normal. As a result, constructionists reject any form of discretness,
universality, and innateness of emotion mechanisms. Russell (2009) summarizes this
disagreement in the following claims:
• There are cultural differences in all known aspects of emotion.
• Different languages lack a one-to-one correspondence between emotion terms.
• Theories based on traditional assumptions have not led to increased precision of
terms. Each term lacks inclusion and exclusion rules.
• Basic emotions rarely occur alone, and yet no accepted theory of how they co-
occur or blend has been developed.
• Failure to find convincing evidence that emotions produce “facial expressions of
emotion”.
• Failure to find convincing evidence of a unique pattern for each emotion in the
autonomic nervous system.
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• Failure to find separate factors corresponding to basic emotions in studies of
self-reported emotional experience.
• Failure to find a class of behaviour common to instances of a given emotion.
• Dissociation rather than predicted associations among manifest components.
(Russell, 2009, p. 1261)
Besides rejecting basic emotion theories, constructionists also reject some claims
coming from appraisal theories. In contrast to the latter, constructionists think that
emotions require the active participation of an agent in order to obtain. For appraisal
theorists, an emotion obtains if there is coordinated activity from the corresponding
subsystems, but this is not dependent on the agent’s psychological history or social
context. Constructionism, on the other hand, does claim that our own learning expe-
rience, categories and social contexts determine which emotion is instantiated.15
Psychological constructionism may be divided into two broad categories. One on
hand, there is the view that the construction of an emotion requires an act of cat-
egorization which requires the possession of emotion concepts. This is Conceptual
Psychological Constructionism. On the other hand, there is the opposite view that
such act of categorization can occur without concepts as long as the necessary ingre-
dients obtain. This is Non-conceptual psychological constructionism.16 I will present
non-conceptual psychological constructionism first, since conceptual psychological con-
structionism builds on the former.
Russell’s non-conceptual psychological constructionism
The main proponent of non-conceptual psychological constructionism is Russell (2003,
2009, 2015). Along with other psychological constructionists, Russell defends a skep-
tical view about the utility of folk emotion categories such as ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ and the
like. In his view, folk emotion terms have no scientific value, as they have lead to
the assumptions that each term should map onto a specific mechanism in the brain
and the body, and that these mechanisms should be distinct from each other as these
terms are.
Given this rejection of folk emotion category, how can we understand emotions?
Russell proposes to think of emotion as composed by serveral components and expe-
riences that get categorized in a particular way. These components include somatic
changes, expressive behavior, and other components that other theories highlight.
However, and more importantly, there are four components that are central to Rus-
sell’s account.
First, Russell claims that at every moment of our waking time, we are constantly
in a state of pleasure or displeasure, i.e. valence, and of activation or deactivation, i.e.
arousal. The combination of these two states into a single two-dimensional construct
15 Additionally, given that constructionists deny discreteness, they also differ this respect from
discrete appraisal theories.
16 I borrow the labels from Scarantino (2015).
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is what Russell calls core affect. Technically speaking, core affect is “that neurophysio-
logical state consciously accessible as the simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident
in moods and emotions” (Russell, 2003, p. 148) . It is important to note that core
affect is general to all affective experience, including moods but also attitudes and
other phenomena we might include in this category. For this reason, and as we will
see below, there is no mechanism or system that distinguishes emotions from other
affects.
Core affect, Russell states, is universal and simple (Russell, 2003, p. 148). It is a
continuous monitoring of one’s own state and can exist without us categorizing it or
interpreting it as part of some affect. It is not dependent on cognitive processing, hence
not being dependent of any concepts we may possess. Lastly, it can be manipulated
by chemical means such as stimulants or antidepressants.
Second, Russell points out that some objects appear to us as possessing certain
qualities related to our affects. We find objects pleasant or unpleasant, upsetting or
calming, and so on. What makes these objects pleasant or unpleasant, upsetting or
calming, etc., is their capacity to change our core affective state. A pleasant object
puts us in a pleasant state; a calming object in a low arousal state. These qualities,
Russell holds, are part of our representation of these objects, and as such they are
perceived as external to us. These he labels affective qualities.
Third, when we perceive an object as having some affective quality and as a con-
sequence perceive changes in our core affective state, we may link these two events
and interpret them as causally related. Such a combination of affective qualities and
core affect is called attributed affect. When we experience an attributed affect, we
experience an object as changing our core affect and as worthy of our attention and
subsequent behavior. This explains emotional utterances such as “I am afraid of a
snake” as cases where we perceive a snake as changing our core affect into a high
arousal, low valence state.17
Lastly, when we perceive an attributed affect, we may categorize that affect as
an instance of an emotion category. Hence, we may experience the affective process
as one of ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ ‘happiness,’ etc. At this point we have what Russell calls
an emotional meta-experience. These emotional meta-experiences require concepts,
but they are only a component of an emotional episode. Furthermore, our emotional
meta-experiences may categorize an affective episode in the wrong way or not obtain
at all. To use Russell’s own examples, we may feel jealous and deny feeling jealous.
Also, according to Russell, children may have affective experiences without emotional
meta-experience, given that they do not have the concepts to categorize their own
states (Russell, 2003, p. 164).
Given these components, Russell summarizes a “prototypical emotional episode”
as follows. First, there is some event; for instance, we see an insect. This event or its
object, in this case the insect, is perceived to have some affective quality, say we find it
disgusting or scary. This automatically shifts our core affective state from low arousal
17 Notice that at this point, Russell is close to formulating a theory of the intentionality of emotions.
He does not offer such theory though.
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to high arousal, and neutral valence to negative valence. As these changes happen,
we attribute the changes to the object, the insect, an enter in an attributed affect. At
this point, we may immediately jump away or scream. This involves changes in our
physiology and expression, which in turn create other subjective experiences as we feel
these reactions happening in our body. Lastly, if we have a concept of disgust or fear,
we may categorize this experience and engage in an emotional meta-experience.
Russell’s constructionism attempts to integrate ideas from dimensional theories
(e.g., dimensional appraisal theories) and categorical analyses (e.g., basic emotion
theories). In his view, core affect by itself cannot explain differences between emotion
categories, a problem I explained above when discussing dimensional appraisal theories.
As he states it:
[...] by themselves, pleasure and arousal do not fully account for most
emotional episodes. Specifically, I acknowledge that my own dimensional
model of emotion (Russell, 1980) does not provide a sufficiently rich ac-
count of prototypical emotional episodes. For example, that model fails to
explain adequately how fear, jealousy, anger, and shame are different and
how observers can distinguish them. The dimensional perspective must be
integrated with the categorical perspective [...]. (Russell, 2003, p. 150).
How, then, are emotion categories distinguished from each other? In other words,
what individuates emotions? According to Russell, emotions are individuated in virtue
of mental scripts that define an emotion category. Let us unpack this claim. First, for
Russell, emotion categories have a prototype structure (Russell, 1991). This means
that what counts as a member of the category does so because it resembles a pro-
totypical instance. For instance, an episode of sadness counts as such if it is similar
enough to a prototypical episode of sadness. Thus, the question concerning emotion
individuation becomes a question about identifying prototypes.
According to Russell, these prototypes constitute mental scripts, sequences of
subevents that typical instances of an emotion follow. For example, Russell (1991)
presents the following analysis of the script of anger:
1. The person is offended. The offense is intentional and harmful.
2. The person is innocent. An injustice has been done.
3. The person glares and scowls at the offender.
4. The person feels internal tension and agitation, as if heat and pressure were
rapidly mounting inside. He feels his heart pounding and his muscles tightening.
5. The person desires retribution.
6. The person loses control and strikes out, harming the offender. (adapted from
Russell, 1991, p. 39)
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On this analysis, instances of anger qualify as such because they resemble this
prototypical pattern, even if exceptions or deviations are at play. For instance, cases
of anger where the offended person does not strike out, or where there is no real
injustice but only perceived injustice, also count as instances of anger in virtue of
their resemblance to this prototypical script.
For Russell, this analysis integrates dimensional and categorical claims about emo-
tions. It concedes to dimensional analyses the idea that emotions are constructed of
domain-general responses such as core affect. However, it also makes room for an
explanation of how emotional categories come about, namely, but the grouping of
patterns of affective responses in terms of resemblance to prototypes. Below I will
argue that even though this approach is promising, non-conceptual psychological con-
structionism still has problems explaining emotion taxonomies in a non-arbitrary way.
Before I discuss this, let us present the other variant of psychological constructionism,
namely, conceptual psychological constructionism.
Conceptual psychological constructionism (Barrett)
Barrett (2017; 2018a) is the main proponent of conceptual psychological construc-
tionism. Similar to Russell, Barrett claims that emotions are constructed from more
basic psychological building blocks that are not themselves emotional. In contrast to
Russell, however, Barrett holds that concepts are necessary to construct emotions.
In early writings, Barrett expressed skepticism regarding the scientific status of
folk psychological categories. In an influential review (Barrett, 2006) and subsequent
writings (Barrett, 2012, 2018a; Barrett et al., 2007), Barrett argued that most of the
tradition in emotion research has presupposed what she calls the “natural kind view”
of emotion. According to the natural kind view, emotions are discrete categories that
correspond to folk categories such as ‘fear,’ ‘anger,’ and so on, and that map onto
specific, unique, and consistent regions or circuits in the brain, as well as distinct
physiological states. In her review, she presents evidence against this view, showing
that empirical research has found variation for each of these categories. Importantly,
she invites us to take variation seriously, claiming that this observed variation is not a
mere methodological artifact awaiting for correct methods of investigation, but rather
the norm. In other words, she considers variation to be established and evidence for a
different account of emotions.18
Her positive view is based on the idea that emotions are constructed by acts of
categorization by means of concepts. Hence, she has referred to her view as the
“Conceptual Act Theory” (Barrett, 2014) in the past. Later she coined the name
“Theory of constructed emotion.”19 According to Barrett, an emotion is constructed
in the sense that our brains create categories based on our experiences that aid in
predicting behavior. Before a child acquires emotion concepts, the child is exposed
18 The claim that variation is established is what I call the Variability Thesis, which I discuss in
detail in the next chapter (see chapter 2).
19 Elsewhere, Barrett has explained that the change in name was due to editorial reasons rather
than substantial changes to the view. See Barrett (2018b)
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to different responses from its brain and body, as well as to the behavior of others
around it, which it learns to categorize given certain similarities. These similarities
then form a concept which the child learns to map to a label in a given language such
as ‘sadness,’ ‘Traurigkeit,’ ‘tristeza,’ and so on.
For Barrett, concepts are a necessary part of the construction process. Without
concepts, all we would have is access to a pattern of sensory signals and behavior. She
proposes an analogy with experiential blindness. In experiential blindness, an agent
sees a stimulus which they cannot categorize. Once the agent acquires a concept of
what the stimulus is, the agent now sees the stimulus as a token of that concept. A
similar situation applies to emotions in Barrett’s view. Emotions may involve bodily
signals and contextual cues. But, contrary to other theories, Barrett thinks that these
only constitute elements of emotion once we have acquired the concepts required to
categorize them. Before acquisition, we are experientially blind to our own emotions,
just as we were experientially blind to the bee. This process of construction is what
creates emotions every time we have an emotional episode. This aspect of Barrett’s
theory contrasts with Russell’s view, in which components are part of the ensuing
emotion regardless of categorization.
In the case of the bee, we have black spots as the basis on which our brain constructs
an image that we later perceive as an image of a bee. What is the basis on which our
emotions are constructed? An important ingredient in this view is core affect, just as
in Russell’s account. For Barrett too, we are constantly in some state of core affect
which can be described in terms of valence and arousal. Yet, Barrett adds more to
the recipe. On one hand, Barrett thinks of affective feelings as predictions. In this
picture, affective feelings are the ways in which our brains detect our core affective
states and formulate predictions based on that information. These predictions may
involve hypotheses about dangerous things in the environment that later construct an
instance of fear, or about winning an unexpected prize which leads to the construction
of happiness.
Other ingredients may also fall under the predictions our brain does to construct
emotions. For example, seeing someone cry may inform our brain that the other is in
distress, and hence construct an instance of sadness. Other information can include
reading a story about someone in a difficult situation with no way out, or watching a
movie we consider sad. As we receive that information, our brains predict instances
of sadness and, if we have the adequate concept, constructs an emotion episode.
Barrett’s view rejects discreteness from the outset. In this account, emotions are
not discretely organized but rather continuous all throughout. In Barrett’s terms,
“instances of emotions are momentary snapshots of continuous brain activity, and we
merely perceive these snapshots as discrete events” (2018a, pp. 36-37; emphasis added).
However, in contrast to Russell, Barrett cannot be said to be committed to a dimen-
sionality claim either. The reason is that for Barrett, even though core affective states
may be described dimensionally, emotions are much broader than core affect. Hence,
strictly speaking, emotions do not lie in a continuous space of core affective states.
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What is clear though is that Barrett’s view strongly rejects claims for consistency
and specificity of the underlying mechanisms of emotions. A mechanism (response or
set of responses) is said to be consistent for an emotion category if it is present in all
instances of that emotion. For example, hypotheses mapping fear to activity in the
amygdala would hold that amygdala activity is consistent for fear. A mechanism is
also said to be specific to that emotion if it is only linked to that emotion and not
others. For Barrett, evidence shows that emotions are heterogeneous at the neural,
physiological, behavioral, expressive, and phenomenological levels. Because of this,
claims for consistency and specificity are taken to be falsified.
Barrett’s account, however, goes beyond merely claiming that consistency and
specificity are false claims. In Barrett’s view, it is not only that they are false, but
that theoretically we should not expect either of these claims to be true. Instead, a
theory of emotions should be compatible with variability and explain how emotions
could arise even in the absence of consistent and specific mechanisms. This is the reason
why she summarizes one of the main tenets of her view under the motto “variation is
the norm” (Barrett, 2018a, p. 23).
Problems with psychological constructionism
When it comes to meeting the theoretical challenge, psychological constructionism
fares no better than other views considered above. For defenders of constructionism,
this might appear not to be a problem at all, since they hold that the Theoretical
Challenge, so construed, is not a challenge worth considering. On this interpreation,
psychological constructionism is not committed to a stong distinction between emo-
tions and other affective phenomena. Instead, they argue that emotions and other
affects are produced by the same domain-general mechanisms underlying valence and
arousal. As a result, the challenge of proposing a theory that would explain emotions
and only emotions is not a challenge they would undertake to overcome.
This interpretation applies particularly to earlier versions of psychological con-
structionism. For example, on Russell’s account, there may be affective responses
without the construction of an emotion in cases where what he calls an emotional
meta-experience does not obtain. Moreover, when an emotional meta-experience ob-
tains, it is only because the subject interprets their core affective state in a particular
manner, but not because of any specific mechanism underlying their responses. Hence,
distinguishing emotions and other affects does not constitute an important matter
worth elucidating. As he explains in his own words:
As a scientific term, emotion is separated from not-emotion (or fear from
not-fear, etc.) in a precise way only by stipulation. I therefore suggest that
we begin to move away from these everyday words as technical terms. If
we do so, we would not need to define emotion prescriptively; that is, we
would not need to stipulate a scientific definition that states the boundaries
of the set of events to be explained, because emotion is given no scientific
work to do. For example, my concept of core affect is not defined in
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terms of emotion. On the other hand, emotional episode does contain
the word emotional. Emotional episodes must be explained, because all
human episodes must be explained, and not because emotional episodes are
qualitatively different from nonemotional episodes, whatever those might
be. In other words, the goal of psychological construction is an account
that includes, but is not exclusive to, all events labeled as emotional. So,
in my account of emotional episodes, emotion functions something like a
chapter heading and does not function as a technical term. (Russell, 2015,
p. 205)
Nevertheless, more recent versions of constructionism, especially Barrett’s TCE,
do seem to attempt to offer a theory of emotions that would explain all emotions
under the same framework. It is unclear though whether this constitutes an attempt
to overcome the Theoretical Challenge. Barrett’s view still holds that emotions are
constructed when we interpret activity in domain-general systems as belonging to an
emotion category. This may be interpreted as a way of explaining what is particular
about emotions, namely, that they are interpretations using a specific set of concepts
we may call “emotional concepts.”
If we interpret Barrett’s TCE, and perhaps other forms of constructionism, as
attempting to overcome the Theoretical Challenge, we find at least three problems.
First, the notion of core affect that lies at the heart of constructionism is questionable
from a naturalistic perspective. As I explained above, core affect is defined as a
neurobiological state of arousal and valence. We could concede that arousal might come
to be naturalized in terms of physiological responses such as heart rate, electrodermal
responses, and the like. However, naturalizing valence is not a straightforward task.
It is unclear what would count as a valenced states merely in neurobiological terms.
At best, we could propose an analysis of valence in terms of harm/benefit relations
between an organism and objects in its environment as concerning its survival, but
this hardly suffices to explain differences between emotional states. For instance, what
makes pride a positive emotion is not merely that objects of pride are beneficial to the
survival of the organism. Similarly, it is difficult to see how shame could come to be
a negative emotion in terms of harmful objects in the environment. Without a clear
account of core affect, the theory cannot propose a naturalistic, scientific theory.20
Second, as with dimensional appraisal theory, constructionism makes emotion cate-
gories relatively arbitrary. On these views, there is no reason why we should distinguish
fear from anger, anger from happiness, and so on, besides conceptual truths that do not
respond to any epistemic aims. In other words, according to constructionism, emo-
tion categories do not serve any scientifically interesting classificatory purpose such
as separating different kinds of responses. Instead, emotion categories are constructs
determined by our social frameworks. This arbitrariness precludes these categories
from being used in generalizations and inductive inferences, thus banning them from
scientific theories.
20 Elsewhere I have argued for this claim. See Eickers et al. (2017).
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Lastly, psychological constructionism submits that emotions are wildly heteroge-
neous phenomena, opposing what Barrett has called the natural kind view of emotions.
Yet, in my view, constructionists appeal to variability without an adequate understand-
ing of this claim. This precludes them from establishing it empirically, since there are
no clear confirmation criteria for this thesis. Additionally, in spite of there being some
evidence in their favor, constructionists overstate empirical findings to fit their view
and assume them as true from the outset. As I will discuss in detail in the next
chapter, it is not the case that evidence unequivocally supports constructionism. As a
result, without a clear account of what variability means, constructionists cannot get
their theory off the ground, nor can they assume at the theoretical level that emotions
are as heterogeneous as they take them to be. In other words, variability must be a
claim to be established empirically, but constructionists lack an account of variability
that would allow them to do so.
1.3 Prospects to overcome the Theoretical Challenge
Let us go back to the Theoretical Challenge as presented at the beginning of this
chapter. The Theoretical Challenge calls for a systematic theoretical framework that
can explain all and only the phenomena under the vernacular term “emotion” in an
empirically interesting and conceptually sound way. As I have shown in this chapter,
none of our best theories in psychology and neuroscience overcomes this challenge.
Each of these theories or families of theories have problems that, at least as they stand
in the current literature, require addressing before they can meet the challenge.
To generalize from the arguments I have presented against each theory, we can
see two main problems current scientific theories of emotions face. First, many of the
theories presented above rely on constructs that are dubious at best. These include the
notion of basicality in the case of basic emotion theories, the construct of appraisal as
a means of emotion individuation in appraisal theories, and the construct of core affect
in psychological constructionism. These categories are not well-defined, which makes
the theories they support conceptually problematic. Without addressing these issues,
these theories cannot provide a sound theoretical basis on which to draw empirical
hypotheses. As a result, none of these theories meets the challenge above.
A second problem which is present in some of the theories above is that they render
distinctions between emotions arbitrary. As we will see in chapter 5, this is a major
issue with dimensional theories in general, which include dimensional appraisal theories
and psychological constructionist theories. The main reason why this is problematic
is that it risks changing the subject, as the phenomena under the vernacular concept
“emotion” do involve distinctions that a scientific theory of emotions should be prepared
to explain. By rendering these distinctions arbitrary, these theories cannot explain
what distinguishes emotions from other affective or even mental phenomena, neither
can they address the question of how emotions differ from each other besides our
conceptual framework. Given these problems, dimensional theories cannot overcome
the Theoretical Challenge.
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Seeing the discussion in this chapter as an update of Griffiths’s arguments, one
could think this suggests that emotions should be eliminated from scientific discourse,
as Griffiths does. Recall that Griffiths argued that if none of our best theories can
account for emotions under the same theoretical framework, there is a sense in which
emotions do not exist as they do not form a natural kind. Consequently, claims
Griffiths, we ought to eliminate emotion concepts from scientific theories.
While I do not share Griffiths’s conclusion, as will be clear at the end of Part I
(see chapter 3), I believe these problems should be taken seriously. The fact that none
of the current theories in psychology and neuroscience meet the Theoretical Challenge
means that we require a new theory of emotions at the very least. If such a theory is
impossible in principle, then there is good reason to opt for an eliminativist view.
Before I discuss the prospects for eliminativism in detail, let us go over the other
side of the problem, what I call the Empirical Challenge. In the next chapter, I will
examine the prospects of finding empirical evidence that would support a theory of
emotions that construes them as homogeneous, projectible categories. I will argue
that evidence suggests an important degree of variability for each emotion category
and across the general category of emotion altogether. Yet, for this claim to support
eliminativist conclusions, a more precise account is necessary.
After I analyze the Variability Thesis, as I will call it, I will revisit eliminativist
arguments and argue that they are unwarranted. This will serve as the basis for
the Part II, where I defend a revisionist position according to which a new theory
of emotions is required. I will offer some criteria which, in my view, a scientifically
interesting theory of emotion must satisfy, and I will attempt to answer the question
of how a satisfactory theory of emotions might look like.
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The Empirical Challenge
The Problem of Variability
In this chapter, I will discuss the Empirical Challenge in terms of what has been
called in the literature the Problem of Variability (Scarantino, 2015). The Problem
of Variability stems for the thesis that emotions are naturally disjoined phenomena
(under some criteria of unity which I will discuss below). Call this the Variability
Thesis (VT). If this thesis is correct, it would presumably follow that emotions do
not form natural kinds, hence precluding the formulation of a proper unified scientific
theory.21
Past failures to reject VT constitute a source of skepticism among a number of
emotion researchers. It is the backbone of Barrett’s (2006) attack on the claim that
emotions are natural kinds. Hence, a tractable scientific theory of emotions, in the
sense demanded by the Theoretical Challenge, would in principle require rejecting VT.
In other words, if a unified theory of emotions in terms of a common set of explanatory
resources is available, it must be able to show how emotions form a unified category
at an empirical level. This is what I call the Empirical Challenge.
In order to offer a detailed account of the Empirical Challenge, we must first analyze
the Variability Thesis. By doing so, we can be clear on what is exactly what is at stake
in the claim that a theory of emotions must enable us to reject VT. This would provide
an idea of what precisely is the demand involved in the Empirical Challenge and its
consequences for scientific research on emotions.
This chapter thus offers an analysis of VT which allows a clarification of the Em-
pirical Challenge. In the first section, I will present VT and how it has been presented
in the debate. Then I will examine some conceptual problems involved in these previ-
ous formulations of the thesis, and propose an analysis that ameliorates some of these
issues. I then identify as one of its core problems the issue of the individuation of
patterns of responses, which requires a discussion in terms of each domain relevant
to the investigation of emotions. Hence, I proceed to discuss each empirical approach
to individuate patterns in each of the relevant domains, and close with a proposal
21 Parts of this chapter were published in Loaiza (2020).
45
Chapter 2. The Empirical Challenge: The Problem of Variability
as to which patterns empirical research should focus on and suggest some ways of
individuating said patterns.
2.1 The Variability Thesis
The Variability Thesis (VT) can be presented under the following working definition:
Variability Thesis (VT) Emotions are naturally disjoined phenomena.
In the current literature, VT is taken to stem from previous efforts to find ho-
mogeneous processes corresponding to emotion categories. As Scarantino (2015) and
others (Barrett, 2006; Prinz, 2004) formulate it, it is a thesis that affects primarily
basic emotion theories, given that these theories (in at least some of its incarnations)
expect hardwired circuits and discrete physiological patterns that map onto emotion
categories, hence expecting homogeneous patterns for each individual emotion. How-
ever, this claim is not exclusive of basic emotion theories. Barrett (2006) argues that it
also affects discrete appraisal theories, since these theories also expect certain degree
of specificity and correspondence. In any case, VT is a problematic thesis for any
theory that expects specificity and correspondence.
Scarantino presents VT as constituted by two theses:
No one-to-one correspondence (NOC) thesis: There is no one-to-one corre-
spondence between anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and so forth, and any
neurobiological, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological
responses.
Low coordination (LC) thesis: There is low coordination between neuro-
biological, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological re-
sponses among instances of anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and so forth.
(Scarantino, 2015, p. 343)
On this presentation, NOC claims that emotions do not map one-to-one onto pro-
cesses in the brain or the body, as well as expressions, behavior, or phenomenology.
There are two ways in which this can occur. These are displayed in Figure 2.1. The
first is a case (case (a)) where two emotion categories correspond to the same set of
neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological responses. The sec-
ond (case (b)) is one where one emotion category is associated with two different sets
of responses.
The LC thesis, in turn, holds that emotions do not constitute homogeneous pro-
cesses in the sense that whatever neural, physiological, or behavioral underpinnings
they may have, these are not coordinated in such a way as to allow their categorization
under a single emotion category. In other words, the LC thesis states that there are
no packages of responses at these levels that we can map onto emotion categories. In
an earlier presentation of this claim, Scarantino and Griffiths (2011) explain:
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Figure 2.1. Variations of NOC
(a) displays a case where two emotions correspond to the same set of neural (N),
physiological (P), expressive (E), behavioral (B), and phenomenological (S) responses.
(b) displays a case where one emotion corresponds to two different sets of responses.
Evidence for LC consists of examples of anger, happiness, sadness, surprise,
etcetera, that are instantiated in the absence of a coordinated package of
physiological, neurobiological, expressive, behavioral, cognitive, and expe-
riential responses. (Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011, p. 448).
This formulation is problematically ambiguous, as I will argue in detail below. In
my view, the conditions under which a coordinated package of responses is absent are
unclear. This makes it difficult to assess in which cases does LC holds, and what kind
of empirical evidence would falsify it.
In the next section, I will discuss this problem as well as other conceptual issues
with NOC and LC. In my view, these issues are not mere conceptual nuisances, but
are paramount to evaluating whether VT is true. In turn, whether VT is true or not is
vital to assess the status of emotion research and the prospects for a scientific theory
of emotions. Thus, VT deserves special attention. Consequently, I will examine these
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issues in detail and raise some questions that could help resolve them. This will help
prepare the ground for what will come later in the chapter, where I will discuss in
detail what I take to be the main problem with VT.
Before I move on to discussing these issues with VT, let us apply these theses to
propose a working definition of the Empirical Challenge. As I explained before, the
Empirical Challenge claims that a theory of emotions must be prepared to enable the
rejection of VT. Given that VT is presented in terms of NOC and LC, we can expand
our definition as follows:
Empirical Challenge Provide a scientifically meaningful theoretical framework that
establishes correspondences between emotion categories and well-coordinated
patterns of neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, and phenomenological
responses.
This formulation respects the empirical load VT is supposed to carry. VT is an
empirical claim, thus requiring empirical means to reject it. If a proposed theory of
emotions is successful in leading scientists to find patterns that correspond to emotion
categories, we can say that the theory shows how emotions form unified phenomena
and hence provides a framework to study emotions scientifically. Nevertheless, VT
also requires conceptual work. It calls for an account of which types of responses are
required to confirm or reject the claim.
With this working definition in hand, let us then move on to conceptual problems
associated with VT. At the end of the chapter, I will revisit this working definition
and apply the refinements I will propose to VT to offer a new Empirical Challenge.
This will provide a standpoint from which to examine the prospects of overcoming or,
as I will argue in Part II, dissolving this challenge.
2.1.1 Clarifying VT
VT, NOC, and LC
Let us start with some general problems regarding VT. As I presented it above, VT
is constituted by two theses, NOC and LC. From the outset, this formulation already
raises an important question: what is the logical relation between VT, NOC, and LC?
To answer this question, one option is to look at Scarantino’s formulations (Scarantino,
2015; Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011). However, these formulations are not helpful, since
they limit themselves to claim that critics of basic emotion theories have proposed
these two theses and that they are empirically supported. As a result, we must look
elsewhere.
Regarding VT and NOC and LC, there are two initial possibilities: either VT is a
conjunction or a disjunction of NOC and LC. Interpreting VT as a conjunction forces
us to accept VT only in case there is no correspondence and no coordination. Yet, it
seems that if there is no correspondence (NOC), this suffices to establish the claim that
emotions are disjoined phenomena, even if there was coordination between different
sets of responses. In other words, in case emotions map onto different coordinated
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packages (NOC and not-LC), this still suffices to establish VT. This suggests that
the correct interpretation is the disjunctive interpretation, rather than the conjunctive
one.
However, in order to establish the disjunctive interpretation, we must also show
that LC by itself is enough to imply VT. One way of approaching this issue is thinking
of a case were LC is true and NOC is false. It is difficult to see such a case though.
To put it clearly, this would require a case where there are no coordinated packages
of responses associated with emotion categories (LC), and yet there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the former and the latter (not-NOC). As it is clear from this
formulation, this is contradictory. Hence, it seems that LC implies NOC. If there are
no coordinated packages of responses, there is nothing to which emotion categories
can correspond, making NOC trivially true.
Could there also be an implication relation from NOC to LC? It is easy to see
why this is not the case. The fact that there is no correspondence between a given
emotion category and a specific set of responses does not entail that there are no such
coordinated sets. As in Figure 2.1b, there can be well defined coordinated packages
of responses and yet no correspondence between them and emotion categories. Hence,
NOC cannot imply LC.
So far LC implies NOC, and NOC does not imply LC. Yet, there is another poten-
tial relation between LC and NOC that deserves attention. Not only does the absence
of coordinated packages (LC) imply the absence of correspondences (NOC), but only if
there are such coordinated packages can correspondence be evaluated. In other words,
it is plausible to think that correspondence only makes sense if there are packages
to which emotions could potentially correspond. As a result, it would be necessary
for LC to be false in order for NOC to be potentially true or false. This suggests
that not-LC is a presupposition of NOC in Strawson’s (1950; 2011) sense.22 It must
be true that there are coordinated packages of responses (i.e., false that there are no
coordinated packages, not-LC) for correspondences to obtain (not-NOC) or not obtain
(NOC). Notice that this analysis in terms of presuppositions clashes with our previous
claim that LC implies NOC. This is because if NOC presupposes not-LC, NOC cannot
have a truth value in case LC is true. Hence, LC cannot imply NOC.
How can we resolve the tension between these interpretations? This depends on
how we interpret NOC. On a strong construal, NOC says that there are coordinated
packages of responses but there is no correspondence between them and emotion cate-
gories. This leads to the presupposition interpretation, since the first of these conjuncts
is not-LC. This has the additional consequence that NOC & LC is contradictory (since
NOC requires the existence of coordinated packages which LC denies), and as a result
leads to the reading VT as a disjunction: (NOC ∨ LC) ≡ VT.
On a weaker construal, NOC is neutral regarding the existence of coordinated
packages of responses. It merely states that there are no correspondences between
22 Strawson’s account of presupposition can be spelled out in the following terms, following van
Fraassen (1968): “A presupposes B if and only if A is neither true nor false unless B is true”
(van Fraassen, 1968, p. 137).
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emotions and coordinated packages, but remains agnostic as to whether this is because
there are no coordinated packages or whether there are such packages but they fail to
correspond to emotions. On this reading, NOC does not presuppose not-LC, but LC
does imply NOC, since the lack of coordinated packages is sufficient to establish lack
of correspondence. Furthermore, it is still true that VT is true either because there
are no coordinated packages (LC), which also implies that there is no correspondence,
or because there are coordinated packages which fail to correspond. Thus, (NOC ∨
LC) ≡ VT still holds on this reading.23
For the purposes of evaluating empirical evidence, we need not decide between
either of these interpretations. As I have shown above, either of these interpretations
leads to the disjunctive reading of VT. Furthermore, the only difference between these
interpretations lies in whether we take NOC not to have a truth-value (strong reading)
or to be true (weak reading) in case there are no coordinated packages of responses, a
decision that does not have much bearing on empirical findings. Since either of these
cases would support VT, I will leave the decision between these interpretations aside
and proceed to examine NOC and LC independently.
NOC
Regarding NOC, let us note first that NOC admits a subdivision in terms in terms
of the type of responses that emotions could correspond to, i.e., neural, physiologi-
cal, expressive, behavioral, or phenomenological packages. Each of these NOC theses
would claim that a given emotion does not correspond one-to-one with a given type of
response (e.g. one emotion corresponding to two types of neural response). Thus, we
can divide NOC into:
NOCNeural There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories and
any pattern of neurobiological responses.
NOCPhysiological There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of physiological responses.
NOCBehavioral There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of behavioral responses.
NOCExpressive There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion categories
and any pattern of expressive responses.
NOCPhenomenological There is no one-to-one correspondence between emotion cate-
gories and any pattern of phenomenological responses.
By dividing NOC into these subtheses, we can have a better idea of what sources of
empirical evidence would be relevant to test VT. Presumably, if an emotion category
does not correspond to a single pattern of neural responses, for example, we have good
reason to accept NOC.
23 I thank Fabio Fang for helping me clarify this analysis.
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However, this immediately raises in important issue: is NOC, as a general claim,
a conjunction or a disjunction of the subtheses involved? Let (C) and (D) be these
interpretations, respectively:
(C) NOCNeural ∧ NOCPhysiological ∧ NOCBehavioral ∧ NOCExpressive ∧ NOCPhenomenological
(D) NOCNeural ∨ NOCPhysiological ∨ NOCBehavioral ∨ NOCExpressive ∨ NOCPhenomenological
Even though I believe NOC is neither a conjunction or a disjunction of these
claims, it is worth considering these options to understand what exactly is the correct
interpretation of the claim. Interpreting NOC as a conjunction (C) leads to an overly
simplified claim. As soon as we find correspondence in one domain, NOC will be false.
For example, if an emotion fails to correspond to neural, physiological, expressive,
and phenomenological sets of responses, but corresponds to one common behavioral
pattern, NOC is falsified. Consequently, we would have to reject VT, given that there is
at least one domain where correspondence holds. This is a consequence that defenders
of VT would find unacceptable, given that an important degree of variation would still
hold.
On the other hand, interpreting NOC as a disjunction of the different subtheses
leads to an overly demanding claim to reject. In this case, evidence for lack of corre-
spondence in one domain suffices to establish NOC and therefore to accept VT. Given
that the aforementioned characterization of NOC includes domains where variability
is expected (for example, in terms of action tendencies or expressions), rejecting NOC
becomes not only implausible, but trivial. Evidence for some degree of variability in
some domain abounds, rendering the question of variability almost insignificant.
In a more charitable interpretation, the various NOC subtheses have different
weights. In other words, depending on the theory, some domains matter more than
others. For instance, for traditional BET, lack of correspondence in the neural or phys-
iological domains (NOCNeural and NOCPhysiological) suffice to claim that an emotion
does not correspond to a coordinated package of (the relevant) responses, where as lack
of correspondence in the behavioral outcomes NOCBehavioral by itself would not suffice.
Discrete appraisal theorists, on the other hand, may accept lack of correspondence in
the first domains without accepting VT, but may have difficulties doing so with the
latter domain.
In order to escape these problems, researchers must decide which domains offer the
most relevant support for NOC. Such consensus, however, is lacking in the literature.
This makes it difficult to assess NOC and hence VT in order to decide between different
theories of emotions, since each of these theories have different decision criteria. In
the later sections, I will offer arguments to limit NOC to the neural, physiological, and
behavioral domains, and suggest some ways in which we can reach a neutral account
of variability that helps us decide between different theories. Before this, however, let
us turn to LC.
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LC
As I explained above, LC is formulated in terms of the absence of a coordinated package
of responses. What is it for there to be such an absence? On a perhaps overly literal
reading of this claim, this would be a case where an emotion obtains but no responses
are observed. But then, why would we accept that an emotion obtains? If there are
no neurological, physiological, behavioral, expressive, or phenomenological responses,
there is no emotion either. It seems clear that this is not the intended interpretation.
Yet, it is the reading that stems from a literal reading of Scarantino’s and Griffiths’s
formulation.
If we do not read this claim as stating that there is no set of responses at all, what
does it mean for a coordinated package of responses to be absent? In its most plausible
interpretation, LC is a claim about correlations. On this reading, a coordinated pack-
age of responses is absent in case the different associated are not robustly correlated
with one another. Barrett (2006), presenting some evidence for this claim, writes:
Although no single study of emotion has simultaneously measured facial
movements, vocal signals, changes in peripheral physiology, voluntary ac-
tion, and subjective experience, many studies have measured at least two
or three of these responses (usually some combination of subjective expe-
rience, behavior, and autonomic activity). These studies have reported a
range of associations, from modest correlations to no relationship to neg-
ative correlations among experiential, behavioral, and physiological mea-
sures of emotion. (Barrett, 2006, p. 33)
Following this interpretation, LC is a thesis about the correlation between different
measurements. LC would be thus established if for a given emotion category, we fail to
find that, for instance, skin conductance responses (physiological measure) for anger do
not correlate with anger expressions, or that neural activity for sadness fails to correlate
with retreat action tendencies characteristic of the emotion (behavioral measure).
Even though this is a step forward towards a scientifically tractable interpretation
of the claim, it needs further requirement. First, given its appeal to correlations, it
is unclear which correlations (or lack thereof) are necessary or sufficient to reject (or
accept) LC. There are two senses in which we can raise questions about correlations
between measurements. In one sense, we can ask about correlations between variables
in the same domain. Call this intra-domain coordination. In another sense, we can
ask about correlations between variables of different domains. Call this inter-domain
coordination.
Intra-domain coordination would obtain in case variables of the same domain are
robustly correlated with one another. However, even inside a single domain, there is a
myriad of possible variables to measure. Consider the physiological domain. Among
physiological measures used to study emotions, we find three families (cardiovascular,
respiratory, and electrodermal), each with a wide range of possible measurements.
Given the different possible variables researchers could employ in their studies, we can
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ask: do we require correlations between all of these variables in all of these domains
in order to reject LC? If not, which correlations suffice? And to which degree?
Additionally, many of these variables will be causally related to one another. For
example, increased heart rate will cause increased respiratory frequencies. This makes
certain correlations trivial, as two causally related variables will always be robustly
correlated. While these causal relations are interesting to individuate (in this case
physiological) patterns of responses, this forces a reformulation of the coordination
thesis. On one hand, there are coordinated packages of responses in a given domain
(i.e., there is intra-domain coordination) in case we have a set of causal relations that
are well distinguished from other sets (thus forming a package or a pattern), and, in
case there are no strict causal relations between two variables, we observe a robust
degree of correlation.
Concerning inter-domain coordination, similar problems arise. We can expect
causal relations between variables in different domains. For example, we may ex-
pect certain expressive patterns such as blushing to be correlated with physiological
variables related to cardiac processes, since blushing is increased capillary blood flow
in the skin in certain parts of the face. Hence, we must also specify in which cases
does inter-domain coordination obtains in terms of both sets of causal relations and,
in case two sets of variables in different domains are not causally related, a robust
degree of correlation.
There is an additional problem regarding inter-domain coordination that must be
addressed. Suppose that a given neural pattern, say amygdala activity, is robustly
correlated with different behavioral responses, e.g. fight, flight, or fleeing responses
(a candidate construal of fear reactions). Should we conclude that there is low inter-
domain coordination because one neural pattern is associated with three distinct be-
havioral responses? If so, then inter-domain coordination is almost impossible, since
there are domains in which variations are to be expected, such as the behavioral and
expressive domains (relative to the neural and physiological domains). As a result, LC
becomes almost trivial, since it is easy to find cases where inter-domain coordination
does not obtain on this criterion.
To solve these problems, we must be clear on two fronts. First, we must have clear
criteria of robustness. This is to say, we need to have clear conditions under which
we will say that coordination (intra-domain or inter-domain) fails to obtain. This
depends on how we interpret correlations, at the very least, which would require a
detailed discussion that I will not pursue here. For now, we can assume that such a
criterion can be given by a proper methodological analysis.
Assuming such a criterion, the second front we must be clear about regards the
individuation of patterns in a given domain. In other words, we must have an idea of
what counts as a neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, and phenomenological
pattern. This is because questions about whether or not there is inter-domain vari-
ability depend on whether we consider different variations parts of a common pattern
or not. In other words, this is a question about how coarse or fine-grained are we going
to cut our patterns. In the example above, whether or not fight, flight, or freezing re-
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actions are considered as instantiating a common behavioral pattern such as “avoiding
danger” will help decide whether one neural pattern is said to be associated with one
or three patterns of response.
This problem of pattern individuation does not only affect the case for inter-domain
coordination, but also plays and important role in inter-domain coordination and ques-
tions about correspondence. In order to decide whether or not a set of causal relations
and correlations counts as one pattern (intra-domain coordination) and to what kinds
of patterns should emotions correspond to evaluate NOC, we must have an account of
pattern individuation for each domain.
In what follows, I will explore the problem of pattern individuation by adopting
a naturalistic, empirically informed perspective. I will examine how scientists have
attempted to individuate patterns in each domain. In some cases, I will offer arguments
for a specific criterion of pattern individuation. In others, I will suggest ways of
offering such criteria, although a final decision would require extensive work and further
investigation.
In any case, this approach will also help us establish whether or not NOC and LC
are empirically well supported. The discussion above offers us a working definition of
these theses already. Regarding NOC, I shall leave it as formulated by Scarantino,
noting that correspondences will depend on the existence of coordinated patterns of
responses according to the criteria corresponding to each domain, and to relevance
criteria regarding which domains are relevant to distinguishing emotions from one
another. With regards to LC, however, a reformulation is in order. I propose the
following working definitions of these claims:
No one-to-one correspondence thesis (NOC) There is no one-to-one correspon-
dence between emotion categories and neural, physiological, behavioral, expres-
sive, or phenomenological patterns of responses.
Low coordination thesis (LC*) Variables in the neural, physiological, behavioral,
expressive, and phenomenological domains do not constitute well-defined pat-
terns of responses (i.e., display low correlations and do not constitute a well-
defined set of causal relations either among variables in a domain or between
variables in different domains).
2.2 Individuating response patterns
2.2.1 Neural patterns
Traditional accounts of emotion that emphasized the role of neural mechanisms in emo-
tions thought of emotions as relating to the activity in specific and consistent regions
in the brain. According to these views, there must be something in the brain that is
domain-specific to each emotion category. These are for example LeDoux’s studies on
fear conditioning (LeDoux, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2013, see also Phelps and LeDoux 2005),
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which attempted to map fear onto amygdala activity, or Panksepp’s (1998; 2011) at-
tempt to individuate subcortical structures underlying primary emotional processes.
Following Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, and Barrett (2012), let’s call these
locationist accounts:
[Locationist accounts] hypothesize that all mental states belonging to the
same emotion category (e.g., fear) are produced by activity that is con-
sistently and specifically associated with an architecturally defined brain
locale [. . . ] or anatomically defined networks of locales that are inherited
and shared with other mammalian species. (Lindquist et al., 2012, pp.
122-123)
From this formulation of locationism, we can distinguish two strands:
Anatomical locationism Mental states belonging to the same emotion category cor-
respond consistently and specifically to an architecturally defined brain region.
Homological locationism Mental states belonging to the same emotion category
correspond consistently and specifically to inherited networks in the brain shared
with other mammalian species.
Anatomical locationism
Anatomical locationism is arguably the most traditional form of locationism. It at-
tempts to map emotions onto distinct brain regions, individuated in virtue of their
architecture. This position is, for many, the most intuitive form of locationism. As a
result, the first meta-analyses on emotions in the brain attempt to test whether there
is good evidence for such a mapping.
One of the earlier, if not the first, meta-analysis in this regard was the one by Phan,
Wager, Taylor, and Liberzon (2002). This meta-analysis examined findings across
imaging studies in search of specific regions associated with emotional activation in
general, with specific emotions and different induction methods. In particular, they
examined how sensitive specific brain regions were to different emotional tasks and how
specific certain brain regions were for different emotional responses. The researchers
took PET and fMRI studies from January 1990 to December 2000, out of which 55
studies from May 1993 to December 2000 met the criteria.
First, they found that no specific brain region was consistently activated in the
majority of studies, across individual emotions and induction methods. This implies
that no single brain region is commonly activated by all emotional tasks. Specifically,
no particular region was activated in over 50% of the tasks. Nevertheless, the mPFC
was often activated, albeit not specific to a given emotion or induction method. The
authors take this to reflect that certain aspects may be shared across multiple indi-
vidual emotions. This is supported by the finding that the mPFC is involved in 4
out of 5 emotions tested (happiness, anger, sadness, and disgust, but not in fear) in
at least 40% of studies. Given this result, the researchers argue that this region may
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be involved in cognitive aspects of emotion processing, such as attention to emotion,
appraisal, or emotion identification.
Concerning particular emotions, they report some interesting results for fear, sad-
ness, happiness, and disgust. For fear, the researchers found a strong association with
amygdala activity (i.e., reported activity in around 60% of studies). In these studies,
the amygdala showed activation for the recognition of fearful facial expressions, feel-
ings of fear after procaine induction, fear conditioning, evocation of fearful emotional
responses from direct stimulation, detection of environment threat, and the coordi-
nation of appropriate responses to threat and danger. A similar pattern follows for
sadness, which was associated with activity in the subcallosal cingulate cortex (46%
of the studies). On the other hand, results were not so positive for happiness and
disgust, which were both linked to activation in the basal ganglia (70% of studies and
60% of the studies, respectively).
Despite some initial promising results, Phan et al.’s results also point towards some
lack of specificity. For example, the fact that both happiness and disgust show basal
ganglia activation suggests that these areas are not unique to either emotion, but rather
are involved in some general process. Similarly, the researchers discuss the association
between fear and the amygdala, hypothesizing that this region might play more general
role involving vigilance or processing salience. This is supported by the fact that the
researchers have found amygdala activation for all kinds of evocative stimuli, including
fear faces, aversive pictures, sad and happy faces, and positive pictures.
Hence, it would appear as if empirical evidence supported some degree of intra-
domain coordination in the neural case but only for a few emotions (given the afore-
mentioned mappings regarding fear, sadness, happiness and disgust). Consequently,
as far as this meta-analysis is concerned, correspondences also fail to obtain overall,
in spite of some correspondences being found.
At around the same time as Phan et al., Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, and Lawrence
(2003) also published a meta-analysis studying the neural specificity of emotion. In
particular, Murphy and colleagues investigated whether there are differences in three-
dimensional distributions of neural activity associated with (1) positively vs. nega-
tively valenced emotions, (2) approach vs. withdrawal emotions, and (3) affect pro-
gram emotions (fear, anger, disgust, happiness, and sadness), and whether there are
specific associations between certain affect program emotions (fear and disgust) and
specific neural regions (amygdala and insula/basal ganglia), among other hypotheses.
They included 106 PET or fMRI studies ranging from January 1994 to December 2001.
They found that distributions between negative and positive emotions did not dif-
fer significantly in any condition, and that there was a significant difference between
approach and withdrawal emotions (greater left- than right-sided activation for the
former). Concerning the distinctions between what they called affect program emo-
tions, they report that all emotions differed from each other significantly based on their
spatial distribution, except for happiness which only approached significance against
anger and did not differ significantly from sadness. As for their location, they report
that the most consistently activated regions for each emotion were the amygdala for
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fear, the insula/operculum and the globus pallidus for disgust, the lateral OFC for
anger, the rostral supracallosal cortex for happiness, and the rostral supracallosal but
also the anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsomedial PFC for sadness.
Building on these two previous meta-analyses, Vytal and Hamann (2010) made an-
other meta-analysis updating and sophisticating the methods of the previous ones. The
researchers conducted two types of analyses: consistency and discriminability analy-
ses. Consistency analysis determined the brain regions whose activity was mostly
consistently and strongly associated with each of the individual basic emotions. Dis-
criminability analysis contrasted activations associated with each basic emotions to
assess whether patterns of regional brain activation can discriminate between different
basic emotions. They investigated neuroimaging studies that included either explicit
emotional elicitation tasks (e.g. mood induction), emotionally arousing stimuli (e.g.
emotional pictures), or emotional facial expressions. They selected 83 PET or fMRI
studies from 1993 to 2008.
Consistency analysis revealed a number of clusters for each emotion. For happiness
they found 9 clusters, with the largest being located in the right superior temporal
gyrus; for sadness, 35 clusters, the largest in the left medial frontal gyrus; for anger,
13 clusters, the largest in the left inferior frontal gyrus; for fear, 11 clusters, largest in
the amygdala; and for disgust, 16 clusters, largest in the right insula and right inferior
frontal gyrus. As for their discriminability analysis, the researchers also observed a
number of clusters that distinguish each emotion from the others significantly. The
locations of these clusters are summarized in Table 2.1. Given that there are significant
clusters of activation in specific locations in the brain, the authors claim that this meta-
analysis provides evidence for the neural specificity of the aforementioned emotions.
Furthermore, Vytal and Hamann ran the same analyses using the same dataset as
Murphy et al. (2003), and found that not only were the previous findings replicable,
but they could also differentiate between happiness and sadness, a distinction that the
previous meta-analysis did not find. Consequently, Vytal and Hamann conclude that
given more sophisticated methods and analytic tools, we can find specific regions in the
brain whose activity corresponds to and helps distinguish between different emotions.
As for the mapping of emotions onto brain regions, they suggest the following mapping:
Happiness Rostral ACC and right STG
Sadness MFG and head of the caudate/subgenual ACC
Anger IFG and Parahippocampal gyrus
Fear Amygdala and insula
Disgust IFG/Anterior insula
Vytal and Hamman’s results suggested a more optimistic outlook for coordination
and correspondence from the perspective of anatomical locationism. Now there was a
set of emotions which were mapped to more or less distinct brain regions. Even though
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Happiness Sadness Anger Fear Disgust
Happiness – R. STG L. rACC R. STG L. rACC
Sadness R. MTG – L. MFG L. mFG R. IFG
Anger IFG R. parahip-
pocampal gyrus
– L. IFG L. IFG
Fear L. amyg-
dala
L. amygdala L. puta-
men
– L. amyg-
dala
Disgust R. putamen L. insula R. puta-
men
R. puta-
men
–
Table 2.1
Summary of results of the discriminability analysis by Vytal and Hamann (2010).
Only the location of the largest cluster found is reproduced here. The following ab-
breviations are also used: L = Left, R = Right, r = rostral, m = medial, STG =
superior temporal gyrus, ACC = anterior cingulate cortex, MTG = middle temporal
gyrus, MFG = middle frontal gyrus, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus.
some emotions were associated with two different regions, this could still be interpreted
as an invitation for further research to discover which region was responsible for the
given emotion.
In spite of this optimism, it was not long before other researchers presented results
in the opposite direction. Especially on the constructionist side of the debate, neural
specificity fell under attack. First, Barrett’s (2006) review criticized previous studies
and meta-analyses, arguing that they did not support the case for specificity. Later,
another meta-analysis was published, targeting these meta-analyses in detail. This
was Lindquist et al. (2012).
Lindquist et al.’s meta-analyses set out to examine evidence for and against loca-
tionist views, contrasting them with constructionism. They characterize the locationist
view as committed to the claim that “instances of an emotion category (e.g. fear) are
consistently and specifically associated with increased activity in a brain region (or
a set of regions within an anatomically inspired network)” (Lindquist et al., 2012, p.
126).24 By consistency, they mean “the fact that a brain region shows increased ac-
tivity for every instance of an emotion category” (ibid.); by specificity, “the fact that
a given brain region is active for instances of one (and only one) emotion category”
(ibid.). In contrast to locationism, constructionism is taken to reject both of these
hypotheses, instead claiming that “the same brain region(s) are more generally impor-
tant to realizing a basic psychological operation (e.g. core affect, conceptualization,
language, or executive attention)” (ibid.).
24 This definition includes both versions of locationism presented above. Nevertheless, I will only
consider evidence against anatomical locationism at the moment.
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In their meta-analysis, Lindquist and colleagues begin by estimating the neural
reference space assuming a discrete classification of emotions. This neural reference
space is comprised of brain regions that show a consistent increase in activation for
instances of anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness, or for the entire category of
emotion. Using this neural reference space, they examined each region’s consistency
with each emotion category (e.g. whether the amygdala is consistently associated with
all instances of fear). Additionally, they asked whether there was an absolute difference
in the proportion of contrasts activating near those voxels for each emotion category
versus the others. This provided grounds to test the specificity claim, that is, whether
the voxels that are activated for all instances of an emotion category (consistency)
are also active selectively for that category. The researchers present their results in a
region to region basis.
They start off with the amygdala, a region traditionally associated with fear, as
seen in the meta-analyses presented above. Lindquist et al. argue that rather than
being associated with fear, the amygdala is part of a network that helps realize core
affect.25 More precisely, they claim that the amygdala is involved in “signaling whether
exteroceptive sensory information is motivationally salient” (Lindquist et al., 2012, p.
130). The reason for this is that amygdala activity is also observed in other tasks such
as orienting responses to motivationally relevant stimuli, novel and unusual stimuli,
and that lesions to the amygdala do not only affect fear responses, but also responses
to other relevant stimuli in general. Additionally, their analyses reveal that amygdala
activity is also significantly associated with disgust.
Next, Lindquist and colleagues discuss the anterior insula, previously associated
with disgust. According to the constructionist hypothesis, the anterior insula is in-
volved in “representing core affective feelings in awareness [i.e.] awareness of bodily
sensations [...] and affective feelings” (Lindquist et al., 2012, p. 133). In this line
of argument, they claim that the anterior insula shows increased activation during
awareness of bodily movement, gastric distention, and orgasm. Electrical stimulation
to the anterior insula also produces other feelings besides disgust, such as feelings of
movement, twitching, warmth and tingling in the lips, tongue, teeth, arms, hands, and
fingers. The reseachers also add that the left anterior insula shows increased activation
in instances of anger.
Regarding the OFC, previously associated with anger, Lindquist et al. claim that
we should understand its role as the integration of exteroceptive and interoceptive
sensory information to guide behavior. Evidence for this claim comes from studies
showing that the lOFC and the mOFC have been linked to associative learning, de-
cision making, and reversal learning. Additionally, against the claim that the OFC
shows specificity for anger, the left OFC shows increased activation in instances of
disgust.
25 Recall that core affect is the “neurophysiological state consciously accessible as the simplest raw
(nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions” (Russell, 2003, p. 148). See also §1.2.3,
p. 37.
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Lastly, the authors consider the ACC, which was thought to be associated with
sadness. In contrast, Lindquist et al. hold that the ACC is involved in a more general
process of visceral regulation. According to their meta-analysis, the ACC displays
increased activity in a number of instances including mania (in contrast to depres-
sion), executive attention and motor engagement. All of these processes involve some
kind of regulation of somatosensory states, which would support the constructionists
hypothesis.
Besides the regions previously linked to basic emotions, psychological construction-
ists expect a number of other regions to be involved in emotion processing. These other
regions would be involved in conceptualization, memory, and other processes related
to psychological construction. Among the evidence they cite for these regions we find
the dmPFC, MTL, and retrosplenial cortex as being involved in a conceptualization
network. This would provide evidence that there is no system nor a set of regions that
are specific and consistent either to particular emotion categories nor to emotion in
general. Rather, there are a variety of systems that are active depending on different
more general domain processes, constructionists claim.
Lindquist et al.’s influential meta-analysis showed that on the anatomical loca-
tionist framework, coordination and correspondence could not be established for the
neural domain. In my view, their evidence is sound, although I do not endorse their
conclusion. For Lindquist and colleagues, evidence supports a constructionist theory
of emotions which assumes that VT is already well-established. I contend that fur-
ther argument is required to establish VT though. On one hand, evidence regarding
homological locationism is still required, since it may be the case that neural patterns
corresponding to emotions are at the network level, rather than at the region level.
Let us explore evidence in this direction.
Homological locationism
As explained above, homological locationism attempts to map emotion categories onto
intrinsic networks, rather than specific brain regions. To understand homological lo-
cationism, it is worth attending to the distinction between intrinsic and functional
connectivity. A network is said to be intrinsic in case it is hardwired in the brain, that
is, if it is a set of brain regions that work together because of predetermined pathways
of excitation and inhibition. This is in contrast to functional networks, which are
correlated but not necessarily in virtue of predetermined mechanisms.
One example of a homological locationist view is Panksepp’s (1998; 2011). Panksepp
claims that in order to individuate the neural patterns in the brain, we must rely on
comparative studies using non-human animals to find evolutionarily adapted networks.
These comparative studies would presumably lead to the discovery of intrinsic networks
shared with other species, which Panksepp calls emotive circuits. These circuits are
defined as follows:
60
2.2. Individuating response patterns
1. The underlying circuits are genetically predetermined and designed to
respond unconditionally to stimuli arising from major life-challenging
circumstances.
2. These circuits organize diverse behaviors by activating or inhibiting
motor subroutines and concurrent autonomic-hormonal changes that
have proved adaptive in the face of such life-challenging circumstances
during the evolutionary history of the species.
3. Emotive circuits change the sensitivities of sensory systems that are
relevant for the behavioral sequences that have been aroused.
4. Neural activity of emotive circuits outlasts the precipitating circum-
stances.
5. Emotive circuits can come under the conditional control of emotion-
ally neutral environmental stimuli.
6. Emotive circuits have reciprocal interactions with the brain mecha-
nisms that elaborate higher decision-making processes and conscious-
ness.
(Panksepp, 1998, pp. 48-49)
On this definition, emotion circuits are not meant in terms of specific regions,
but rather collections of regions that work connectedly. What is important is that
these networks are “genetically predetermined,” meaning that they depend on intrinsic
properties of the brain rather than functionally constructed networks (which I will
discuss below).
Panksepp (2011) presents evidence for subcortical networks that interconnect mid-
brain circuits with various structures in the basal ganglia, such as the amygdala and
the nucleus accumbens, through pathways running through the hypothalamus and tha-
lamus. He characterizes each of these networks by using capitalized labels to remain
agnostic about their correspondence with vernacular emotion terms. He writes:
These labels, by using full-capitalization of terms, refer to specific sub-
cortical networks in mammalian brains that promote specific categories
of built-in emotional actions and associated feelings. No claim is made
of identity with the corresponding vernacular words, although profound
homologies are anticipated. (Panksepp, 2011, p. 8)
Among the networks he identifies, he includes:
SEEKING Nucleus accumbens – VTA, Mesolimbic and mesocortical outputs, Lateral
hypothalamus – PAG.
RAGE Medial amygdala to Bed Nucleus of Stria Terminalis (BNST), Medial and
preformical hypothalamic to PAG.
FEAR Central and lateral amygdala to medial hypothalamus and dorsal PAG.
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LUST Cortico-medial amygdala, Bed nucleus of stria terminalis (BNST), Preoptic
hypothalamus, VMH, PAG.
CARE Anterior cingulate, BNST, Preoptic Area, VTA, PAG.
PANIC Anterior cingulate, BNST and Preoptic Area, Dorsomedial Thalamus, PAG
JOY Dorso-medial diencephalon, Parafascicular Area, PAG. (adapted from Panksepp,
2011, p. 9)
In spite of Panksepp’s optimisim, there is nevertheless evidence against the pres-
ence of intrinsic networks in the brain as well. Touroutoglou, Lindquist, Dickerson,
and Barrett (2014) show that increases in activity during emotion experience and per-
ception do not map onto intrinsic networks in the brain using resting state connectivity
fMRI. Their meta-analysis is based on the previous work by Vytal and Hamann (2010)
mentioned above. Touroutoglou and colleagues write:
If anatomically constrained networks for each emotion category exist in
the intrinsic architecture of the human brain, as the basic emotion view
[e.g. Panksepp’s] predicts, then the meta-analytically derived seed regions
for a given emotion category (i.e. the peaks of consistent activation for
a given category of emotion, such as happiness) should produce ‘discov-
ery’ maps whose spatial overlap reveals a network for that category. This
finding would provide strong support for the hypothesis that emotions are
biologically basic categories reflected in the intrinsic structure of the brain.
Alternatively, if the peaks observed in Vytal and Hamannn (2010) are nodes
in domain-general intrinsic networks, as predicted by the conceptual act
theory of emotion [now called the Theory of Constructed Emotion], then
the conjunction of the discovery maps for a given emotion category would
not converge on a single network. Instead, emotion-based seeds would give
evidence of the domain-general intrinsic networks that are already known
to exist in the literature. (Touroutoglou et al., 2014, p. 1258)
The idea then is that if there are intrinsic networks individuating each emotion
category, the activation maps for each emotion category should consistently reveal
a specific set of regions that are intrinsically connected. The conjunction of sets of
active regions for a given emotion category is what they call the discovery map. If
coordination in terms of intrinsic networks fails to obtain, we should expect that for a
given emotion category, there are a variety of networks which are presumably domain-
general, hence yielding an empty discovery map.
The researchers report finding domain-general networks involved in emotional ex-
perience, which in their view supports the claim that there is nothing we can call a
coordinated package of neural responses in terms of intrinsic networks. For example,
for anger, they observed no overlap between the sets of active regions, suggesting an
empty discovery map. For fear, sadness, and happiness, they found a general dorsal
region connecting the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cortex.
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These results suggest that coordination in terms of intrinsic networks, i.e., ho-
mological locationism, is not empirically well-supported. In other words, we cannot
obtain coordinated patterns of neural activity at the level of intrinsic networks. As
with previous efforts to establish variability, the authors take this to support construc-
tionism.
Yet again, there is still an alternative approach. As I explained above, there are two
senses in which we can talk about brain networks. One is by identifying networks that
are genetically predetermined or hardwired. A second approach is to think of networks
in terms of their functional connectivity patterns. In this case, we can expect sets of
active regions that correlate robustly with one another, even if their connections are
not wired from birth. Call this strategy pattern assignment :
Pattern assignment Mental states belonging to the same emotion category corre-
spond consistently and specifically to functionally individuated patterns in the
brain.
Let us explore the prospects for such an approach.
Pattern assignment
As I just presented the view, instead of trying to individuate patterns in terms of
domain-specific intrinsic networks, we could take the relevant neural patterns to be at
the level of regions that show correlated activation even in the absence of an intrin-
sic network, e.g., functional networks or distributed patterns of activation. A prime
example of this approach is the one involved in multivariate pattern analyses (MVPA).
Multivariate pattern analyses of brain activity steer away from traditional loca-
tionist hypotheses that try to map psychological states onto specific regions in the
brain. Instead, these analyses try to find networks of brain activity that underlie
psychological states. By focusing on the interaction between different regions, multi-
variate techniques allow researchers to identify higher level patterns of activation, thus
overcoming failures in one-to-one mappings of psychological states and brain regions.
In the case of emotions, multivariate techniques provide an interesting reply to the
constructionist challenge. As I explained before, constructionists stress the lack of
neural specificity for emotions in terms of brain regions. However, it is possible to
accept this type of variability while expecting specificity at a network level.
One of the earlier studies using these techniques is Kassam, Markey, Cherkassky,
Loewenstein, and Just (2013). Kassam and colleagues scanned ten subjects’ brains
using fMRI. During the scan, the subject saw different emotion words, and they were
asked to attain the corresponding emotional state for a period of time. The researchers
then trained a classifier on the data in order to test whether the classifier could accu-
rately predict the subject’s emotional state using only their neural activity data.
Kassam et al. report that their classifier was able to successfully predict a subject’s
emotional state from their neural data in a given trial. In other words, using a subject’s
data throughout the experiment, they could predict their emotional state in one trial
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by looking at their neural activation. They report that this classification was accurate
between 77% and 89% of the time. Besides this result, the researchers attempted to
predict a subject’s emotional state using all of the participant’s data. This yielded a
lower, but still significant accuracy score of 70%. Kassam et al. could even predict
the emotional content of a stimulus from a different modality with their classifier.
Specifically, they used data obtained with their word-cued induction method to see if
they could predict the content of a visual image. As they report, the classifier was able
to predict disgust 91% of the times. Even though this is only a significant finding for
one emotion, they claim that their results were promising enough to support further
research.
After Kassam et al. (2013), other studies followed suit. Kragel and LaBar (2015)
tested how multi-voxel patterns of BOLD response predict discrete emotional states
and whether these patterns conform to categorical or dimensional models of emotion.
They used film emotion induction and instrumental music induction followed by self-
report. The researchers classified seven emotional states (contentment, amusement,
surprise, fear, anger, sadness, and neutral) with 37.3% accuracy (chance = 14.3%).
These measures, they claim, show reliable detection of emotion-related information.
To test whether neural classification models generalized across modalities, they
trained the classifier on the film data and tested on the music clips. This yielded an
accuracy rating of 28.38% (again, chance = 14.3%). They then tested which voxels
contributed to the models’ accuracy the most, and report a variety of voxels throughout
the brain. They explain that the patterns seem distinct yet partially overlapping at
a macro-scale, as activation within many of the same structures contributed to the
prediction. However, at the voxel level, the patterns did not overlap significantly.
To compare between categorical and dimensional models, they created a model for
each type. The categorical model divided the self-report data into seven dimensions,
corresponding to each discrete emotion. The dimensional model reduced the data to
valence and arousal. They calculated how homogeneous the data was in each model.
Accordingly, they report that categorical models yield more sparse and equidistant
clusters, whereas the dimensional model yields a more clustered and overlapping view.
The researchers conclude that we can successfully predict the occurrence of seven
distinct emotional states using MVPA across two induction methods. Regarding cat-
egorical vs. dimensional models, they conclude that it is best to see them as comple-
mentary, given that both models are able to classify emotions successfully in terms of
self-report, although the dimensional model did not do well for the neural data. For
the purposes of testing coordination in the neural domain, this study supports the
pattern assignment strategy, since it is possible to obtain categorical classification in
terms of multivariate patterns at the neural level.
Most recently, one study has gained special attention among defenders of multi-
variate approaches to emotion: Saarimäki et al. (2018). In this study, the researchers
investigated the neural underpinnings of different basic and non-basic emotion cat-
egories using fMRI. Participants heard 4 narratives for each of 14 emotional states
plus a neutral condition. Each narrative was designed to elicit the corresponding emo-
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tion. Using MVPA, the researchers then trained a classifier for each participant and
afterwards averaged across participants.
At the behavioral level, ratings showed that the narratives successfully elicited the
target emotions reliably and strongly. Accuracy assigning a narrative to the correct
target category was 97%. Regarding the classification of basic vs. non-basic emotions,
the researchers report a mean classification accuracy across the 14 emotions and neutral
state was 17% (chance level of 6.7%) and above significance when corrected for multiple
comparisons. On average, basic emotions could be classified more accurately than non-
basic emotions (26% vs. 15% respectively).
According to the researchers, experiential similarity matrices derived from behav-
ioral ratings was significantly associated with the neural similarity matrices derived
from whole-brain classification. Clustering of whole-brain confusion matrices yielded
four clusters:
1. Happiness, pride, gratitude, love, and longing
2. Disgust, sadness, fear, and shame
3. Anger, contempt, guilt, and despair
4. Surprise and neutral
Positive emotions in cluster 1 were more prominent in the anterior frontal areas,
including the vmPFC. Negative emotions in cluster 2, in turn, were more prominent
in the insula, supplementary motor area, and specific parts of subcortical structures.
Negative social emotions in cluster 3 were associated with the left insula and adjacent
frontal areas, and surprise was associated with the auditory cortex, supplementary
motor areas, and left insula.
Saarimäki et al. conclude that multiple emotion states have distinct and distributed
neural bases. In their view, many emotions are represented in the brain in distinct
yet overlapping regions. They claim that each emotion state likely modulates different
patterns measured with fMRI, and the overall configuration of the regional activation
patterns defines the resulting emotion. Altogether, 12 emotions (excluding longing and
shame) could be reliably classified from fMRI signals. Yet, the researchers are careful
to clarify that this study cannot provide causal evidence, given its use of classification
techniques. These, they claim, require lesion studies rather than mere classification.
Among the regions that gave rise to different emotions, the researchers report the ACC,
PCC, and precuneus for most emotions. They also found activation in the brainstem,
including periaqueductal grey, pons, and medulla, which they interpret as probably
modulating autonomic responses.
These results from MVPA offer a lifeline for theories claiming neural specificity
of emotion. In other words, they seem to support some form of coordination in the
neural domain. Given the presence of networks mapping onto emotion categories, it is
possible for theorists to cash out specificity at a network level, bypassing the demand
for mappings at the level of brain regions. As McCafrey (in press) puts it regarding
basic emotion theory:
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[...] the brain may respect BET after all. While individual regions are
recruited for multiple emotions, [basic emotions] may map onto distributed,
overlapping brain networks. We should therefore abandon the assumption
that BET requires whole distinct neural circuitry for BEs.
[...] multivariate analyses may provide valuable new tools for finding BE
biomarkers. While individual variables (e.g. heart rate, face muscles, brain
areas) are often non-specific for emotions, patterns among multiple vari-
ables tend to improve specificity. (pp. 29-30)
In spite of McCaffrey’s and others’ optimism, there are also reactions against
these approaches. Clark-Polner, Johnson, and Barrett (2017), for instance, argue that
MVPA findings do not support specificity at all. In their view, the patterns found using
MVPA do not reveal brain states underlying specific processes, but rather a “statistical
summary” of what goes on in the brain frequently under certain conditions. In their
words:
Any statistical summary of a category is an abstraction that does not nec-
essarily exist in nature. This is also how emotion categories work [...].
Although as a group the instances of any emotion category can be diag-
nosed with a pattern, the pattern itself is an abstraction and does not
necessarily describe one feature or set of features that is necessary for ev-
ery (or even any) single individual instance in the category. [...] Thus, in
a statistical sense, Saarimaki [sic] et al. did not find evidence to support
the theory of basic emotion, nor the existence of biologically basic emotion
categories. (Clark-Polner et al., 2017, p. 1946)
What does it mean for patterns to be a statistical summary? Clark-Polner and col-
leagues offer the following example. Consider the statement “the average middle class
U.S. family has 3.13 children.” This statement does not say that every middle class
U.S. family has 3.13 children. Moreover, this interpretation would be non-sensical, as
a family cannot have non-integer numbers of children. What this statement expresses
is a statistical fact about middle class U.S. families, namely, the fact that the average
number of children is 3.13. A similar logic, they claim, applies to patterns found with
MVPA. When we find a set of voxels associated with a given process (in this case, a
given emotion category), all we are saying is that in average, these voxels are active
during the emotional episode. This does not mean that any of these voxels is necessary
or plays a relevant role in the ongoing emotion.
It is true that statistical summaries do not imply any causal property of the object
of study, as Clark-Polner and colleagues argue. The fact that the average middle class
U.S. family has 3.13 children does not say anything specific about any particular family
in the U.S. But it is not true that statistical summaries do not say anything interesting
about their objects. In the example above, knowing this statistical fact leads us to
infer that any given middle class U.S. family will most likely have a number of children
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ranging from 0 to 6, approximately. Of course, statistical summaries allow exceptions,
but there are still properties that we can infer from them, at least probabilistically.
A similar argument can run for MVPA: voxels constituting patterns associated with
an emotion may not be present for every single instance, but the fact that they are still
associated with it helps us map certain emotion categories to broadly construed brain
networks. We need not commit ourselves to the claim that every single voxel in the
pattern will appear in every single instance. We can do with the statistical summary
and infer that there are typical mechanisms, specified in terms of networks, that do
map onto particular emotion categories.
Variability at the neural level
Overall, it seems that the best candidate to spell out patterns of neural activity
that would support coordination is in terms of pattern assignment. Evidence against
anatomical and homological locationism seems compelling, or at the very least plau-
sible. If researchers want to establish coordination and correspondence in the neural
domain, characterizing neural patterns in terms of functional networks seems the most
attractive remaining alternative.
However, the pattern assignment strategy is not without problems. As critics of
functionalism such as Clark-Polner et al. point out, it might be the case that mapping
psychological function, in this case emotion categories, onto functional networks is not
explanatorily interesting. In my view, statistical summaries do constitute explanatorily
relevant findings about how emotions are realized in the brain, and hence should be
taken seriously. Nevertheless, a full-fledged defense of this claim requires a detailed
discussion about how to map psychological function onto the brain.
This question, in its broad construal, is the question at the center of debates
on cognitive ontology. Two questions in these debates are of vital interest for our
current discussion. The first is the question raised above, namely, to which degree are
functional networks explanatorily interesting. The second, which lies at the heart of
the present discussion, is to which degree should we preserve current taxonomies of
psychological phenomena. On one hand, we may think that we must preserve emotion
taxonomies as they are and attempt to map them onto the brain in whichever form. On
the other hand, we may think that if mappings between emotion categories and brain
regions or networks fail to obtain, we should revise emotion categories themselves.
Answering this question requires an account of what are the explanatorily relevant
divisions in which we can divide the brain, be it at the level of anatomical regions,
intrinsic networks, or functional networks.
Regarding these questions, Anderson (2015) distinguishes three approaches:
Conservatives It should be possible to specify a set of fundamental operations that
will allow cognitive theories and process models to map more cleanly onto the
brain than is currently evident. We should consider neurobiological evidence
during the analysis and decomposition of a cognitive process into its components,
rather than perform this in isolation.
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Moderates Many elements in the current ontology may not be composites, and some
elements may not reflect any aspect of psychological reality. A careful examina-
tion of the way the brain responds during experiments designed to manipulate
these constructs can reveal them for what they are, suggesting splitting and
lumping categories when the brain calls for it. At the end, we will have a set of
mental operations that will often map to brain regions one-to-one.
Radicals We should rethink the very foundations of psychology. The required revi-
sions may involve the construction of categories that divide the mind in very
different ways than the current ontology does. At the end we may have very
few one-to-one mappings between brain regions and psychological primitives.
(adapted from Anderson, 2015, p. 70)
In the case of emotions, conservatives would argue that there must be a one-to-one
mapping between emotion categories and brain regions. Moderates, in turn, would
be open to revising emotion categories depending on empirical findings about the
brain. Lastly, radicals argue that we should abandon emotion categories if necessary
if findings about how the brain is divided call for it.
I will not attempt to solve general questions about cognitive ontology here. Yet,
I will venture the following position. In my view, there are good reasons to maintain
emotion categories, since they constitute the explananda of emotion research. Many of
the examples championed by defenders of radicalism are constructs which are posited
in the context of scientific psychology, such as working memory, or attributions such
as attributing the left lateral fusiform area the function of visual word form processing
(Price & Friston, 2005). These latter constructs are posits meant to explain other
phenomena of which we do have a clear idea, namely, short-term memory or reading.
The phenomena themselves are not up for elimination, since they constitute what
psychology is ultimately trying to explain. I believe that emotion categories resemble
short-term memory and reading more than they resemble working memory or visual
word form processing as a proper function of the left lateral fusiform area.
On the surface, this would appear as a defense of a conservative position. There
is a sense in which I do endorse such a view. Specifically, I believe that we cannot
dispense with emotion categories, since doing so will lead to a change of subject. In
other words, we cannot explain emotions without some recourse to emotion categories
(which I will explain in detail in chapter 5). Yet, if we approach the issue from the
perspective of brain function, I endorse a more radical view. As it will be clear in the
second part of this work, particularly in chapter 6, we should accept that emotions
can be multiply realized in a number of brain regions and networks. If this is the case,
then it may be true that the brain does not mirror distinctions in terms of emotion
categories. In other words, whatever the brain does, whatever its proper functions
may be, they may not map onto emotion categories. However, I do not take this to
be sufficient to eliminate emotion categories, as I will argue in later chapters.
In any case, resolving the issue of how to individuate neural patterns requires rais-
ing questions, not only about correspondences with emotion categories, but also about
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what a scientifically tractable taxonomy of brain function will look like. As it stands,
it seems that the best prospects for defenders of coordination at the neural level is to
appeal to pattern assignment. This is not to say that the pattern assignment will be
ultimately successful, as future research may show its limitations. All that I claim here
is that if scientists are to look into the brain for correspondence and coordination, the
current best candidate strategy is to assign emotions to overall patterns of activation
rather than locating them in specific and consistent brain regions or intrinsic networks.
In turn, this requires a defense of functional networks as explanatorily relevant. With-
out such an account, we have good reason to accept that coordination at the neural
level fails to obtain, and thus that NOCNeural is a well supported claim.
2.2.2 Physiological patterns
Physiological evidence concerns the presence or absence of patterns of autonomic ner-
vous system activity (hereafter ANS activity). ANS activity measures can be divided
into three categories. First, there is activity related to the cardiac system, which
includes heart rate variability (HRV), blood pressure, cardiac cycles, and the like.
Second, we find variables regarding respiration, e.g. respiratory cycles, respiration
period, amplitude, etc. Lastly, there are variables concerning electrodermal activity,
i.e., skin conductance levels, responses, resistance, etc.
Given these types of physiological variables, whether or not there are coordinated
patterns of physiological activity can be broken down into two criteria. One is deter-
mining whether there is patterning within a class of variables. We can ask whether
there are specific patterns concerning cardiac, respiratory, or electrodermal activity for
a particular emotion. Additionally, we can investigate patterning between the classes
of variables, i.e., whether cardiac, respiratory, and electrodermal activity are robustly
correlated and form a homogeneous set of responses for each emotion.
In an early study on autonomic activity associated with emotions, Ekman, Lev-
enson, and Friesen (1983) investigated surprise, disgust, sadness, anger, fear, and
happiness, the emotions they included in their earlier basic emotions lists. In one
task, they asked subjects to contract specific muscles in order to implicitly mirror a
given facial expression, without telling them explicitly which expression it was. The
idea behind this task is that, in their view, facial expressions corresponding to a given
emotion would elicit the corresponding autonomic markers. In another task, the re-
searchers asked subjects to relive a past experience that would elicit a given emotion
(this time explicitly telling them which emotion it should be). During these tasks,
the investigators measured the subjects’ heart rate, left- and right-hand temperatures,
skin resistance, and forearm muscle tension (to control for heart rate effects due to
subjects clenching).
Ekman et al. report a main effect of emotion in autonomic variables, i.e., that
autonomic variables change significantly depending on the emotion. However, they also
noticed an interaction between task and emotion. This means that there was an effect
on autonomic variables depending on the task and the emotion elicited. Regarding
the emotions themselves, they found that heart rate and temperature increased for
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anger, as well as heart rate increases for fear, in contrast to happiness. They also
hold that they were able to distinguish disgust and anger from each other and from
fear or sadness in the first task, and that sadness from disgust, anger, or fear in the
second. Lastly, the researchers claim that they could differentiate between negative
and positive emotions in both tasks.
In a later report (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990), the same researchers re-
peated this experiment in four different samples. Again, they report autonomic speci-
ficity for all emotions, particularly in terms of heart rate and skin conductance.26
Regarding heart rate, anger, fear, and sadness elicited the greatest acceleration, fol-
lowed by disgust, happiness, and lastly surprise. As for skin conductance, fear and
disgust produced the most conductance when compared to the other emotions (which
did not differ significantly from one another).
These studies, on the surface, suggest that there are autonomic patterns corre-
sponding to at least some emotions. Yet, they fail to provide conclusive evidence.
First, asking subjects to mimic a facial expression without explicitly naming the cor-
responding emotion does not prevent subjects from easily realizing the expression they
are mimicking. If this is true, it is plausible that subjects finding out about a given
emotion would trigger associations that would elicit the emotion via memory and im-
agery. Even though Ekman and colleagues report differences between the imitation
and the memory tasks, these may have been due to subjects feeling nervous in either
scenario or being distracted by their efforts to move individual muscles (which they
do not move that way in a natural context).
But even if we accept that the tasks worked as they should have, still the dis-
tinctions and correlations they report do not provide a conclusive case for autonomic
specificity. On one hand, the first report present an interaction between task and
emotion, an interaction that is not explored further. How can we tell, then, that the
effects they observe are evidence for physiological specificity instead of artifacts of the
tasks at hand? Moreover, many of the expected differences fail to be significant. For
example, fear and anger both share accelerated heart rate and skin conductance re-
sponses. At best, the researchers were only able to distinguish one positive from four
negative emotions.
Later studies have attempted to expand on these findings and find better distinc-
tions in terms of autonomic activity. Collet, Vernet-Maury, Delhomme, and Dittmar
(1997) for example used slides portraying expressions for each of the emotions tested
by Ekman and others, and asked subjects to feel the emotion corresponding to each of
the slides shown by thinking about past experiences. This method of autobiographical
recall mirrors again the one used by the other researchers. This time, however, Collet
and colleagues measured a different set of autonomic variables, namely, skin resistance,
skin conductance, skin potential, skin blood flow, skin temperature, and instantaneous
respiratory frequency.
26 Even though the previous study investigated skin resistance, the two measures are essentially
the same, as they are complimentary.
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Collet and colleagues report finding specific patterns for each of the emotions they
studied. For instance, happiness is characterized by higher skin conductance and
relatively low skin temperature, whereas anger displays high conductance and temper-
ature. As they report their findings, none of these patterns is identical to one another,
thus providing evidence for autonomic specificity. Additionally, they stress that their
results go beyond the previous studies in that it provides distinctions between partic-
ular emotions and not only between positive and negative ones.
More recent studies have introduced multivariate techniques to look for physio-
logical patterns. Rainville, Bechara, Naqvi, and Damasio (2006), for example, used
principal component analysis to see which variables were the most useful when clas-
sifying different emotions from data on autonomic responses. As in other studies,
they used autobiographical recall methods to elicit anger, fear, happiness, and sad-
ness. They measured a number of variables regarding respiration and cardiac cycles,
including respiration period, amplitude, heart-rate variability, and others.
In their analyses, the researchers first contrasted each emotion to a neutral con-
dition independently. They report that the respiratory period decreased in fear and
happiness and less consistently in anger, while the variability in respiratory period
increased in sadness. Regarding heart-rate variability, there was a decrease within
respiratory cycle and high frequency range were robust in fear and significant but
weaker in happiness. Univariate comparisons between the four emotions showed that
several dependent variables were sensitive to emoton-related effects. Indices of HRV
and respiratory activity showed highly significant effects of emotions. Graphical repre-
sentations contrasting pairs of emotions showed that anger was clearly separated from
both fear and happiness based in respiratory period and respiratory rate.
Using exploratory PCA showed five contributing factors that explained 91% of
overall variance. Factor 1 explained most of the variance in HRV measured within
respiratory cycles. No respiratory variable loaded noticeably on Factor 1, which the
researchers take as implying that this factor mostly captures HRV. Factor 2 corre-
sponded mainly to respiratory period and part of respiratory amplitude. However, it
also captures some HRV variance. Hence, the researchers conclude that factor 2 cap-
tures most of the variance in HRV coupled with respiration. In turn, factor 3 captured
variance in mean respiratory rate levels independently of HRV and other respiratory
variables. Factor 4 was associated with the frequency index of respiration variability,
and lastly, factor 5 reflected variance in respiration period and amplitude. What these
PCA analyses mean is that variance in physiological measures can be reduced to these
five main factors. In other words, it is these groups of variables that distinguish among
different emotions in terms of autonomic activity measures.
The researchers claim that this study provides some evidence that basic emotions
are associated with distinctive patterns of cardiorespiratory activity. Different emo-
tions were distinguished from a neutral condition based on different subsets of depen-
dent variables and multi-dimensional exploration of the data revealed complex patterns
of activity that characterized each emotion. According to the PCA, the variance in
cardiorespiratory activity can be explained along five dimensions, mostly HRV.
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Besides these particular studies, seen from a panoramic perspective, some meta-
analytic findings also support the case for autonomic specificity. Kreibig (2010), for
instance, covered 134 publications and examined three classes of variables: cardio-
vascular, respiratory, and electrodermal. She reports specific patterns for a great
number of emotions. For example, she claims that anger involves faster breathing as
seen in shortened inspiration and expiration times, more expiration than inspiration,
increased heart rate, increased overall blood pressure, among others. Fear elicited a
similar pattern, involving broad sympathetic activation, cardiac acceleration, increased
vasoconstriction, and increased electrodermal activity. However, in the case of fear,
peripheral resistance decreased whereas it increased for anger.
Other reported findings show that we might even get more fine-grained categories
by looking at physiology. The case of sadness is a prime example. Kreibig reported two
types of physiological responses for sadness: activating and deactivating. Activating
sadness, or crying sadness, is characterized by increased cardiovascular sympathetic
control and changed respiratory activity. Specifically, it is correlated with increased
heart rate and increased skin conductance levels. Deactivating sadness, or non-crying
sadness, is characterized by sympathetic withdrawal, and decrease in electrodermal
activity, as seen in a decreased heart rate, longer preejection period, increased heart
rate variability, decreased diastolic blood pressure.
Despite the studies supporting autonomic specificity, there are also efforts trying to
challenge it. In a recent meta-analysis, Siegel et al. (2018) evaluated empirical evidence
in favor or against specificity. In their own words, they contrasted the hypotheses that
there is “limited ANS variation around a fingerprint (the classical view)” against the
hypothesis that there is “substantial variation that is meaningfully tied to the situation
(the constructionist view)” (Siegel et al., 2018, p. 347). In contrast to previous studies
and meta-analyses, they claim that evidence supports the latter hypothesis.
The authors included 204 studies from 1950 to 2013, and studied the same three-
fold division of variables used by Kreibig, namely, cardiovascular, respiratory, and
electrodermal measures. To do this, they compared the effect sizes across all their
studies. Some results display mean ANS changes from baseline across several effect
sizes but with substantial variability. For instance, the patterns of anger and fear
showed large effect sizes, suggesting that their physiological patterns differed signifi-
cantly from baseline across several autonomic variables (specifically, heart rate, cardiac
output, diastolic and systolic blood pressure). Yet, these effect sizes are very hetero-
geneous, indicating that even though these emotions have clear physiological effects,
these effects are not uniform and do not form a stable pattern.
Other results show small mean ANS changes and moderate variability. For exam-
ple, the researchers report the cases of disgust and neutral categories. For disgust, only
skin conductance level and responses had relevant effect sizes, but only the latter was
homogeneous. For neutral conditions, only systolic blood pressure had an interesting
mean effect size, but it is also a heterogeneous variable. Happiness and sadness had
increased effect sizes in heart rate, diastolic blood pressure, skin conductance level,
and others, but they are mostly heterogeneous. As a result, most mean ANS changes
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were not uniform. Additionally, the researchers claim that ANS changes were not
specific to a given emotion category either. Happiness had a mean increase in skin
conductance level similar to disgust, anger, fear, and sadness, for example.
We can now interpret evidence challenging physiological specificity using the cat-
egories presented above. On one hand, there is evidence suggesting that there is low
coordination between cardiac, respiratory, and electrodermal variables. Evidence of
the first type presented by Siegel et al. is one example. As they suggest, correlations
between physiological variables preclude their classification as a specific pattern. On
the other hand, there seems to be evidence showing low coordination within physi-
ological variables, as presented in the second group of findings reported by Siegel et
al. According to this argument, some physiological variables have more impact than
others in determining the ensuing emotion. As a result, given the lack of correlation
between physiological variables, the researchers claim that there is no physiological
specificity for emotion.
Nevertheless, settling this discussion requires further methodological and episte-
mological decisions. First, it is unclear whether all physiological variables should have
the same influence when considering whether there is a coordinated pattern or not.
Often used variables such as heart-rate variability surely are among the most impor-
tant ones to consider. Yet, the status of other variables such as respiration period or
vaso-constriction is left undecided.
To determine the relevance of such variables for the purposes of emotion classifi-
cation, we must be clear, first, about their causal relationships, and second, in case
where no causal relationships hold, how we expect them to correlate. For example,
it is plausible that a number of cardiac variables are causally connected with electro-
dermal variables. An account of physiological patterns should take these connections
into account when classifying autonomic activity into sets of responses. If these causal
connections fail to hold, but there is correlation, we need to be clear what these cor-
relations entail and whether they are robust enough to warrant classification under a
pattern.
Second, both optimistic and skeptical researchers fail to distinguish between within-
and between-variable coordination. This leads to an ambiguity that affects both
camps. On one hand, it could be the case that we need correlations among vari-
ables of the same type (say, respiratory variables) in order to consider that there is a
robust physiological pattern (i.e., a respiratory pattern). On the other hand, we may
not demand correlations within a given family of variables, but rather between some
measures of different types. For instance, we may expect some cardiovascular mea-
sures to correlate with some electrodermal ones, without the requirement that there
are within-variable patterns. As it stands now, researchers highlight evidence showing
that one measure is associated with a given emotion or that another is not, without a
clear argument as to whether it is necessary that all measures of a given type correlate
with one another or whether it is necessary that some measures of different types do
so.
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Lastly, similar to the discussion regarding neural patterns, the use of multivari-
ate techniques is still controversial. Presumably, lots of physiological processes obtain
when we experience an emotion or any other state. As a result, whether or not the
ability to classify them with analyses such as PCA tell us something explanatorily
relevant remains unclear. Skeptics may argue that the mere presence of a statistical
pattern says little about the causal mechanisms involved in emotion. Optimists may
react by pointing out that multivariate techniques are nevertheless more robust and
that they do not claim that there is just any pattern at play. In any case, we need cri-
teria to count statistical relations between variables as dividing physiological responses
into distinct types. As long as researchers do not agree on these criteria, discussions
about physiological specificity are bound to remain indecisive.
2.2.3 Behavioral patterns
Behavioral patterns refer to possible behavioral outcomes of an emotion episode. In
the current literature, the best account of the behavioral patterns of emotion comes
from appraisal theories. According to these theories, emotions involve states of action
readiness (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). On one influential construal, action
readiness is cashed out as the individual’s readiness or unreadiness to engage in in-
teraction with the environment. This may consist in readiness to engage or disengage
from interaction with some object in a particular way (action tendency) or in a general
state of activation or inhibition of behavior (activation modes) (Frijda, 2007). Among
the major modes of action readiness, as Frijda calls them, we find “moving toward,”
“moving away,” “moving against,” “[being] helpless,” “submission,” “rest,” “[being] in
command,” “[being] excited,” “apathy, disinterest,” and “undo” (Frijda, 2007, p. 34).
Some researchers claim that we can differentiate between emotions by appealing
to the different states of action readiness they elicit. On one such study, Frijda et al.
(1989) asked subjects to recall instances of emotions and asked them to rate different
statements concerning various action patterns. These statements included descriptions
such as “I wanted to approach or make contact” or “I wanted to oppose, to assault.”
They then tried to map patterns of action to emotion names by investigating how well
they could predict the emotion label from these patterns. Frijda and colleagues report
some predictability for 32 emotion categories. Among the highly correlated patterns
they report crying for sadness, protecting one self for fear and anxiety, moving against
an object for anger, avoidance for disgust, and hiding from others for shame, among
others. This suggests that there may be some correspondence between action readiness
states and emotion categories.
Other studies have yielded similar results. Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz (1994) used
as similar experimental design, asking subjects to recall past emotional experiences,
narrate them, and answer a questionnaire that tapped into their behavioral outcomes,
among other variables. Questions relating to behavioral outcomes included questions
about whether during a given emotion, they wanted to approach something or avoid
it, or whether they wanted to cry or resign to something, and the like. The researchers
claim that their experiment shows clear distinctions between 10 emotions in terms of
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their action tendencies. Among the tendencies reported, we find fear as a readiness
to reduce the possibility of harm, sadness as crying and seeking comfort, disgust as
attempting to get something noxious out of the body, among others. The emotions
they claim they could distinguish were fear, sadness, distress, frustration, disgust,
dislike, anger, regret, guilt, and shame.
In spite of these optimistic efforts, cashing out emotions in terms of action readiness
and action tendencies does not go without problems. On one hand, there is some
observed variability. In Frijda et al. (1989) we find one action pattern corresponding
to two emotions (e.g. protecting oneself in fear and anxiety). Frijda (2007) recognizes
this, and writes:
Major mode [sic] tend to map on major emotion categories. “Fear” cor-
responds with a tendency to move away, “anger” with the tendency to
move against (or “oppose”) as well as “hurt”), “sadness” to being helpless,
and so forth. The modes are not truly linked to particular emotion cate-
gories, though. Different emotions may share the same action tendency, as
do timidity and fear, and humility and shame. Different instances of one
emotion class may differ in action tendency; so, for instance, “anger out”
and “anger in.” (Frijda, 2007, p. 34; emphasis added)
As it should be clear from the preceding quote, Frijda’s view regarding the role
of action tendencies as distinguishing between emotion categories is not as optimistic
as it may have appeared at a first glance. He thinks that some action tendencies
to map onto emotion categories, but he does not think that action tendencies are
sufficient to individuate emotions. As a result, Frijda seems to endorse the claim that
there is no correspondence between emotion categories and behavioral patterns, i.e.,
NOCBehavioral.
On the surface, this would only mean that variability in terms of behavior is still
controversial. However, the problem runs even deeper. Critics of appraisal theories
have argued that the links between emotions and action tendencies may as well be a
matter of conceptual truth rather than empirical fact. If so, questions about corre-
spondence become trivial; emotions will trivially correspond to behavior patterns (just
as water “corresponds” to H2O.) Consider the presumed correspondence between fear
and engaging in behavior towards protecting oneself in situations of perceived harm.
Suppose we attempt to falsify such correspondence. We would need to be able to ob-
tain a fear state that does not involve such a behavioral tendency. Yet, arguably, that
tendency is precisely what it means to be in a fearful state. As a result, any candidate
state to falsify this supposed hypothesis would not count as a fear state as a matter
of conceptual fact.
This problem can be brought to light by considering moves to ameliorate it. Rose-
man (2011), in response to challenges of variability between emotions and behavioral
outcomes, argues that emotions are consistent at the level of coping strategies. He
claims, for instance, that fear forms a consistent pattern insofar as it involves a strat-
egy to move away from or stop moving toward some danger. Again, we could ask:
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what would it mean for this to be false? Presumably, this correlation obtains, not as
a contingent fact, but because the behavioral outcome provides a definition of what
it means to be afraid. To use Smedlund’s (1992) example, these results are as if we
discovered that bachelors are male and single.27
A similar worry runs regarding LC in the case of inter-domain coordination. De-
pending on how we carve out behavioral outcomes, any outcome that may correspond
to a give emotion, even if not one-to-one, can be spelled out to yield a correlation
with some neural and physiological state. If we carve out behavioral outcomes in a
fine-grained fashion, coordination between the neural and physiological domain would
be almost trivially true. One can resist this result by clarifying that triviality only
obtains if neural and physiological states are interpreted as token states, not as types,
i.e., by adopting a coarser grain. Still, the question of how to spell out these patterns
properly remains unanswered.
In chapters 5 and 6, I will suggest a way out of this difficulty in detail. In my
view, we can rely on folk psychological vocabulary to determine the grain to carve out
behavioral outcomes, by noticing distinctions in how we distinguish emotions in our
everyday concepts. We can then explicate folk emotion concepts into more abstract,
functionally defined scientific concepts of emotions that yield empirical hypotheses
regarding dispositions to engage in certain behaviors which individuate emotions. For
the time being, let it be clear that as the literature stands right now, there is no
clear account of how to individuate behavioral patterns in an empirically interesting
manner. This makes claims about coordination and correspondence in the behavioral
domain problematic. As I will argue at the end of this chapter, behavioral evidence is
important for emotion research, but requires further conceptual work. Before I dwell
into these arguments, let us go on to the next type of pattern involved in VT, namely,
expressive patterns.
2.2.4 Expressive patterns
One of the main issues surrounding the existence of emotions as distinct, universal
constructs come from the main source of evidence motivating traditional basic emotion
theories: the universality of facial expressions. As I explained in the previous chapter,
universality was an important piece of Ekman’s and Izard’s versions of BET and still
remains a contentious issue.
Regarding the issue of emotions as kinds, the question of universality can be framed
as a question about the historical, functional, or social nature of emotions. In tradi-
tional versions of BET, universality entails that emotions are evolved and linked to
biologically patterns of autonomic and neural activity. In turn, opponents of BET
claim that if universality is not established, this would show evidence for the func-
tional or social nature of emotions (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018) or it would provide
support for skeptical theses (Nelson & Russell, 2013; Russell, 2003).
27 McEachrane (2009) makes a similar point. In his view, appraisal theory is pseudoempirical
since it individuation in terms of appraisal or action tendencies follows from the meanings of the
emotion terms involved.
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In order to explore the issue of universality, it is paramount to define first what
universality means. Russell (1994) distinguishes four propositions related to univer-
sality:
(a) Specific patterns of facial muscle movement occur in all human beings.
(b) Certain facial patterns are manifestations of the same emotions in all human
beings.
(c) Observers everywhere attribute the same emotional meaning to those facial pat-
terns.
(d) Observers are correct in the emotions they (consensually) attribute to those facial
patterns. (cf. Russell, 1994, p. 106)
The first of these propositions relates to the specificity of the facial expressions
themselves. The second, to their correspondence to emotional states. It is important
to note the independence between these two. It is logically possible that there is a
limited repertoire of specific facial expressions that does not match to the number of
emotions that they can express. For example, suppose that the Duchenne smile is one
of such specific expressions that occurs in all human beings. Yet, it may be possible
(and in fact is often the case) that the Duchenne smile can express both happiness and
pride. Conversely, there can be a fixed number of emotions but no specific patterns of
facial movement that occur in all human beings. Facial expressions could vary from
culture to culture such that there is no fixed repertoire of expressions, without the
same applying to emotions themselves.
The third and fourth propositions relate to the observers of these facial expressions.
Proposition (c) is descriptive, that is, it merely describes a possible state of affairs, a
sociological and psychological fact about how we attribute emotions. Proposition (d),
however, is normative, as it involves standards of correctness about the attribution
of emotions via facial expressions. Furthermore, (d) requires establishing at least (c),
since in order for observers to attribute emotions correctly everywhere, they must first
attribute emotions in a uniform manner.28 Since I am interested in questions about
correspondence between expressions and emotions, and not about the correctness of
attributions in terms of expressions, I will not deal with (c) and (d) at the moment.
Instead, I will focus my efforts on (a) and (b), i.e., whether empirical evidence helps
establish the existence of specific facial movement patterns and their correspondence
to emotions.
The main defender of universality is, without a doubt, Ekman (see e.g. Ekman,
1972, 1980; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Ekman et al., 1987, 1983; Ekman, Sorenson, &
28 Russell thinks that it requires all of the previous three propositions. However, it is possible,
albeit unlikely, that observers everywhere attribute the same emotional meaning to expressions
even in the absence of a specific repertoire of facial movements and a fixed number of emotions.
This would require observers to be right every time the see an expression, even if they have not
seen it before, and to attribute the right emotion, even if they have not encountered it in the
past. As unlikely as this may be, it is logically possible.
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Friesen, 1969). I will not comment all of these studies in detail, but I will expand on
two groups: the series of American-Japanese studies presented in Ekman (1972) and
the study in New Guinea in Ekman and Friesen (1971). Not only are these studies
some of Ekman’s most cited, but also great examples of Ekman’s groundwork for his
theory.
Ekman (1972) presents a series of studies (prior to Ekman and Friesen (1971),
which I will discuss below) in which he investigated how similar were the facial ex-
pressions and their recognition among Japanese and US Americans. In the first study,
he compared how well can one culture recognize emotions in the expressions of the
other culture as well as their own. According to Ekman, if emotional expression were
culture-specific, recognition would be high for one’s own culture but not for others.
In this initial study, Ekman showed both Japanese and US American samples
stress-inducing and neutral videos. They then videotaped these reactions and showed
them to four separate groups in Japan and the United States. Viewers of these re-
actions were instructed to judge whether the person in the video had watched the
stressful or the neutral film. As he expected, Ekman found that both Japanese and
US American samples were capable of recognizing expressions in both cultures above
chance (around 60% of the time). This was, in his view, evidence that emotional
expression was universal.
In spite of his optimism, the study suffered from three important flaws. First, the
experiment only showed that whatever expression both Japanese and US American
samples showed, they are similarly interpreted by both cultures, but not that they
had actually portrayed the same expressions. Second, the study can not say anything
about whether expressions are specific to each emotion or not, since the only conditions
tested were stress (unpleasant) vs. neutral. Third, it could not rule out learning effects
due to exposition to visual representations of the other culture (e.g. in TV, magazines
or books).
To address the first two problems, Ekman repeated the previous study—again be-
tween Japanese and US American samples. This time he measured the participants’
facial expressions using an instrument designed along with Friesen and Tomkins (Ek-
man, Friesen, & Tomkins, 1971), the Facial Action Scoring Technique, FAST (which
would later become the Facial Action Coding System, FACS). FAST consisted in divid-
ing facial expressions into different muscle movements, determining the beginning and
end of each movement, and classifying them according to a predefined list of items such
as raising the eyebrows or opening the mouth. By using FAST, Ekman and colleagues
could compare expressions between the different cultures and determine whether the
expressions were similar themselves and not only judged in the manner. Additionally,
they tested for six of Tomkins’s primary affects: Surprise, fear, anger, disgust, sadness,
and happiness.
In this new study, Ekman reported obtaining correlations between each culture’s
facial expressions at the level of each item (e.g. they raised the eyebrows at the same
time). Additionally, when the researchers categorized expression items into emotions,
correlations between these emotions were higher. That means, when they classified an
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expression as a sadness expression, they found that instances of sadness were correlated
in the two cultures. The same logic then applied to the other primary affects they
tested. This would presumably show that not only were expressions in the two cultures
similar, but also that they corresponded at the level of specific emotions.
These studies provided a basis to think of emotions or at least emotional expression
as universal. In later studies (see Ekman, 1972), Ekman would reportedly replicate and
extend these findings to other cultures and with other methods. There was, however, a
persistent problem that would be addressed in a study years later, namely, that there
was no way to control for exposition and learning effects. Most of the cultures Ekman
tested had been in one way or another subject to the representations of emotions that
might have biased the results. As a result, Ekman opted to conduct a study in a
remote culture that would have had no contact with Western cultures and therefore
would prove a true test of universality.
Ekman and Friesen (1971) conducted a study with members of the Fore group
in New Guinea. The Fore were isolated until the mid-twentieth century, hence they
constituted an interesting community in which to test Ekman’s hypotheses. The re-
searchers showed subjects three photographs of different facial expressions and told
them a story. Subjects then chose the photograph that matched the story’s emotional
content. Stories included content for happiness, sadness, anger, surprise, disgust, and
fear. These six emotions would make up one of the most widely used lists of basic
emotions.
In their report, Ekman and Friesen showed that subjects were generally able to
identify the correct photograph at a high success rate. In their view, this result
provided evidence that there were facial expressions that were universally recognizable,
even in cultures with no contact with Western societies. In later years, Ekman and
colleagues (1987) would use this method in other Western cultures and replicate these
findings.
Against universality
In spite of Ekman’s optimism, universality does not go without its critics. Arguments
against universality come in three main strands. The first strand of criticism intends
to cast doubt on the robustness of the findings presumably supporting universality,
showing flaws in the designs as well as the assumptions of a number of studies. The
second strand tries to outweigh empirical evidence for universality by underscoring
cultural variation.
Methodological criticism
The most influential methodological criticism of universality comes from Russell (1994).29
In his review, Russell argues that universality studies are plagued with problems in
their ecological, convergent, and internal validity. If Russell is right, it is doubtful
29 Some of the arguments in this review are rehearsed and updated in Nelson and Russell (2013).
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how much we can trust previous findings, let alone establish correspondences between
expressions and emotions. Let us go through some of his arguments at a time.
First, Russell argues that there is little information on what facial expressions occur
naturally in the societies studied. On one hand, a number of studies have used highly
artificial stimuli whose ecological validity is unclear. These stimuli are mainly posed
facial expressions, which are seldom present as such in natural contexts and, moreover,
already presuppose which expressions are to be found. This is because actors posing
these expressions are already taught how these expressions should look like. Also,
study designs using these sets already presuppose that emotions are divided into the
number of expressions available in the set.
On the other hand, designs involving forced-choice paradigms may guide subjects
into specific responses. This is problematic, for example, in both of Ekman’s studies
mentioned above. If researchers ask subjects to pick from a fixed set of labels which
emotion does an expression signal, subjects are bound to pick the label that mostly
applies in that case, even if they would categorize it differently in other contexts. Since
we lose contextual information when forcing our choices to a fixed set of labels, studies
using these designs incur in issues with their ecological validity.
Additionally, Russell reports that when participants are allowed to freely choose
their labels, agreement between them drops dramatically. To make matters worse, even
if we used free labels, the interpretation of the results is made difficult by problems
regarding synonymy and translation. Suppose we run a study in two different cultures
with two different languages. We obtain then two lists of possible emotion terms, and
we want to know whether these two lists match up. To do so, we must translate the
terms of one list to the other. Even if they don’t correlate one-to-one, it is difficult
to say whether a given translation is adequate without presupposing already our own
categories. This thus becomes a radical translation problem, one that may plague
studies overall.
Second, Russell attacks the internal validity of these studies, claiming that there are
a number of factors that researchers have not controlled properly that may introduce
a number of confounds. For example, in some studies (e.g. Winkelmayer, Exline,
Gottheil, & Paredes, 1978), participants are shown the whole set of pictures before
rating. This already gives subjects information about which expressions they are
going to see, and may already lead to pre-categorizing according to the number of
different expressions in the set.
In addition, problems regarding possible learning effects or familiarity with experi-
mental hypotheses are frequent. One such example regards the use of college students
as participants. College students may be exposed already to the categories and ex-
pressions that these studies undertake to obtain. This may happen either directly, for
instance, by using psychology students, or indirectly, by students being exposed to
representations of emotions in terms of fixed facial expressions in popular and artistic
media.
Lastly, problems with convergent validity, Russell claims, include the use of similar
methods in most studies and a lack of methodological variation. In his view, studies
80
2.2. Individuating response patterns
mostly used what he calls the standard method : subjects are shown preselected still
photographs of largely posed facial expressions and then asked to choose one of a fixed
number of alternatives. At best, Russell explains, studies use variations in one or two
elements of the standard method (e.g. varying the length the lists, using free labeling,
using films rather than photographs). Yet, he argues, little is known outside of these
small variations.
Empirical criticism
On the side of empirical evidence, attacks on universality come from two sources. One
is evidence showing that agreement among cultures regarding which facial movements
correspond to which emotions has been overstated. Rather than finding robust agree-
ment, researchers have showed that agreement drops under certain conditions. The
other source stresses cultural variation, showing differences between different popula-
tions in terms of their perception and categorization of facial expressions.
One example of the first source of evidence is the meta-analysis by Elfenbein and
Ambady (2002). Using the same data as that in Ekman’s and Izard’s studies among
others, Elfenbein and Ambady show that there is an in-group advantage in facial
expression recognition. In other words, the researchers show that members of the
same group are more accurate in judging expressions of members of their same group.
Specifically, they report that Western participants are 9.3% more accurate when judg-
ing other Western faces than with African or Asian ones. Even if overall recognition is
still above chance level (58% accuracy), these results suggest that there is important
accuracy scores depend on culture and are not as uniform as defenders of universality
might think.
Examples of the second source of empirical evidence involve studies in a number
of cultures. Elfenbein and Ambady themselves claim that when analyzing data in
terms of individual emotions, some emotions are poorly recognized universally. In
their meta-analysis, they found that fear and disgust are the most poorly recognized,
even though they are among the most cited candidates to universal, biologically basic
emotions. According to them, this implies that culture still shapes meaning of faces
even in the presence of some uniformity.
Other studies also show mismatch between Western and non-Western interpreta-
tions of faces. Crivelli and Fridlund (2018) report that communities from the Trobiand
islands in New Guinea understand gasping faces as threat displays instead of fear dis-
plays, as traditional studies have attempted to show. Similarly, Gendron, Roberson,
van der Vyver, and Barrett (2014) found that the Himba people of Namibia perceive
facial actions in context, that is, not as corresponding to a feeling but to the whole
situation. For example, instead of interpreting crying as corresponding to a feeling of
sadness, they situate it as a response to death, showing differences in the intentionality
of their interpretation. Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, and Schyns (2012) report that East
Asian facial expressions overlap considerably, leading to fuzzy categorization contrast-
ing with Western taxonomies. Along the same lines, Jack, Sun, Delis, Garrod, and
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Schyns (2016) claim that in Chinese societies categorize emotions into more categories
than English samples when asked to judge facial expressions.
Variability and expression
Universality, without a doubt, remains a controversial subject. In spite of Ekman and
others’ optimism, evidence for universality is still inconclusive and has been challenged
in a number of ways. However, given that the heaviest criticism is methodological, we
cannot yet rule out some degree of universality. There is some evidence supporting
universality, albeit a weak interpretation.
Let us go back to Russell’s propositions concerning universality. Regarding the
first proposition, that specific patterns of facial muscle movement occur in all human
beings, evidence seems to speak in its favor. Not only is there some recognition of
the same set of pictures across cultures, but also more recent studies have shown
some patterns that obtain reliably. For instance, Jack et al. (2016) report that four
patterns described in terms of action units (individual muscle movements in the face)
obtain and are recognized in both Western and non-Western samples. In the same
vein, Cordaro et al. (2018) report patterns for 22 emotions in five cultures (China,
India, Korea, Japan, and the US). In this sense, we can take the first proposition to
be partially supported by empirical evidence.
Yet, when it comes to the second proposition, that certain facial patterns man-
ifest the same emotions in all human beings, matters are still unclear. First, the
methodological flaws that Russell has pointed out suggest that a number of studies
suffer from problems with circularity, since the categories and correspondence they
set out to prove already inform subjects’ responses, and hence are already implicit in
the experimental designs. More importantly though, issues with translation and the
intentionality of facial expressions cast doubt on the correspondence between these
and emotional states. Without a common background on which to judge the content
of facial expressions, there will be a constant mismatch between how different cultures
read out the face.
Evidence for cultural variation in emotion expression production and recognition
tries to dismantle the second proposition presented above, namely, that emotional
expressions are manifestations of the same emotions in all humans. On the face of it,
there could be universal patterns of expression (assuming the methodological criticism
is misguided), but they do not correspond to the same emotions everywhere. If this
is true, then we would have evidence to reject LC, but also we would have to accept
NOCExpressive.
Apart from showing how universality is controversial, I suspect these findings sug-
gest that the question of the universality of emotional expression is a different topic
altogether that does not have much bearing on the issue of variability. Even if there
were no universal patterns of emotional expression (LC) and hence no correspondence
with emotions (NOCExpressive), would that entail that emotions are variable phenom-
ena? Plausibly not. The reason is that there could still be fixed, even innate patterns
at the neural or physiological level that would grant emotions some robust form of ho-
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mogeneity. Otherwise, we would be forced to split emotion categories in terms of their
different expressions even in presence of evidence for neural and physiological homo-
geneity. If this line of argument is correct, it follows that evidence on the universality
of emotional expression is largely irrelevant to the question of variability.
Someone may object that expressions are still a central part of our emotion at-
tribution and behavioral manifestation. If this is so, the objection would hold, we
cannot set evidence on expression aside, as it provides important information about
how we individuate emotions folk-psychologically. In my view, this objection leads to
an interesting consequence: it reduces expressions to subsets of behavioral patterns.
According to the objection, expression matters because they form part of behavioral
outcomes that help distinguishing between emotions. If this is true, there would be
no reason to consider expressive patterns as separate from behavioral patterns (ac-
tion tendencies) altogether. In other words, expressions are at best part of our action
tendencies, and at worst irrelevant to the case of variability.
2.2.5 Phenomenological patterns
Lastly, we come to phenomenological patterns. Phenomenological patterns are often
understood as patterns of subjective experience. What exactly characterizes subjective
experience is nevertheless unclear. Subjective experience, taken as a criterion to indi-
viduate patterns candidate to correspondence and coordination, fails on two grounds.
First, the phenomena subjects and theorists describe as subjective can plausibly be
reduced to other types of patterns already under consideration, such as collections of
neural and physiological states as well as action tendencies (behavioral patterns). Sec-
ond, even if there is some remainder in terms of qualitative experiences, there are good
reasons to doubt these can successfully help us individuate emotions, thus precluding
claims even about their variability.
A first approximation to tap into phenomenological patterns of emotions is to
rely on self-report data, asking subjects to narrate or describe their own emotional
experience. One influential example of such an approach is the work by Davitz (1969).
Davitz undertook to develop a dictionary of emotions that synthesized how people
use language to refer to their own emotional states. Based on a short list of emotion
terms (Affection, Anger, Anxiety, Boredom, Cheerfulness, Confidence, Impatience,
Sadness, and Satisfaction), he interviewed people asking them how they would describe
each state and recorded their reports. To this list of statements he then added more
descriptions from 1200 subjects who were asked to think of concrete instances of each
emotion. From these reports Davitz obtained a list of 556 statements about emotion
experience. Lastly, he asked a third group to rate how adequate each statement was
to describe their own experiences. With this material in hand, he compiled the most
used descriptions for each term into the dictionary.
A short examination of the definitions and statements found in Davitz’s dictionary
shows that many of the descriptions presumed to tap into subjective experience can
be reduced to other patterns. For example, ‘anger’ includes among its most common
descriptions ‘my blood pressure goes up,’ ‘my pulse quickens,’ or ‘my heart pounds.’ In
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the case of sadness, we find ‘there is a lump in my throat,’ ‘there is a clutching, sinking
feeling in the middle of my chest,’ and ‘I have no appetite.’ Similar descriptions can
be found for other emotions terms as well. In these cases, it is easy to see that these
patterns can be described as physiological patterns corresponding to each emotion.
Other patterns in Davitz’s dictionary’s entries refer rather to action tendencies. In the
cases above, anger includes ‘my fists are clenched,’ ‘there is an impulse to hurt, to hit,
or to kick someone else,’ and sadness, ‘tears well up’ or ‘I cry.’
Perhaps a more sophisticated approach to the phenomenology of emotion is found
in Lambie and Marcel (2002). Lambie and Marcel distinguish three types of questions
regarding the empirical investigation of emotions: (a) what is the content of emotion
experience as it is experienced?, (b) to what nonconscious process or representation
does emotion experience correspond?; and (c) what processes or differences in content
lead to and contribute to emotion experience? In their view, only the first of these
questions tackles phenomenology.
To answer the question of what is the content of emotion experience, Lambie and
Marcel separate between emotion states and emotion experiences. Emotion states
are the functional aspects of emotion apart from conscious experience, which include
primary appraisals of events in terms of relevance to the organism, the activation
of brain and bodily systems, and preparation for action. Emotion experiences are
both the phenomenological aspects of emotional states (first-order experience) and
the awareness of these experiences themselves (second-order experience).
For the purposes of evaluating NOC and LC, following Lambie and Marcel, we
would have to decide at which level are emotions individuated. Suppose we decide
that they must be individuated at the first-order experience level. Characterizing
first-order experience is problematic for a number of reasons. As Lambie and Marcel
recognize, our first mode of access to first-order experience is by introspection, which
requires awareness of it, which in turns changes the first-order experience itself. The
authors suggest that we can instead rely on memory and episodic reinstatement to
tap into previous episodes of first-order experience, circumventing this problem. Yet,
there is good evidence on memory manipulation showing that memory is also affected
by our current epistemic states (Brown & Marsh, 2008; Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, &
Dudai, 2011; Loftus, 2005; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). If this is the case, relying on
episodic reinstatement does not fix the problem.
A second worry regarding first-order experience is that, as Lambie and Marcel
have characterized it, it includes aspects that are again reducible to other patterns.
Given that first-order experience has underlying brain and bodily states, as well as
involving action tendencies and appraisals, it is unclear why this level of description
would yield a different type of pattern at all. As the characterization stands, Lambie
and Marcel have suggested facets of neural, physiological, and behavioral patterns
that are involved in emotion, but have not shown that there is something uniquely
phenomenological worth separating.
One may object that these reductions leave the qualitative character of emotion
experience untouched. In the same vein as proponents of the explanatory gap in
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philosophy of mind (Chalmers, 1997; Levine, 1983) one could argue that physical or
behavioral states do not exhaustively describe pure forms of emotion experience. An
argument of this sort seems to be in the background of LeDoux’s (LeDoux, 2012, 2013;
LeDoux & Brown, 2017) claim that emotions and feelings should be used interchange-
ably. As a consequence, LeDoux recommends not making reference to emotions when
we talk about circuits underlying survival behavioral dispositions, and instead looking
for a theory of emotional consciousness as a theory of emotion.
This approach would entail individuating emotions by their qualitative character
alone. As the record of discussions on the hard problem of consciousness attests,
problems soon arise. First, to do this we need an account of how we could ground
emotion concepts on first-person qualitative properties. Since we presumably do not
have access to others’ first-person experiences, we seem to fall prey of arguments such
as Wittgenstein’s private language argument (Wittgenstein, 1953/2009). According
to a broad and naïve construal of this argument, it is nonsensical to think that the
meaning of concepts such as ‘red’ or ‘yellow’ (and in this case ‘sadness’ and ‘fear’)
can grounded in first-person experience, since we would have no public criteria for
their correct application. This leaves us with concepts on which we cannot construct
a scientific theory.
Second, we could resist the private language argument (and other similar ones)
and insist that there is no reason why it would be impossible to ground phenomenal
properties on publicly available criteria. There are good reasons to doubt that reduc-
tions of the phenomenal character of consciousness are impossible in principle (see e.g.
Pauen, 2017), hence opening the door for third-person descriptions. In other words, we
can reject the explanatory gap and defend the possibility of describing phenomenality
in functional terms. This is for instance what LeDoux and Brown (2017) attempt in
offering a theory of emotional consciousness. If this were so however, then we would
be able to describe phenomenality in neural, physiological, or behavioral terms, thus
diluting the category of phenomenological patterns into the other three.
Lastly, it is doubtful that the appeal to irreducible qualitative properties provides
a tractable account at all. It is difficult to see, on their qualitative aspects alone,
how emotions can differ from one another. This case is clear for emotions that are
similar to one another like anger and indignation, or joy from pride (Prinz, 2007,
p. 52). However, it is even more pressing for comparisons between intuitively very
different emotions such as anger and fear, which are more similar to each other than,
for instance, happiness and fear. Without invoking non-qualitative properties such as
valence (which is ultimately a relational property), we cannot explain many differences
between emotions (for an argument in this direction, see Frijda et al. 1989, p. 227).
Let us grant then that first-order experience cannot do the trick. We may still
claim that phenomenological pattern individuation can obtain at the level of second-
order awareness. Second-order awareness can be characterized, according to Lambie
and Marcel, in two ways. In some cases, our emotion experience is directed to the
self. These are cases where we, for example, experience anger as an offense to our
own selves or sadness as an own failure. In other cases, emotion experience is directed
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to the world. Here our emotions are describable in terms of objects, as when we
experience the object of our anger as something offensive or blameworthy, or sadness
as presenting a world that is unfulfilling.
The case for phenomenological pattern individuation at the second-order awareness
level resembles attempts in appraisal theories to individuate emotions in terms of
core-relational themes (Lazarus, 1991). It is also reminiscent of other approaches in
phenomenology proposed by enactivists (Colombetti, 2009, 2017; Hutto, 2012). In
both of these cases, second-order awareness refers to an experience of an emotion in
terms of the relation between an organism and its environment, whether it is focused
on the standing of the self as related to objects or focused towards properties of the
objects as appraised by the self.
If this interpretation is correct, second-order awareness may be described in terms
of other patterns as well, namely, as action tendencies. Both appraisal theorists and
enactivists stress the idea that the phenomenology of emotion, so construed, is essen-
tially linked to our possibilities of action given a relation with the environment. In a
broad understanding of action tendencies, we can describe these relations as possible
behavioral outcomes an organism may experience in a given moment. Again, phe-
nomenology is described as part of other patterns already considered, casting doubts
on the decision to separate it into its own category.
As a result, the individuation of phenomenological patterns as a separate category
of patterns that would be candidates for correspondence and coordination seems un-
promising. Either we get stuck with problems in grounding concepts in first-person
experience, hence precluding us from establishing any claims regarding their variabil-
ity, or, if we can overcome such an obstacle, we would be able to reduce phenomenal
patterns to other patterns which turn out to be the relevant ones to decide for or
against variability. Consequently, I propose leaving the qualitative character of emo-
tional experience separate from the problem of variability or taking it as a result of
other relevant patterns.
2.3 How to understand variability?
Having discussed the problems emotion researchers face when attempting to individ-
uate patterns of responses in order to determine whether coordination and correspon-
dence hold, we come to two central questions:
• How should we understand VT?
• According to this account of VT, is this thesis well-established?
Regarding the first question, recall the formulation of VT as presented at the
beginning of this chapter:
Variability Thesis (VT) Emotions are naturally disjoined phenomena.
According to the preceding discussion, VT is analyzed in terms of a disjunction
between the following two claims:
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No one-to-one correspondence thesis (NOC) There is no one-to-one correspon-
dence between emotion categories and neural, physiological, behavioral, expres-
sive, or phenomenological patterns of responses.
Low coordination thesis (LC*) Variables in the neural, physiological, behavioral,
expressive, and phenomenological domains do not constitute well-defined pat-
terns of responses (i.e., display low correlations and do not constitute a well-
defined set of causal relations either among variables in a domain or between
variables in different domains).
Each of these claims, in turn, demanded analysis. There are two initial questions
to answer in order to carry out such an analysis. First, which patterns of responses
are relevant to distinguish emotions from one another? In other words, which are the
patterns on which variability is to be evaluated? Second, once we have determined
which types of patterns are relevant to decide questions about variability, we can raise
the question of how to individuate those patterns in an empirically tractable manner.
In my view, the discussion in this chapter suggests that only three types of patterns
or domains are relevant for questions about variability. These are neural, physiological,
and behavioral patterns. The reasons why I exclude expressive and phenomenological
patterns have already been presented and can be synthesized as follows. For both
types of patterns, either they are relevant as subsets of behavioral responses, in which
case they reduce to the behavioral domain, or they do not tell much about distinc-
tions between emotions and thus about the issue of how emotions form kinds. In the
expressive case, I argued that universality of expression does not imply homogeneity
in terms of emotion categories, and at best it is only interesting as part of how we
individuate and attribute emotions folk-psychologically. In the case of phenomenology,
I argued that either it is cashed out in scientifically intractable terms (e.g. qualitative
experience) or, if understood in other terms, reduces to neural, physiological, or behav-
ioral responses. Hence, we can exclude these domains from the discussion regarding
variability.
These arguments suggest the following account of VT as the disjunction of:
No one-to-one correspondence thesis (NOC’) There is no one-to-one correspon-
dence between emotion categories and neural, physiological, and behavioral, pat-
terns of responses.
Low coordination thesis (LC’) Variables in the neural, physiological, and behav-
ioral domains do not constitute well-defined patterns of responses.
Having delimited the set of relevant domains to the neural, physiological, and
behavioral domains, we can now approach the second question: how should we indi-
viduate these patterns in order to empirically evaluate VT? Offering a definite answer
to this question requires a much deeper discussion that what I have and can offer here.
Nevertheless, I offer the following working hypotheses.
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In my view, evidence for neural patterns suggests that they are best individuated
in terms of functional, distributed networks as found by multivariate analyses. Given
the past failures to find anatomical regions or intrinsic networks corresponding to each
emotion, the best candidate for neural patterns is functional locationism. Regarding
physiological patterns, the question is much more complex. As I argued above, we
should understand physiological patterns as sets of cardiac, electrodermal, and res-
piratory variables which are either causally related to one another or are robustly
correlated so as to support distinctions between emotions.
Lastly, regarding behavioral patterns, our best candidate account is in terms of ac-
tion tendencies, that is, dispositions to act in certain ways. In this case, the challenge
is to avoid rendering empirical evidence trivial by tying these action tendencies to the
meaning of emotion terms. As will become clear in later chapters, this can be done
by explicating emotion concepts into functional kinds in terms of a psychofunctional-
ist framework. On this view, behavioral disposition patterns are found by empirical
investigation and constitute part of an emotion’s functional description. This is the
main claim I argue for in Part II.
Having adopted the aforementioned working individuation criteria, we can now
approach the issue of whether VT is empirically well-supported. In my view, the
empirical case for VT is rather strong. Regarding coordination, we observe a relative
degree of coordination in the neural case in terms of functional networks, but evidence
in the physiological and behavioral cases is not as promising. In the physiological
domain, even on multivariate analyses, there is an important degree of overlap between
different emotion categories in terms of their associated autonomic responses. It is
also unclear whether there are coordinated packages of responses in terms of causally
related or correlated variables. At best, these hypotheses have not been tested with
these concepts in hand, precluding establishing the presence of coordinated patterns.
Lastly, regarding behavioral patterns, evidence is sparse given that most of empir-
ical research on emotions has attempted to map them onto neural and physiological
patterns. Yet, some claims are suggested by available findings. On one hand, it is
unclear whether expressive patterns, understood as a part of behavioral outcomes, are
uniform enough to support a coordination claim for the behavioral domain. This is
because both methodologically and empirically universality is controversial. On the
other hand, even though evidence on the phenomenology of emotions that can be re-
duced to behavioral outcomes (e.g. Davitz’s dictionary) does suggest some ways to
differentiate emotions in terms of the ensuing action tendencies, the grain on which
we must carve behavioral responses is yet to be determined. Again, I shall offer an
account that solves this problem below. Nonetheless, for the purposes of determining
the case for or against VT, I believe we must remain at least agnostic regarding the
coordination of behavioral outcomes before more empirical evidence can be gathered.
Consequently, overall, VT seems to be relatively well-supported. If this is true,
then, it seems that the Empirical Challenge has not been overcome yet. To be clear,
let us apply the preceding analyses to reformulate this challenge. At the beginning of
this chapter, I presented the Empirical Challenge as follows:
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Empirical Challenge Provide a scientifically meaningful theoretical framework that
establishes correspondences between emotion categories and well-coordinated
patterns of neural, physiological, expressive, behavioral, and phenomenological
responses.
This definition already captures the idea that VT should be understood as the
disjunction of a correspondence and a coordination claim. This can be seen in that it
spells out a rejection of VT in terms of a conjunction of ¬NOC and ¬LC. Nevertheless,
I have suggested that we do not include expressive or phenomenological patterns in this
definition. As a result, the Empirical Challenge should be formulated in the following
terms:
Empirical Challenge Provide a scientifically meaningful theoretical framework that
establishes correspondences between emotion categories and well-coordinated
patterns of neural, physiological, and behavioral responses.
As I have suggested, it seems that empirical evidence does not enable us to reject
VT, making the Empirical Challenge a pressing obstacle for a unified scientific theory
of emotions. This leads to a dilemma. Either we accept that emotions are disjoined
phenomena, leading to taking emotion categories as arbitrary, which may lead to elim-
inativism, or we offer an account of emotion categories that surpasses the Empirical
Challenge in spite of the empirical evidence in its support. In Part II, I will sketch
meta-theoretical criteria for such an account, rendering the VT unproblematic and the-
oretically tractable. Before I discuss this solution though, let us consider the Empirical
Challenge together with the Theoretical Challenge and explore their consequences.
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Interlude
Can we study emotions scientifically?
In the previous chapters, I have presented what I take to be the two main challenges for
a scientific theory of emotions. These are what I have called the Theoretical Challenge
and the Empirical Challenge. The Theoretical Challenge states that a satisfactory
theory of emotions is one that explains the phenomena covered by the vernacular
term “emotion” with a common set of explanatory resources. The Empirical Challenge
claims that we an empirically tractable theory of emotions is one that allows us to
reject the Variability Thesis, that is, one that enables us to find correspondences
between emotion categories and well-defined (coordinated) neural, physiological, and
behavioral patterns of responses.
First, on the Theoretical Challenge, following Griffith’s (1997) argumentative strat-
egy, I claimed that none of the best scientific theories of emotions succeed in offering
a solution. These are basic emotion theories, appraisal theories, and psychological
constructionist theories. All of these theories run into difficulties either internal to the
theories’ conceptual resources (e.g., problems with ‘basicality’ for BET or problems
with ‘core affect’ for constructionism), their structure as scientific theories (e.g., involve
unwarranted ad-hoc moves and ceteris paribus clauses), or successfully explaining the
phenomenon at hand (e.g., making emotion categories arbitrary or not explaining all
emotions). Hence, Griffiths’s analysis, at least in part, still stands to this day.
Second, concerning the Empirical Challenge, I argued that it should be understood
in terms of finding correspondences between emotion categories and well-coordinated
patters of neural, physiological, and behavioral responses. For each of these domains,
I argued that scientists must be clearer about what counts as a pattern candidate
for correspondence. In the case of neural patterns, the best alternative is to seek
for functional networks in the brain; for physiological patterns, we must be clear
about causal connections between different variables as well as have a clear account of
correlations between them; and for behavioral patterns, I argued that they should be
cashed out in terms of action tendencies which are to be empirically investigated and
not posited as a matter of definition.
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In this interlude, I want to devote some time to some final remarks regarding these
challenges. If we are to meet them, we must be clear about their aims, their demands,
and their foundations. To do this, I first explain some points in common and some
divergences. This will provide an idea of what would count as an answer to one or
another, and whether it is possible to attack both challenges at once. Second, I discuss
some consequences of past failures to meet the challenges. I explore two alternative
replies to the current state of the art, namely, eliminativism and revisionism. In my
view, we must opt for a revisionist solution. Thus, I argue against eliminativism and
provide grounds to motivate revisionism. Lastly, I raise some questions about how
to approach these challenges that will give some structure to the second part of our
discussion.
3.1 The Two Challenges Considered
3.1.1 Where the challenges meet
As I explained above, the Theoretical Challenge requires an account of vernacular
emotion categories. In other words, a theory that successfully meets this challenge is
one that takes the differences of folk emotion categories into consideration. If this is
correct, we can raise the question: does the same hold for the Empirical Challenge?
At a first glance, it seems that the Empirical Challenge does not require accounting
for vernacular concepts of emotions. As Scarantino (2012) has argued, science could
find specific and consistent mechanisms underlying emotions that do not map one-to-
one onto vernacular emotion concepts. For example, we may find that fear corresponds
to three kinds of mechanisms, anger to two kinds of mechanisms, and so on. It would
thus appear that responding to the Empirical Challenge does not demand considering
folk-psychological kinds at all.
Yet, there is a difficulty I will explain later in chapter 5. In my view, marking
a strong division between folk-psychological concepts and scientific concepts runs the
risk of changing the subject. When discussing dimensional theories, I claimed that
one problem they run into the problem of making emotion taxonomies arbitrary and
thus not accounting for the phenomena we call “emotions.” The same could apply
to the Empirical Challenge. Whatever specific and consistent mechanisms we may
find, we must have clear criteria to call them mechanisms of emotions. Thus, I sug-
gest, responding to the Empirical Challenge might also require considering vernacular
concepts. How this can be done in detail will be a question I will discuss later.
This, however, seems to allow a response to the Empirical Challenge without an-
swering the Theoretical Challenge. All that scientists require to tackle to the Empirical
Challenge is some criteria, as vague as they can be, to call a mechanisms a mechanism
of emotion. Consider LeDoux’s experiments on fear conditioning in rats (Phelps &
LeDoux, 2005). These experiments require some way of telling when a rat feels fear
and has been thus conditioned successfully. Presumably, this occurs when the rat
freezes after hearing the conditioned stimulus. On the face of it, all that the experi-
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menter requires is this vague criterion to attribute fear to the rat: if the rat freezes,
it is afraid. This seems far from a full-fledged commitment to a specific theory of
emotions. If this is true, it follows that the Empirical Challenge is largely independent
from the Theoretical Challenge.30
In my view, there three ways in which we can resist or at least qualify this objection.
First, it is unclear whether this procedure is independent of theoretical commitments.
The decision of studying fear in rats and the sense in which the scientist attributes
fear to the rat already implies certain degree of theoretical commitment. Even if in the
context of discovery this commitment is not explicit, in the context of justification it
requires some background assumptions about why fear is a phenomenon that we can
study by using animal models. In LeDoux’s specific case, there is even an assumption
that fear involves activation of the amygdala, hence the hypothesis that by lesioning
this area, fear conditioning would be altered.
The fact that LeDoux’s case involves this commitment also serves to show that
once candidate theories have been proposed, the Empirical Challenge is no longer
independent from those theories. Before we introduce a theory, it is plausible that
scientists can start their investigation with very vague, perhaps folk characterizations
of the phenomena. But once theories have been introduced, these theories shape what
qualifies as an underlying mechanism of an emotion and hence what are the plausible
hypotheses to test. If this is true, then given that theories are already on the table,
the Empirical Challenge is no longer fully independent of the Theoretical Challenge.
Finding mechanisms for emotions requires an analysis of how theories cash out these
mechanisms and formulate their hypotheses.
Lastly, as I have formulated it, the Empirical Challenge stems from Barrett’s dis-
cussion of basic emotion theories and discrete appraisal theories. This is the reason
why the challenge asks for specific and consistent mechanisms, an assumption that
arguably lies at the base of traditional accounts of emotions. This requirement does
reveal an explicit theoretical commitment. If we formulate theories that do not expect
specific and consistent mechanisms (a strategy that I intend to defend below), then the
Empirical Challenge, at least in this version, is dissolved. As a result, the Empirical
Challenge does call for a response to the Theoretical Challenge, at least as the debate
stands currently, and at least in a very broad sense.
3.1.2 Where the challenges diverge
In spite of their common spirit, the two challenges diverge in important respects. Put
differently, even though these challenges are connected in the sense that the Theoretical
Challenge shapes the hypotheses that lead to the Empirical Challenge, they diverge in
a much more nuanced sense. The Theoretical Challenge, as stated above, calls for a
common framework to study all emotions. As such, replying to the challenge requires
an overarching theory of emotions in general. Griffiths formulates the challenge in
terms of kinds. If we take this formulation seriously, then the challenge becomes
30 I thank Diana Pérez for raising this issue.
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offering a theory that presents emotion as a single kind. In other words, overcoming
the challenge implies showing how emotions form a class which allows generalizations
and inductive inferences. I will leave the question of how this kind should be structured
for the second part.
In contrast to this appeal to a general kind, the Empirical Challenge does not
necessarily call for a general framework to study emotions. Instead, this challenge
asks for an account of how specific emotions form kinds. This makes the Empirical
Challenge less theoretically demanding than the Theoretical Challenge.
To make this clear, we can interpret the Empirical Challenge in two ways. On
a weak interpretation, the challenge does not require all emotions to correspond to
specific and consistent patterns of responses. All that is required is that at least some
emotions have such correspondences. In this sense, views such as BET can meet the
Empirical Challenge if they show that at least the so-called basic emotions correspond
to specific and consistent mechanisms. I will call this the Weak Empirical Challenge.
On a stronger interpretation, however, the challenge demands all emotions to cor-
respond to specific and consistent patterns. Even though this interpretation is more
demanding than its weaker counterpart, it is still less stringent than the Theoretical
Challenge. A possible response to this version of the challenge–the Strong Empirical
Challenge, as it were–could account for all emotions as kinds but without committing
to the idea that all emotions form the same type of kind. In other words, we could
meet the Strong Empirical Challenge by showing that basic emotions form a partic-
ular type of kind while higher cognitive emotions form a different type of kind. This
would make it possible to meet the Strong Empirical Challenge while failing to meet
the Theoretical challenge.
If these interpretations are correct, it follows that meeting the Empirical Challenge
does not require an answer of the same scope as an answer to the Theoretical Challenge.
We can answer the Empirical Challenge by proposing different theories for each type of
emotions, thus failing to offer an overarching theoretical framework. This is consistent
with the fact discussed above that answers to the Theoretical Challenge inform the
demands of the Empirical Challenge. In this case, it is as if we offered different
replies to the Theoretical Challenge, failing to meet it as it stands in the literature
but providing an account of what mechanisms are to be expected for each type of
emotions.
How about the converse? Is it possible to meet the Theoretical Challenge without
meeting the Empirical Challenge? At a first glance, we could offer a general theory of
emotions that presents them as a higher order kind without committing to the claim
that emotions in particular form kinds. Consider an analogy with other kinds such
as gold. Even if gold forms a kind in terms of all of its elements sharing an essence,
this does not mean that different types of gold form kinds themselves. There could be
arbitrary distinctions between different types of gold such that there are no lower-level
kinds relative to the general kind of gold. Similarly, it is presumably possible to offer a
theory of emotions that groups them all into a single kind without particular emotions
forming kinds themselves.
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The preceding discussion raises a problem for this line of argument though. One of
the criteria I have proposed to meet the Theoretical Challenge was to account for the
vernacular distinctions between emotion categories. I criticized dimensional views on
the grounds that they do not shed light on these distinctions, making classifications
arbitrary. If this constitutes a failure to meet the Theoretical Challenge, it follows that
meeting the challenge demands an account of the discreteness of emotion categories.
Consequently, a response to the Theoretical Challenge must include an account of
how particular emotion categories form kinds themselves. If this is correct, meeting
the Theoretical Challenge would seem to imply a response to the Empirical Challenge,
even in its strong form.
Nevertheless, I believe we can resist this conclusion and make a case for the pos-
sibility of meeting the Theoretical Challenge while leaving the Empirical Challenge
aside. As I explained above, the Empirical Challenge not only appeals to the presence
of a kind, but to a particular type of kind in terms of specific and consistent mech-
anisms. If we offer a theory of emotions that cashes them out in terms that do not
demand specific and consistent mechanisms, then we would have met the Theoretical
Challenge while dissolving the Empirical Challenge. On such an account, there would
be no need to find specificity and consistency, thus rendering the Empirical Challenge
uninteresting. This is the sort of account I will defend in Part II. Before discussing
my proposal in detail, nonetheless, let us explore the consequences of failing to meet
these challenges.
3.2 Failing to meet the challenge: Should we just give up?
What happens if we cannot find a theoretical framework that explains emotions and
if we find no sense in which emotions correspond to well-coordinated packages of
responses? Does this imply that a science of emotion is impossible in principle?
One pessimistic outcome is eliminativism. If there is no way to formulate a theory
of emotions that is scientifically tractable, it follows that we should eliminate emotion
categories from scientific discourse. Depending on whether the problem stems from
general observations about the nature of scientific theories or whether it stems from
problems with emotion concepts in particular, eliminativism may arise in two forms.
I will call these Wide Eliminativism and Narrow Eliminativism respectively.
Wide Eliminativism is the claim that a theory of emotions is impossible in principle,
not because of problems specific to emotion concepts but because of problems with
a more general class of concepts. In its most influential form, Wide Eliminativism
gets its voice in Churchland’s (1981) argument. Churchland claims that there is no
interesting sense in which we can study mental phenomena scientifically. The reason
for this is that mental concepts, which have their roots in folk-psychological categories,
have already failed to meet scientific standards. Baker (1993) spells out Churchland’s
argument (she calls it the Argument from Science) in the following terms:
(P1) Propositional-attitude concepts genuinely apply to humans if and only
if they are underwritten by the best science of the mind.
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(P2) The best science of the mind will not underwrite propositional-attitude
concepts.
Therefore,
(C) Propositional-attitude concepts do not genuinely apply to humans.
(Baker, 1993, p. 180)
Framed in this way, the argument concerns propositional-attitude concepts. Nev-
ertheless, this argument is not what is at stake in the case of eliminativism regarding
emotions. To see this, let us consider what I call narrow eliminativism, as proposed
by Griffiths (1997).
As I explained in chapter 1, Griffiths argues that since none of our best theoretical
frameworks capture emotions as a whole, then we must eliminate emotion categories
from scientific discourse. The reasons he puts forward concern then emotions in par-
ticular, claiming nothing about other kinds of concepts in science. In order to evaluate
Griffiths’s argument, I updated his view to consider more recent theories of emotions.
Moreover, I conceded that none of our best theories overcome the Theoretical Chal-
lenge. Hence, it would seem that Narrow Eliminativism is still on the table.
In contrast to Churchland, Griffiths does not think that there is no phenomenon
corresponding to emotions. Instead, he believes that emotions correspond to a het-
erogeneous set of phenomena. This is different from Churchland’s argument, which
claims that there are no such things as folk-psychological states like belief or desires.
Given this difference, I shall leave wide eliminativism aside, and focus on Griffith’s
narrow eliminativism.
I believe there are good reasons to resist Griffiths’s conclusion though. In other
words, the fact that our best theories cannot capture the phenomena in question does
not entail eliminativism, even in this constrained form. The only thing that follows
from this argument is that currently, we have no satisfactory theoretical framework.
The possibility of offering such a framework, however, remains open.
Consider a classic example defenders of eliminativism have used in the past: the
caloric theory of heat. The theory’s failure to capture the phenomenon of temperature
did not mean that temperature was not an object of scientific study. Rather, it meant
that another theory had to be proposed, one that would capture the phenomenon
successfully. The switch from the caloric theory to the analysis of temperature in
terms of mean kinetic molecular energy did just that. Consequently, past failures do
not entail eliminativism.
A more charitable interpretation of Griffiths’s view could reply that not only does
he show that no theoretical framework explains all and only the phenomena we call
emotions, but that the phenomena themselves are heterogeneous and thus escape ex-
planation and description under a common theory. The narrow eliminativist could
hold that Griffiths’s showed that it is not just that theories have failed to offer such a
framework, but that the theories he considered are well-confirmed theories that show
that emotions themselves are not a unitary phenomenon, but that they are rather two
(or three) different kinds of phenomena. If this is true, it follows that an overarching
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theory of emotions is impossible in principle, since we know already that we need
different theories for each kind involved.
I do not think this interpretation holds up. First, as I claimed above, Griffiths’s
argument is outdated. This not only means that an update is required, but that the
theories he considered are no longer our best theories. Consequently, it is not the
case that those theories are now considered well-confirmed, nor that they reveal some
intrinsic fact about emotions that precludes offering a general theory. Second, even in
its updated version, one could turn things around and argue that precisely because our
best theories have failed to explain emotions, they are bad theories. In other words,
instead of taking sides with the theories, we can use these findings as arguments to
reject the theories themselves.
As an alternative to eliminating emotion categories from science, I suggest we
revise our scientific categories of emotions. Without exhausting the option of Revi-
sionism, we cannot claim that a theory of emotions is impossible in principle. As
long as a revisionist strategy is still available, eliminativism cannot get off the ground.
Consequently, the rest of this work deals with the question of how to carry out such
revisionism. As we will see, not only is revisionism still a possible alternative, but a
promising one. If I succeed in defending this revisionist project, then it follows that
(1) we can overcome the Theoretical Challenge, and (2) once we have a new theory
in place, we can proceed to evaluate the empirical demands of the theory in order to
revisit the Empirical Challenge.
3.3 What do we need to theorize about emotions?
In my view, there are three important pieces to answer the question of how to construct
a scientifically interesting theory of emotions. The first is to make clear what are the
criteria for a classificatory scheme to be considered scientific. This problem lies at
the heart of criticisms claiming that emotions do not form a natural kind, such as
Griffiths’s and Barrett’s. By claiming that emotions do not form a natural kind, they
suggest that emotion categories are not objects of scientific investigation. In order to
respond to these arguments, we must make clear what role the notion of “natural kind”
is supposed to play in these arguments and in considerations about scientific theories
in general. This will be the central question I will discuss in chapter 4.
Besides having an idea of what counts as a scientifically respectable kind, the next
step is to determine how we can construct scientifically interesting taxonomies given
the criteria adopted in the previous step. To do this, we must first clarify what is
it exactly that we intend to explain in our candidate vocabulary, that is, what the
explanandum phenomenon for our theory is. In other words, we need to reconstitute
the phenomenon (Bechtel & Richardson, 2000/2010). I shall discuss this issue in
chapter 5.
Lastly, once we have an idea of how to fix the explanandum and what types of
vocabulary are available to us to construct a scientific theory, we must apply these
results to the case of emotions. We must ask what are the conditions under which we
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would say that a kind corresponds to emotions as an explanandum phenomenon, and
which vocabulary is best suited to construct a scientific theory of emotions. This will
occupy the final chapter (chapter 6).
If we succeed in answering these questions, we will have offered an account of how to
construct a scientifically interesting theory of emotions, this allowing a response to the
Theoretical Challenge. Additionally, we will have made progress on how to attack the
Empirical Challenge, since offering the theory will give us ways to formulate testable
hypotheses and tools to interpret empirical evidence already gathered.
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Chapter 4
Scientific Kinds
There are numerous ways to classify objects in the world. Most objects we encounter
in our everyday lives can be classified according to size, shape, color, etc. When we
classify these objects, we label the class and assign it a name. Thus, we talk about
big and small, round or square, red or blue objects, and so on. We can also specify
what the name is meant to capture, what property is it that allows such groupings and
that the name is intended to convey. For example, we can say that objects classified
as round are those whose borders are at an equal distance from their center. We
can further elaborate more precise descriptions of these conditions, using more refined
languages that allow us to make better distinctions. This is the case of red objects,
which we can classify as those whose surface reflects a certain range of wavelengths
(making use of the vocabulary of physics), thus producing in us the sensation of red.
Not all classifications are interesting for scientific inquiry. Objects that lie 300
meters away from the Eiffel Tower do share a property in common (namely, lying 300
meters away from the Eiffel Tower), but this does not tell us much about what kinds of
objects we will encounter. Objects that satisfy this property may include cars, people,
animals, buildings, etc. In contrast, other classes seem to be scientifically meaningful.
Once we discover that all molecules of water are composed of two atoms of hydrogen
and one of oxygen, we can expect them to behave in certain ways, such as them boiling
at 100°C at sea level or forming solid structures below 0°C. The question then is: what
distinguishes classes that are scientifically interesting from those that are not?
It is common to phrase this question in terms of natural kinds: what defines the
genuine natural kinds from the merely appearance of natural kindhood? Presumably,
it is because genuine natural kinds “carve nature at its joints” that they are the proper
objects of scientific inquiry.31 But what does it mean for a kind to carve nature at its
joints? And why is this important for scientific investigation?
31 This view is frequently ascribed to Plato. In the Phaedrus, Socrates presents two forms of
discourse which the interlocutors follow in their discussion on eros. One we can call composition
or synthesis, and consists in subsuming different particulars under one idea. The second can
be called division or analysis, and consists in dividing things into elements. When presenting
analysis, Socrates says: “The second principle is that of division into species according to the
natural formation, where the joint is, not breaking any part as a bad carver might” (Plato, n.d.,
265e; my emphasis). Interestingly, Plato was not discussing the division of objects in the world,
nor problems related to induction or scientific inquiry. Rather, he is suggesting different methods
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In this chapter, I will defend a reformulation of the latter question. I will claim
that questions regarding scientific kinds require a pluralistic view of kinds that takes
some distance from the tradition of natural kinds. In other words, I will argue that
there may be many answers the question of what makes some classes interesting for
scientific inquiry. What determines these answers are the explanatory interests of a
given discipline and the conceptual resources with which we characterize the object of
study. If this is so, the question of what kind of scientific object are emotions must
be approached relative to the disciplines that study it, rather than a metaphysics of
natural kinds.
4.1 The tradition of natural kinds
4.1.1 Mill and the introduction of Kinds
Mill (1843/1974) is often credited as the father of the tradition of natural kinds.
Nevertheless, as I will show below, much of what the tradition has inherited from Mill
stems from conflating two different concepts in Mill’s work. These are the concepts of
‘real Kind’ and of ‘natural group.’ Real Kinds are meant to capture the logic behind
general terms, while natural groups are intended to explain the metaphysical and
epistemological aspects underlying induction. By conflating these two concepts, the
tradition has assumed a picture of natural kinds that does not accommodate actual
scientific practice, and that overstates the role certain patterns of induction play in
how we construct scientific categories. With this in mind, I will present Mill’s ideas
on kinds and induction, and connect them to the contemporary landscape of theories
of natural kinds and what I believe are important drawbacks of the current debates.
In his investigation on induction, Mill suggested that there is an unlimited number
of ways to construct classes, but only some tell us something about the world. He
noticed that some classes are bound together only by the property connoted by their
name. This would be the case of the class of ‘Objects that lie 300 meters away from
the Eiffel Tower’; the only shared property we can know of is the one that the name
of the class makes reference to. Other classes, those such as water, have a number
of properties beyond the one specified by the name; molecules of water are not only
molecules of H2O, but also form substances that boil beyond certain temperature or
freeze below another.
Mill thought that classes of the second kind correspond to distinctions in nature.
In his words:
And if any one even chooses to say that the one classification is made
by nature, the other by us for our convenience, he will be right; provided
he means no more than this: Where a certain apparent difference between
things (though perhaps in itself of little moment) answers to we know not
in which we can proceed in discourse and present our ideas. Yet, this phrase has been widely
popularized in debates about natural kinds.
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what number of other differences, pervading not only their known proper-
ties, but properties yet undiscovered, it is not optional but imperative to
recognise this difference as the foundation of a specific distinction; while, on
the contrary, differences that are merely finite and determinate, like those
designated by the words white, black, or red32, may be disregarded if the
purpose for which the classification is made does not require attention to
those particular properties. (Mill, 1843/1974, p. 123)
Thus, Mill thought that classes for which we can discover further properties, those
whose properties are unexhausted by their defining property and potentially infinite in
number, are to be privileged and taken as mirroring distinctions in nature.33 Moreover,
he identified these classes with those that Aristotelians called genera or species. The
differences between genera and species are not mere accidents, but are differences in
kind. In turn, differences in kind in the Aristotelian sense were taken to be differences
in essence. The class of objects that lie 300 meters away from the Eiffel Tower differ
from objects that do not in an accidental way. There is nothing essential to those
objects that makes them members of the class. In contrast, members of the class
water differ from other objects in the world because they have a specific essence
(namely, being molecules of H2O) that is not present in other objects. Furthermore,
if any other object possessed said essence, it would necessarily count as member of
the class water. Consequently, the difference between objects that lie 300 meters
away from the Eiffel Tower is an accidental difference, whereas the difference between
objects that are water and those that are not is a difference in kind.
These discussions introduced the term kind into recent philosophical literature.
The term was first meant to capture those classes on which scientific inquiry was
grounded, those for which science could discover new facts and properties. Even if Mill
is wrong about what characterizes these kinds (see Hacking, 1991), it is important to
note what the term is meant to convey. Notice, however, that Mill did not yet introduce
the adjective ‘natural’ to designate these kinds. He thought that these interesting type
of kinds would mirror distinctions in nature, but did not qualify them as ‘natural kinds.’
This is important because, as I will show below, the adjective ‘natural’ has become a
source of confusion among philosophers of science and metaphysicians alike.
Even though Mill is often attributed the introduction of the notion of ‘natural
kind,’ he uses two different albeit related terms. The first is the term «real Kind».
Mill introduces this term after the discussion above, which is a discussion on the logic
behind some general terms and their classificatory purposes. Real Kinds are those to
which we assign a general term as a name, and are among the kinds that constitute
interesting objects of scientific investigation. These are kinds that are “distinguished
32 Notice that Mill thinks that classes grouped by color are examples of uninteresting classes. I do
not share this view, but I shall leave this discussion aside.
33 It is important to clarify that Mill did not believe that classes exhausted by their defining
property where not also classes carved by nature. He recognizes that both types of classes are
natural in a sense, and that classification itself is a human activity. What he does believe is that
only classes for which there is more to discover ground scientific inquiry.
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from all other classes by an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from
one another” (Mill, 1843/1974, p. 126).
Nevertheless, the notion of a «real Kind» must not be confused with a the second
notion in Mill’s work, namely, that of a «natural group».34 In the chapter called “Of
Classification, as Subsidiary to Induction”, Mill revisits some of the ideas regarding
real Kinds, although with a difference in focus. It is clear from the title that in this
case, classification is discussed not in relation to the use of general names, but as part
of our inductive practices. Mill even starts this chapter by making such distinction.
Here, classification is not taken as the division of things according to the use of a
name (thus it is not the logical structure of classification that is being discussed), but
as a problem of “[how] To provide that things shall be thought of in such groups, and
those groups in such an order, as will best conduce to the remembrance and to the
ascertainment of their laws” (Mill, 1843/1974, p. 712).35
Mill repeats a point made earlier in his first discussion of classification: there are
infinite ways of logically constructing classes. But, similarly to the previous discussion,
there are special ways to construct classes that, in this case, serve the purposes of
scientific inquiry. In his view, scientific classification works by grouping objects in
order to make the most generalizations possible. These groupings will correspond,
whenever possible, to the properties that cause other properties of the class. Yet,
it is the most salient effect that will serve to diagnose the class, as we do not know
the causes beforehand. Therefore, a group of objects will be said to be natural if it
is constructed in virtue of its most general similarity. These similarities may not be
obvious from the outset, and their discovery constitutes one of the aims of scientific
inquiry.
Consider the case of water. Saying that instances of water form a natural group
amounts to saying that they share a number of properties in common, some of which
are caused by some others. At the beginning of the investigation, we do not know
which are the properties that cause one another, and thus we identify the objects by
its most salient effects: they are generally found as transparent liquids, we are able to
drink them, etc. In this sense, we determine certain salient similarities among different
instances and group them under a class accordingly.
However, this is not yet sufficient for us to ascertain that water forms a natural
group. Besides a general degree of similarity, it is also necessary that we group things
according to those similarities that allow us to individuate the kind as best as possible.
In Mill’s words:
[...] when we are studying objects not for any special practical end, but
for the sake of extending our knowledge of the whole of their properties and
relations, we must consider as the most important attributes, those which
contribute most, either by themselves or by their effects, to render things
34 The distinction between real Kinds and natural groups is discussed in detail by Magnus (2015).
35 Moreover, in the previous discussion on real Kinds, Mill claims at several points that distinctions
between real Kinds are interesting for the logician, and that different Kinds constitute different
logical species. See Mill (1843/1974, p.123).
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like one another, and unlike other things; which give the class composed
of them the most marked individuality [...]. (Mill, 1843/1974, p. 716)
In this sense, not only similarity, but also individuality, constitutes a necessary
condition for a natural group. To put it differently, a natural group must be a group
of objects naturally similar to each other in important respects, such that these respects
determine the criteria to judge whether something is a member of the group or not,
thus allowing us to individuate the group.36
To take the case of water again, once we have identified the class superficially, we
can then investigate further and discover that these objects share the property of being
molecules of H2O, that they boil at 100°C, and other related facts about water. By
identifying the molecular composition as central to what water is, we are formulating
a definition that allows us to summarize our body of knowledge about water, as it is
due to this molecular composition that other properties follow. As a result, we have
found a way of ascertaining certain laws or facts about water by using this scheme of
classification. Furthermore, any object that shares this property will be counted as
member of the class, and thus this property becomes the individuating feature of the
group.
Insofar as the notion of «natural group» is invoked in the discussion of classifi-
cation as a task of dividing objects in the world, the distinction is metaphysical and
epistemological. It is metaphysical, in the sense of capturing something about how
objects are organized independently of ourselves. And it is epistemological, because
it intends to say something about the best way to classify things for the purposes of
induction and scientific knowledge.
Having presented the notions of «real Kind» and «natural group» as suggested by
Mill, we can now raise the following question: do all natural groups form real Kinds
and viceversa? As explained above, the notion of «real Kind» is a logical one, one
intended to specify the logic behind the use of some general terms. In contrast, the
notion of «natural group» is metaphysical and epistemological, intended to capture
the ways in which objects are grouped together in nature and to make clear what is
the best way in which we can construct taxonomies to capture such groupings.
Mill claims that distinctions in terms of real Kinds correspond to distinctions in
nature in the sense that real Kinds form classes that are subject to further scientific
inquiry. According to Mill, the fact that two groups differ in an inexhaustible number
of ways is a symptom that these groups differ in nature. In this sense, all real Kinds
are natural groups. Yet, natural group distinctions are not exhausted by distinctions
between real Kinds. The reason is that there may be natural groups that do not have
an indefinite and inexhaustible number of difference, therefore not forming different
real Kinds. Mill uses the examples of differences among species to claim that these may
only have a select number of properties distinguishing them. For instance, raspberries,
which are members of the genus Rubus, do not differ from other members of the genus,
36 Mill does not allow for natural groups or Kinds to be fuzzy. See Mill (1843/1974, p. 720).
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such as roses, in an inexhaustible set of properties. Yet, they are classified differently
by botany, and as such form different natural groups.
In sum, Mill introduced the notion of «real Kind» to characterize the logic behind
some general terms, and the notion of «natural group» to capture distinctions in nature
that constitute the objects of scientific inquiry (and hence induction). Unfortunately,
many philosophers in the debates about natural kinds have missed this distinction.
As a consequence, they take Mill’s real Kinds as the precursors of what we now call
natural kinds. This gives rise to the idea that natural kinds are individuated by their
essences, as real Kinds are for Mill. In other words, this confusion has lead to one of
the most important accounts of natural kinds: essentialism.
4.1.2 Essentialism
Recall that the question about what makes certain kinds interesting for science amounts
to asking what makes certain groupings available for inductive inferences. Mill thought
that induction depends on certain groups being formed in nature itself in virtue of their
members possessing a number of salient properties, some of which allow us individuate
the group and extend our knowledge. Given that some of these groups were individu-
ated by their essence, this gave rise to the idea that perhaps all natural groups were so
individuated. This view, which Mill rightly traces back to Aristotle, is the backbone
of essentialism.
Essentialism can be defined as the view that natural kinds are individuated by
a specific, epistemically privileged property that, by itself, warrants membership to
the kind and serves justify inductive inferences across a kind’s members—an essence.
Contemporary essentialism is attributed mainly to the work of Kripke (1972) and
Putnam (1970/1977, 1975). Interestingly, neither Kripke nor Putnam offered a defense
of essentialism itself. Rather, they presupposed essentialism to develop their causal
view on reference. Their idea is that the meaning of many general terms such as
‘water’ or ‘gold’ was determined, not by their intension, but by their extension, and
that these extensions correspond to natural kinds understood as groups individuated
by an essence.37
To understand the role essentialism plays in Kripke’s and Putnam’s view, consider
the proposition ‘Water is H2O.’ This is an identity statement, connecting the terms
‘water’ and ‘H2O.’ Presumably, if this is an identity statement, it must be necessarily
true, that is, it must be true in every possible world. The problem is that the intensions
associated with ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are not the same. ‘Water’ can be described as ‘A
transparent substance that living organisms drink to survive’ (and other descriptions
associated with water), whereas ‘H2O’ is described as ‘A molecule consisting in two
atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen.’ Given that their intensions are different,
37 On one construal, essences may be understood in a logical sense, as that which defines a kind.
This is not the sense in which I will use the term essence, and I think this is not the sense
intended by essentialists about kinds. In my view, essentialists appeal to a stronger construal
of essences in terms of properties that objects possess independently of our categories. In this
chapter, I use the term “essence” in this latter sense.
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how is it possible that the identity statement connecting them is necessarily true? It
could perhaps be the case that in some possible world, chemists did not discover that
water is H2O, and as such the identity statement would be false. For example, in
Putnam’s Twin Earth (Putnam, 1975), chemists assigned the name ‘Water’ to sub-
stance XYZ, a substance satisfying all superficial properties of H2O but differing in
its chemical composition. In Twin Earth, chemists would not consider ‘Water is H2O’
to be true, but the statement ‘Water is XYZ’ instead.
What Kripke and Putnam argued is that the problem arises only if we endorse the
view that intensions determine the extension of the terms involved. If we abandon
such a view, we can see that the extension of ‘Water’ and ‘H2O’ in our world is the
same, and therefore the identity statement connecting them is true. Furthermore,
given our assignment of the terms to this extension, we see that in every possible
world, ‘Water’ (assigned to the extension we assign to it in our world) always refers
to the substance which we refer to when using the name ‘H2O.’ In the case of Twin
Earth, Twin Earthians have assigned the name ‘Water’ to a different extension, and
in this sense they use the name differently from us. When we take into account such
assignment of names, we see that ‘Water is H2O’ is true in every possible world, even
if in other possible worlds the assignment has been different. As long as we understand
that our use of names refers to a particular extension, and that this extension remains
the same in every possible world in which it exists, then our identity statement would
hold even in worlds where other names are used to refer to them.
This argument runs if we presuppose that the extensions associated with ‘Water’
and ‘H2O’ remain constant in every possible world where they exist. In other words,
we need to presuppose that in every world were water exists, it is H2O. This is the
essentialist intuition underlying Kripke’s and Putnam’s argument, the intuition that
if water is indeed H2O, then it is so essentially. By ‘essentially’, they mean that an
object that looked like water but was not H2O (such as XYZ) would not be water at
all; hence, H2O would be the essence of water.
Salmon (1981), in his discussion of Kripke’s view, pointed out that there are two
theses involved in the argument above. The first is the thesis that names such as
‘Water,’ i.e. natural kind terms, refer to classes united in virtue of some essence; this
is what he calls the Semantic Thesis. The second is the thesis that there are in the
world classes united in virtue of some essence; this is what he calls the Metaphysical
Thesis. As can be seen from the above, the Metaphysical Thesis does not follow from
the Semantic Thesis. It might be the case that we assign natural kind terms as if
there were such essentially bounded classes, even if there were no such classes. Thus,
essentialism is presupposed, rather than defended, by Kripke’s (and Putnam’s) theory
of reference.
Essentialism, taken as the claim that natural kinds are groups in nature formed
in virtue of an essence, does provide an answer to what makes certain kinds useful
for induction though. When we make inductive inferences, we observe a limited set
of phenomena and we project certain properties (or predicates) to other unobserved
instances of that phenomenon. We would be right in projecting these properties if the
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instances above shared an essence, since we would be rightly attributing properties to
things that will at least probably have them. For example, if we examine some samples
of water and determine that they boil at 100°C at sea level, then we would be right in
inferring that for any other substance with the same chemical composition (H2O), it
would be the case that it will boil at 100°C at sea level.
Yet, even if essentialism offers a theory for some interesting scientific kinds, it
fails when it comes to others. Consider the case of lilies discussed by Dupré (1981).
Lilies are referred to in biological taxonomy as members of the family Liliaceae. These
include paradigm cases of lilies such as the Lonely Lily (genus Eremocrinum) and
the Desert Lily (genus Hesperocallis). Yet, the family of Liliaceae also includes other
plants that, under the common usage of the term ‘Lily,’ would not be included. These
are garlic and onion (genus Allium). If Liliaceae were to form a natural kind, then we
would have to specify an essential property that all of its members share. However, its
members are so different (as different as paradigmatic lilies and onions) that finding an
essence seems unlikely. But even if there was such a property, what is intended with
this way of classifying lilies is to capture, not a set of essential features uniting the
class, but their common ancestry and place in evolutionary history. In other words,
the scientific kind Liliaceae is meant to support inductive inferences in virtue of a
common historical background, not a common essence.
This sort of objection has been raised widely throughout the literature, particularly
by philosophers of biology (Griffiths, 1999; Hull, 1978). In general, the objection is
that some sciences, in this case biology, do not classify their objects by virtue of their
presumed essences, that is, in terms of a concrete property or microstructure shared by
all members of the class. As we will see below, other sciences such as psychology and
neuroscience also appear to classify in non-essentialist ways. If this is the case, then
essentialism cannot offer a satisfactory account of scientific classification.38 What we
need, perhaps, is a wider account of classification that accounts for the kinds essen-
tialism account for, but also includes classification in other sciences such as biology.
These considerations lead to the traditional alternative to essentialism, Boyd’s (1991;
1999a; 2010) homeostatic-property-cluster account.
4.1.3 The HPC account
In the second half of the twentieth century, Richard Boyd developed the homeostatic-
property-cluster account (HPC account for short), designed to overcome some of the
issues raised against essentialism. In contrast to essentialism, which was developed
mostly due to concerns regarding metaphysics and the philosophy of language, the
HPC account was developed in the context of philosophy of science. As such, the
38 There are also a number of metaphysical problems with essentialism. These include problems
with what counts as an essence, whether there may be disjunctive properties as essences, whether
they require a number of modal features such as necessity, and the level at which essences can
be located. Since my concern here is with accounts of kinds as explaining scientific classification
rather than with their metaphysics, I will not go over these problems here. For an overview,
however, see Khalidi (2013, Ch. 1)
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HPC account emphasizes the actual practices of scientists in order to draw an account
of how particular disciplines classify their objects.
Homeostatic Property Clusters
We have already established that members of a kind share a number of properties
that allow us to succeed in our inductive inferences. According to the essentialist,
one of these properties will have a special place in our epistemic practices, as it will
constitute the essential property that warrants induction across members of a kind.
In contrast to essentialism, the HPC account claims that for at least some natural
kinds, it is not necessary that there is one property shared by all members of the kind
(e.g. an essence). Instead, we see that many kinds in science merely tend to share
properties, that is, they have a number of properties that tend to cluster together but
may vary across members of the kind. This would be the case of the family Liliaceae,
whose members tend to share but not always possess the same properties, such as
being flowering plants with generally large and colorful flowers and air-borne fruits.
For the HPC account, the important question is not only which clustering of prop-
erties is associated with the kind, but why does this clustering obtain. In this view,
a given clustering of properties is inductively interesting only in case it obtains for a
reason. Specifically, the HPC account claims that there must be a mechanism that
makes these properties tend to cluster together if the kind is to be considered a natural
kind. Kinds are thus individuated, not by members possessing the same set of (essen-
tial) properties, but rather by the mechanisms underlying the homeostatic clustering
of properties. Consider again the case of Liliaceae. Even if there are outliers such as
onions and garlic, members of the kind have a number of properties that tend to clus-
ter together, such as the size and color of their flowers. In this case, these properties
cluster together because all members of the kind descend from a common ancestor. As
such, mechanisms involved in reproduction and evolution warrant that the properties
associated with the kind will tend to co-occur in a relatively stable fashion.
Following Boyd (1999), HPC kinds may be initially characterized as follows:
(1) There is a family of properties F that are contingently clustered in nature.
(2) The presence of some of the properties in F either favors the presence of other
associated properties or is caused by underlying mechanisms that favor it (or
both). This is what Boyd (sometimes metaphorically, sometimes literally) calls
homeostasis. (See Boyd, 1999a, p. 143)
Under this account, then, natural kinds are homeostatic clusters of properties. But
importantly, Boyd thinks that not just any clustering of properties counts. Only those
clusterings which are causally relevant for the explanatory purposes of a discipline are
acceptable as natural kinds. Hence, he adds another condition to his characterization:
(3) The clustering of properties in F has causal effects because of the conjoint oc-
currence of properties and the presence of their underlying mechanisms. (Boyd,
1999a, p. 143)
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I will return to the justification behind this condition below, when we discuss
to which extent do we need a metaphysics of kinds to offer an account of scientific
classification. For now, it suffices to show that Boyd’s HPC account is committed to
a realist view of science in which natural kinds map onto the causal structure of the
world (see particularly Boyd, 2010).
Boyd further adds other conditions to his account. These can be summarized as
follows:
(4) There is a kind term t that is applied to things that have a homeostatic clustering
of most properties in F.
(5) t has no analytic definition. The definition is given by the properties and mech-
anisms that underlie the kind. Hence, defining the kind is a matter of discovery
and theoretical development.
(6) A member of the kind may display some but not all of the properties in F,
and some but not all underlying mechanisms may be present (i.e. there may be
imperfect homeostasis).
(7) Whenever there is imperfect homeostasis, the relevance of some properties in F
or some mechanisms over others is an a posteriori theoretical issue, not an a
priori conceptual one.
(8) There may (and will be) cases of extensional indeterminacy.
(9) The causal importance of F, together with the underlying homeostatic mecha-
nisms, is such that the kind or property denoted by t is a natural kind.
(10) No refinement of t towards less extensionally vague clusters will preserve the nat-
uralness of the kind. Either it will overstate explanatorily irrelevant distinctions,
or lead to a neglect of explanatorily relevant similarities.
(11) The HPC that serves to define t is not individuated extensionally but histori-
cally. The properties determining membership to t may change over time with-
out t changing its definition, depending on the causally or inductively relevant
properties at a given time. (Boyd, 1999a, pp. 143-144)
Accommodation and discipline relativism
So far, kinds are individuated by the presence of a mechanism that causes a causally
relevant clustering of properties. There are, however, a wide range of mechanisms
that can be identified in nature, and therefore there would be a wide range of possible
taxonomies. What makes it so that we prefer some taxonomy over another? In Boyd’s
account, the decision for a particular taxonomy depends on the explanatory demands
of a particular discipline. For example, since biology is presumably in the business of
explaining commonalities among organisms that have evolved from a common ancestor,
reference to species and other clades as kinds is vital to its explanations. In this sense,
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reference to species as a kind accommodates to the demands of biology. In contrast,
other disciplines such as gardening would not find the class of Liliaceae useful for
their purposes, as their interests might lie, for instance, in the aesthetic properties of
plants. As a result, Liliaceae would not form a kind for gardening, as the clustering
of properties in this class is no longer explanatorily relevant to the discipline.
This claim can be formulated as what Boyd calls the Accommodation Thesis:
Accommodation Thesis We are able to identify true generalizations because we
accommodate our inductive practices to the causal structure of the world by
using a vocabulary that is itself accommodated to relevant causal structures.
Let us unpack this thesis. Each discipline has a number inductive and inferential
practices along with some conceptual resources to explain the phenomena its inter-
ested in. These constitute what Boyd calls a disciplinary matrix. In order for these
practices to be successful, each disciplinary matrix M will demand certain fit between
its concepts and classificatory schemes and the causal structures relevant to the dis-
cipline. These are M ’s accommodation demands. Given that questions about natural
kinds are questions about our inductive practices, the problem of how to define natural
kinds can be formulated as a one regarding the contribution of natural kind terms and
concepts to the satisfaction of the accommodation demands of different disciplinary
matrices.
Boyd distinguishes two senses in which we define natural kind terms. On the one
hand, for a disciplinary matrix M, we can define the kind by the explanatory role that
the use of a natural kind term t plays in satisfying M ’s accommodation demands. For
example, we can define an element by its relation to other elements in the periodic
table, or a species by its phylogenetic position. This is what Boyd calls a programmatic
definition. On the other hand, we can define t by appealing to the properties associated
with the kind. In this second sense, we define an element by appealing to properties
such as its atomic number; in the case of the species, we may appeal to the derived
characters that tie members of the species together. Boyd calls these explanatory
definitions.
An important feature of explanatory definitions is that the properties that figure
in them must be those in virtue of which reference to the kind satisfies M ’s accommo-
dation demands. In other words, they must be those properties that enable the use of
natural kind term t to play the role specified in the term’s programmatic definition.
Hence, there is a close relation between the two types of definition. Programmatic
definitions set the role reference to the kind plays in the inductive and explanatory
practices of a discipline, while explanatory definitions pick out the properties by which
this role is satisfied.
One consequence of this relation is that the definition of a kind term is relative
to the inductive practices of a given discipline. Since explanatory definitions depend
on programmatic definitions, and programmatic definitions depend on what is it that
a discipline wants to explain, then the natural kind vocabulary we use in a scientific
context will be discipline-relative. This discipline dependency has lead some to criticize
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the HPC account, claiming it is dangerously close to conventionalism. The objection
holds that the HPC account makes it so that natural kinds are decided by convention,
and not by nature itself (see Craver, 2009, for a discussion). Boyd himself accepts
that his account involves some degree of conventionalism, but he stresses that the
decision to accept a kind is not merely conventional, but responds to the sorts of
causal structures that constitute the object of study of a discipline. Again, arbitrary
clusters of properties, even if present in high frequencies, do not form natural kinds if
they are not useful to understand the causal relations within and between the kinds
involved. The class of Liliaceae, for instance, is a natural kind on this account, because
it helps us understand the causal history that lead paradigmatic lilies, onions, and
garlic to share the same cluster of properties. In contrast, the set of objects that
lie 300 meters from the Eiffel Tower, even if they have a range of similar properties
(e.g. being spatiotemporally located in France) do not engage in interesting causal
relations, and therefore the class does not accommodate to the explanatory demands
of any discipline.
Shortcomings of the HPC account
Despite its initial plausibility, the HPC account is not without shortcomings. Generally
speaking, the main problem with the HPC account is that even though it aspires to
offer a general account of natural kinds, it fails to capture many kinds in science.
One such objection appeals to fundamental particles in physics (Chakravartty, 2007;
Magnus, 2014). The argument is premised on the idea that if fundamental particles
were to count as a natural kind on the HPC account, there would have to be an
underlying homeostatic mechanism producing the property cluster that defines the
kind. The presence of an underlying mechanism would imply that the particles in
question are not fundamental. Thus, either they are not a natural kind or the HPC
account is wrong. Since physics makes successful generalizations by making reference
to fundamental particles as a kind, then the HPC account is wrong.
Similar lines of argument run for other types of kinds, including the kind that
the HPC account was thought to be most suited for, species (Ereshefsky & Matthen,
2005; Ereshefsky & Reydon, 2015; Slater, 2015). According to this objection, the HPC
account puts too much emphasis on similarities among the members of a putative kind,
as it requires members of the kind to share more or less the same properties (that
is what is intended with the notion of a property cluster). Biology, however, defines
species in terms of their phylogeny, disregarding similarities almost completely. Hence,
species, as classified in biology, fall outside the scope of HPC kinds.
Besides fundamental particles and species threatening the generality of the HPC
account, there is yet another whole family of kinds that lies outside the HPC account’s
scope: multiply realized kinds. Multiply realized kinds are pervasive in psychology and
neuroscience, and as such, they should be included in an account of what makes certain
kinds scientifically interesting. To understand the problems concerning these kinds,
consider the case of memory.
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Neuroscientists distinguish between different types of memory. First, there is
declarative and non-declarative (or procedural) memory. Declarative memory includes
episodic and semantic memory, i.e., the recollection of past episodes or facts. Non-
declarative memory involves cases of memory that do not involve the declaration of
episodes or facts, such as learning how to ride a bicycle or conditioned learning. These
two types of memory have been found to have different underlying mechanisms. Evi-
dence for this claim comes particularly from lesion studies. This is the famous case of
patient H.M., who lost parts of his hippocampus and other regions as part of a surgical
procedure to decrease his epileptic seizures. After this lesion, H.M. retained many of
his declarative memory abilities, such as recollection of his own biography. However,
he lost the ability to form new memories and other abilities related to short term and
procedural memory. This result invited distinguishing between declarative and non-
declarative memory, and to examine the different mechanisms underlying each (Baars
& Gage, 2010; Gazzaniga & Mangun, 2014).
On the HPC account, given the difference in mechanisms underlying different types
of memory, there would be reason to think that memory is not a natural kind. This
claim has been defended by Michaelian (2010), for instance. Michaelian thinks that
we cannot give a unifying computational description of the various types of memory.
If this is true, then we cannot unify these types of memory under a single cluster
of properties, and thus we cannot make sense of memory as a natural kind. In a
similar vein, Pöyhönen (2016) holds that memory fails to be a natural kind both under
essentialist and under HPC accounts due to the fact that we have no unifying account
of how much does memory extend, whether it should be considered only intracranially,
transactionally, or as widely extended.
Consider a similar case, the case of psychiatric categories. Psychiatric categories are
often individuated as collections of symptoms in different combinations. For instance,
the DSM V diagnoses major depressive disorder by considering a list of nine symptoms,
where any combination of five out of nine (in case they are not attributable to any other
condition and in case they disrupt the patient’s social or other kinds of functioning)
suffices for the diagnosis. Importantly, episodes of major depressive disorder must not
be attributable to the physiological effects of a particular substance or an underlying
medical condition. In this sense, it is important that major depressive disorder has no
identifiable underlying mechanism, but instead is instantiated in different ways across
patients. What characterizes this disorder is not one mechanism causing a number of
symptoms, but the co-occurrence and interaction of the symptoms themselves. As a
result, given the relative disregard for a particular defining mechanism, it would appear
as if psychiatric categories like depression were not members of the set of natural kinds.
This result is nevertheless puzzling. Major depressive disorder, as a category in the
DSM and other diagnostic manuals (e.g. ICD-10) serves important epistemic purposes
in psychiatry. First, it allows scientists to distinguish a number of patterns of behavior
from other related patterns such as anxiety or bipolar disorders. Second, it has lead
to a number of interesting hypotheses in neuroscience (e.g. the monoamine deficiency
hypothesis). Lastly, it enables psychiatrists to identify important interactions between
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major depressive disorder and other conditions such as schizophrenia or multiple scle-
rosis. As such, the category seems to serve the inductive practices of psychiatry, even
if it does not have one unique underlying mechanism defining it. Rather, what seems
to be accounting for the epistemic success of the category is that it unites several
mechanisms under a common functional pattern. In other words, it is the functional
unity of the category, that is, the fact that it unifies a constellation of symptoms under
a common concept, that makes it useful for the purposes of psychiatry (see Cramer et
al., 2016).
This functional character not unique to major depressive disorder. On the contrary,
it is a common feature of psychiatric categories that they are functionally individuated.
Godman (2013) discusses the case of pathological withdrawal syndrome (PWS) and its
status as a natural kind. As she presents it, PWS is characterized by symptoms in-
cluding apathy, depression, panic attacks, and some others. Interestingly, psychiatrists
investigating PWS concluded that this syndrome is not an organic disorder, meaning
that it is not individuated by some medical or physical illness. Yet, they are able to
use the category to diagnose and successfully treat patients that suffer it. Patients
even have similar experiences throughout the development of the syndrome, even at
the stage of recovery. This suggests that PWS is an interesting psychiatric category
whose use for scientific and therapeutic purposes does not depend on the identification
of a particular underlying mechanism. Rather, it is individuated functionally and used
successfully to make some generalizations about the condition.
The cases of memory and psychiatric categories, among others, show that there are
kinds, including multiply realized kinds, whose use seems to depend on their functional
unity rather than the identification of a homeostatic mechanism or an essence. Nev-
ertheless, in the HPC account, we do not find a clear account of how these functional
kinds do their job. The reason is that these kinds, insofar as they are instantiated in
different systems and processes, fail to provide us clear reasons that support inductive
inferences across members of the kind.
Millikan (1999) raised this issue when discussing Fodor’s (1974) argument for the
autonomy of psychology. Millikan examined kinds whose instances, according to Fodor,
map onto instances of kinds at lower levels, but not always to members of the same
lower level kind. For Fodor, these are the kinds present in psychology. Consider again
the case of memory. Memory states map onto brain states (lower level kinds), but
not to the same kind of brain states; declarative memory states map onto different
mechanisms than those underlying non-declarative memory states. In Fodor’s view, the
multiple realizability of psychological kinds shows that psychology is an autonomous
science insofar as its kinds are not reducible to the kinds of lower level sciences such
as physics.
Millikan argues, against Fodor, that the sorts of kinds over which scientific gener-
alizations can be made must be bound together either in virtue of their history (for
which she coins the term «historical natural kinds», and which she associates with
Boyd’s HPC kinds (see Boyd (1999a))) or in virtue of some property members of the
kind share ahistorically (for which she coins the term «eternal natural kinds»). The
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reason behind this constraint is that for Millikan, there must be a good reason to think
that unobserved members of a putative kind will possess at least some of the proper-
ties that observed instances do. In the case of historical natural kinds, there is some
common history that led members of one kind to resemble one another in important
respects. For example, we know that tigers we have not observed yet will most likely
have stripes because they have evolved from the same ancestors as other tigers that
do have stripes. On the other hand, eternal natural kinds are bound together by some
eternal property that they have independently of spatiotemporal considerations. For
example, if water is H2O, then we can presumably claim that it has been H2O as long
as it has existed and as long and wherever it will exist.
The problem with multiply realized kinds, in Millikan’s view, is that there is no
good reason to expect that unobserved members will share the same properties as
observed members of the putative kind. If multiply realized kinds are, by definition,
realized in different instances of different lower level kinds, then the properties present
in one instance of the higher level kind might not be present in another instance.
Thus, laws in higher level sciences become plagued with exceptions, thus precluding
any interesting inductive inference. In the case of psychology we can, at best, have
generalizations localized to a particular species, but this is only because psychological
kinds within a species are realized in relevantly similar ways, claims Millikan. For
instance, it is plausible that human brains instantiate non-declarative memory states in
similar ways, and thus we can project from one instance of non-declarative memory to
another. Yet, when we jump from humans to, for instance, Martians, the instantiation
of non-declarative memory might be so different that none of what we know about
human non-declarative memory states will apply to Martian psychology.
If Millikan’s argument is right, then psychological kinds, taken as kinds in a gen-
eral science covering different species and systems, are not scientifically interesting, as
they do not support the sort of generalizations that science is interested in making.
Moreover, the result would be generalizable to all sorts of functional kinds, including
psychological but also psychiatric kinds. Insofar as functional kinds are multiply real-
izable, they are neither historical kinds nor eternal kinds in Millikan’s sense. Hence,
either we conclude that functional kinds are not scientific kinds at all, or we reply to
Millikan with an account of how functional kinds enable us to be successful in our
epistemic practices and hence count as legitimate scientific kinds. Unfortunately, nei-
ther essentialism nor the HPC account provide good prospects. Given the multiple
realizability of functional kinds, they do not constitute kinds tied together by some
essence; and given that Millikan associates HPC kinds with historical kinds, functional
kinds do not constitute HPC kinds either.
Boyd (1999b) thinks that some multiply realizable kinds may be natural kinds in
spite of Millikan’s observations. He invites us to consider livers. Livers are multiply
realized insofar as there may be differences across human livers and between human
livers and those of other species. Yet, “liver” is a term that functions as a natural kind in
anatomy: it involves certain causally relevant properties and serves the accommodation
demands of the discipline in which it functions. In Boyd’s view, this sort of multiple
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realization is unproblematic because of what he calls replacement stability. If I have
surgery on my liver, some of its microstructural properties change but at least many
of its macroscopical properties remain stable. The same holds across different human
livers which in spite of their differences, share a number of macroscopical properties.
This explains why “human liver” is a term which can be used to pick out a natural kind
in anatomy: the properties associated with the kind remain stable across realizations.
If Boyd is right, then the same holds for many other multiply realizable kinds.
This is why he thinks that it is possible to have multiply realizable natural kinds in
case “the commonalities produced by the relevant replacement stabilizing processes
are sufficiently robust and relevant to accommodation” (Boyd, 1999b, p. 95). This
also invites a multi-level view of kinds. We can have human anatomy, mammalian
anatomy, and even vertebrate anatomy. At higher levels of abstraction, kinds become
less uniform but, as long as there is some stability across members of the kind, they
can still figure in interesting scientific enterprises. If so, then the multiply realizable
kinds of psychology may count as genuine natural kinds.
Reydon (2009) develops a similar argument to expand the HPC account to cover
functional and multiply realizable kinds. In his view, traditionally accepted natural
kinds served traditionally accepted explanations insofar as they provided the divisions
on which explanation is supposed to work. By dividing things into natural kinds, we
constrain our explanations to classes whose members share something that allows us
to project these explanations throughout the class. This, he points out, is also what
functional kinds do for mechanistic explanation.
A mechanistic explanation is a description of “how the component entities and
activities are organized together such that [a] phenomenon occurs” (Craver, 2006, cited
in Reydon, 2009, p. 730). The organization of these entities and how they produce
the phenomenon is functional, insofar as it focuses on how the component entities
relate to one another produce an output, i.e. to fulfill a certain function. Hence, in
mechanistic explanation, mechanisms—and therefore the basis on which scientists will
generalize—are individuated functionally. In Reydon’s terms:
What matters in [mechanistic explanations] is that particular parts perform
functions under particular circumstances. The detailed ways in which these
functions are actually realized are not important in the analysis of the over-
arching system [...]. Functionally defined kinds, then, serve as the “hinges”
around which [mechanistic explanations] turn in the following sense. Ref-
erence to the functional kind to which a particular part of a system belongs
is explanatory as the basis of a generalization about the behavior that it is
expected to exhibit when placed in a particular environment. In addition,
the existence of the various functional kinds is itself a phenomenon in need
of an explanation, as it need to be explained how the black-boxed enti-
ties are able to realize the various functions that they realize as parts of
systems and how these entities have come into existence in the first place.
(Reydon, 2009, p. 731)
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Reydon thinks that by given the role functional kinds play in mechanistic expla-
nations, they should be regarded as natural kinds in the same sense as traditional
examples do. Both traditional natural kinds and functional kinds act as the “hinges”
that serve as the basis of certain generalizations. As a result, Reydon proposes an ex-
tension of the HPC account to include functional kinds. His proposal is to include the
factors that cut things into kinds in particular types of explanation into the definition
of an HPC kind. In Reydon’s words, we can extend the HPC account as follows:
(HPC*). A particular natural kind term is defined by a combination of a
particular Φ, F*, and H*, where
Φ = the factor(s) that individuate(s) things as members of particular kinds
in explanations (e.g., the capability to perform a particular causal role
function),
F* = the set of those particular properties that play central roles in the
explanation of Φ and are found to repeatedly cluster in nature, where this
clustering may be imperfect and exception-ridden,
H* = the set of causal factors that underwrite this clustering. (Reydon,
2009, p. 734)
In this sense, if some scientific explanation (e.g. mechanistic explanation) carves
kinds by appealing to the functional properties of some objects, these kinds will count
as HPC kinds as well. Hence, the upshot of this proposal is, on one hand, accommo-
dating functional kinds into the framework of the kinds captures by the HPC account,
and on the other, showing a link between functional kinds and their role in mechanistic
explanations.
These attempts to extend the HPC account to capture functional kinds are inter-
esting on their own right. Yet, I believe that the problem regarding functional kinds,
as well as many other problems concerning natural kinds, do not lie in the difficulties
of accounting for them in terms of the HPC account or any other particular account.
Rather, functional and multiply realizable kinds are problematic only if we hold on to
the idea that all scientific kinds are useful for induction because of the same reason.
Given that multiply realizable kinds differ in important respects from essentialist and
HPC kinds, they turn out to be problematic, but only given the expectation that all
scientific kinds are of one type. Once we are ready to recognize different types of sci-
entific kinds and different reasons why scientists classify objects into kinds, can we see
that functional and multiply realizable kinds are not problematic, but only different.
In other words, by adopting a pluralistic view of scientific kinds, we can open up some
space for functional kinds as well as other types of kinds.
4.2 Projectibility and scientific kinds
I began this chapter by asking the question of what sorts of kinds allow us to do
science. I presented the traditional answer, which identifies the interesting kinds for
science (i.e., scientific kinds) with natural kinds, and examined some of the theories of
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natural kinds and their shortcomings. What the tradition missed, in my view, is that
we need not identify scientific kinds with one type of natural kind. To see why this is
so, let us go back a couple of steps.
Scientific kinds, in the most general sense, are kinds that allow us to do induction.
In turn, doing induction is inferring something about an unobserved set of entities
or events given already observed instances. This inference from the observed to the
unobserved involves projecting properties from the former to the latter. If every sample
of water we have observed boils at 100°C at sea level, then we can infer that future
samples will be have in the same way and that they share the same properties that
our observed samples have. Hence, we can project successfully.
Notice that when we project properties to unobserved instances, we project to
other members of the same kind. We can project the property of boiling at 100°C to
future samples of water because the form a kind with those that we have observed
before. Thus, the question of what makes induction successful ties in together with
the question of what determines kinds and how do we use kind terms in our epistemic
practices. As Hacking (1994) puts it:
Classification and generalization must be rejoined. To use a name for any
kind is to be willing to make generalizations and from expectations about
individuals of that kind. To use a common noun to classify is to use it,
and to use it is to be willing to project it. (Hacking, 1994, p. 221)
The question of what makes scientific kinds interesting thus amounts to the ques-
tion of what makes certain classifications inductively interesting for a scientific dis-
cipline, or what makes certain scientific classifications adequate for projection. This
question is reminiscent of Goodman (1979/1983). Goodman saw the problem of in-
duction as an application of the more general problem of projection, and therefore a
solution to the latter would buy us a solution to the former. Moreover, by having a
theory of projection we can also get closer to a theory of scientific kinds, as a theory of
what makes it so that we can project certain properties or predicates and not others
will shed light on what makes certain classifications useful for projecting.
Goodman formulated the problem of projection in terms of which hypotheses or
predicates are worth adopting and how can we eliminate undesirable ones. He devised
the famous ‘grue’ case to explain that if we limit ourselves to the relation between
the evidence and the hypotheses that we can formulate based on it, we cannot reach
a criterion to decide between desirable and undesirable hypotheses. The case can be
presented as follows. Consider emeralds and the hypothesis “All emeralds are green.”
This hypothesis is supported by all our evidence so far, and therefore seems like a case
where projection is not problematic. In other words, there seems to be no problem
with projecting the predicate ‘green’ to all emeralds. However, we can also think of
another predicate, ‘grue,’ that applies to all things examined before time t in case
they are green, and to other things in case they are blue. Before time t, the hypothesis
“All emeralds are grue” is equally supported by the evidence, and therefore, if we are
willing to adopt the hypothesis “All emeralds are green,” we should also be willing
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to adopt the hypothesis “All emeralds are grue,” even though these two hypotheses
are inconsistent with each other. Importantly, evidence will not provide a criterion to
decide between one of these two, as all evidence at time t supports both hypotheses.
Thus, we need to look elsewhere for a criterion.
The solution proposed by Goodman appeals to the use of a predicate in past
projections. The intuition underlying this solution is that the predicate ‘green’ has a
better record in past successful projections, and therefore it is better entrenched into
our body of knowledge. An entrenched predicate, in Goodman’s account, is one that
has been used successfully in the past and that is coextensive with other projectible
predicates. Consequently, since we have used ‘green’ in the past instead of ‘grue’, we
prefer ‘green’ and the hypotheses in which it figures, even if ‘grue’ is equally supported
by the evidence.
This conclusion sheds light on why should we prefer some classifications over others,
and thus why we use certain kinds for science. Goodman himself remarked that using
entrenched predicates to group things entails adopting some classification scheme over
others. In other words, we take some classes to be useful for science because they are
well entrenched. Therefore, scientific kinds are, at the very least, entrenched kinds.
Quine (1969/1977), following Goodman, applied this solution to the case of natural
kinds. He thought that Goodman’s solution captured the intuition that green objects,
being an entrenched part of our classificatory schemes, are more similar than grue
objects in some important respect. In his words:
[...] why do we expect the next [emerald] to be green rather than grue? The
intuitive answer lies in similarity, however subjective. Two green emeralds
are more similar than two grue ones would be if only one of the grue
ones were green. Green things, or at least green emeralds, are a kind. A
projectible predicate is one that is true of all and only the things of a kind.
(Quine, 1969/1977, p. 157)
To put it differently, taking ‘green’ as a better entrenched predicate than ‘grue’
implies that in our classification, green objects will form a kind. Furthermore, due to
the entrenchment of ‘green,’ we construct theories in which the property of greenhood
is more important that the property of grueness. In Mill’s terms, green is a salient
property that allows us to individuate the kind, and therefore it is suited to figure into
the ways in which we divide objects in the world.
This invites the view that all there is to scientific kinds is projectibility and en-
trenchment. Naturally, there may be resistance to this view. In particular, this view
seems incompatible with realism about science. After all, if we hold to the view that
kinds are projectible and entrenched classes, this makes scientific classification depen-
dent on our interests and minds rather than on reality. For some, this may be an
overly pragmatist view of kinds. Before advancing the argument, then, let us dis-
cuss the question of realism about kinds, and examine the consequences of holding a
projectibility-view instead.
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4.2.1 Realism and kinds
One of the motivations behind theorizing about natural kinds is the idea that science
aims at the discovery of classes that exist in Reality (with a capital R), independently
of our knowledge and interests. Natural kinds, presumably, capture Real groupings in
nature, rather than our own arbitrary and contingent, empoverished ways of classifying
objects in the world. Yet, I have claimed that all there is to natural kindhood is
projectibility and entrenchment. This makes natural kinds dependent on our own
epistemic stances, rather than in Reality. Therefore, the view I am advancing here
seems to run counter to realism about science.
In this section, I will claim that the question of realism is a red herring. What
is important at the moment is how our scientific classifications serve our epistemic
purposes, rather than the question of whether we can say that some classifications are
more privileged than others in the sense that they get closer to something we can call
‘real.’ This is not to say that one cannot be a realist about kinds though. What I
want to claim is that questions about realism are of a different order than questions
about how science constructs kinds. In other words, I want to claim that a pluralistic
account of kinds of the sort I am proposing is compatible with either an endorsement
or rejection of realism.
Both the essentialist account and the HPC account are committed to the idea
that natural kinds ought to be real in some special sense. For the first, essences are
special properties that exist in reality and that determine the ways in which objects
will group themselves. And for the second, it is the real causal relations that lead to
the clustering of properties that determine natural kindhood. In any case, both views
and therefore much of the tradition has been committed to a realist account of kinds.
Why should we commit ourselves to such an account? One of the main motiva-
tions for realism in general comes from the no-miracles argument. According to this
argument, we cannot understand scientific progress unless we accept that science ap-
proximates reality as it develops new theories and explanations. Otherwise, scientific
progress becomes a miracle, mere luck in our wild guesses about the world. Applied
to kinds, the argument holds that unless our scientific theories approximate the ulti-
mate true taxonomy of reality, we cannot explain how is it that we are successful in
projecting across certain classes of objects.
Now, does it really matter whether kinds approximate something like an ultimate
taxonomy? Even though the tradition of natural kinds has been framed in the realist
picture, the question that they are trying to ask in relation to scientific kinds is not
one about reality but about epistemic success. Recall again the question with which
I started this chapter: why are some classes better than others for the purposes of
scientific induction? To answer this question, we need not say much about the problem
of realism.
For the sake of argument, let us suppose first that realism about science is false
and that science does not approximate reality. Yet, there are still some classificatory
schemes that are better suited for our theories and explanations, or at least that we hold
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to better standards than others for certain epistemic purposes. Just as the classification
of lilies, garlics and onions in terms of the family Liliaceae was better suited for
biology but not for gardening, there are classifications that accommodate (to use
Boyd’s term) better than others independently of whether science approximates reality.
The question is thus why are some classifications better suited to some disciplines and
therefore more epistemically successful than others. Claiming that it is because they
are ‘more real’ does not explain much, as even if they were not, scientists would still
hold some classifications as preferable over others. In other words, explaining the
success of certain classifications in terms of them being real amounts to little more
than foot-stamping realism, as Fine (1984) puts it.
Let us now suppose the contrary, that realism about science is true. Even if we
suppose that realism is true, we have not said anything about the reasons why we
should adopt a classificatory scheme over another. There are a myriad of ways to
create classifications. What the Realist is asking is to find the one that ‘best’ reflects
Reality. This presupposes either that there is only one privileged taxonomy that is the
one that captures Reality the best, or that there are several taxonomies that can do the
job. Limiting kinds to only one taxonomy over all is much too stringent and does not
accommodate adequately to actual scientific practice. I will expand on this idea below.
On the other hand, once we recognize that science works with a number of taxonomies,
we would then need to ask not just which one is it that reflects Reality, but which
one does it best. Yet, asking which one is ‘best’ is always asking which one is best for
something. And since science is in the business of explaining and predicting (besides
reflecting Reality if realism is true), it follows that we must then ask which taxonomy
works best for these epistemic purposes. Thus, even if Realism is true, questions about
what characterizes scientific kinds amount to questions about scientific projectibility
and entrenchment.
This is not to say that we should opt for an anti-realist view of kinds. All I want to
claim is that questions about how science picks kinds are independent from questions
about realism. Asking whether scientific kinds are real is a whole different problem,
one that we need not answer here. Instead, the central question for a theory of scientific
kinds is one about the criteria by which a scientific discipline holds certain classes as
projectible and well-entrenched.
Another issue related to realism about kinds is the idea that there must be one
epistemically privileged taxonomy over all others. According to this view, there is one
ideal taxonomy that would in principle capture the kinds that exist in nature. One
could, additionally, call this taxonomy the ‘real’ one, as it were. This is what Hacking
(1991) calls the Uniqueness Principle:
There is a unique taxonomy in terms of natural kinds, that represents
nature as it is, and reflects the network of causal laws. We do not have nor
could we have a final taxonomy of anything, but any objective classification
is right or wrong according as it captures part of the structure of the one
true taxonomy of the universe. (Hacking, 1991, p. 111)
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Hacking himself rejects this principle, arguing that the idea of a complete taxonomy
is nonsensical. He thinks that we should instead develop a historical understanding
of natural kinds as they figure in different disciplines and historical contexts. In
this view, kinds are epistemic tools with which we do things, namely, with which
we understand the world. As such, they may be changed and tailored according to
our current epistemic commitments.
Similar arguments abound in the literature. Dupré (1981), for instance, presents
it as the thesis of promiscuous realism. For Dupré, there are a myriad of similarity
relations that support projectibility, and none of these relations should be taken as
privileged in any sense. As a result, no one taxonomy gets the title of being more real
than another, and therefore all taxonomies are equally real in some sense. After all, he
claims, all taxonomies capture some range of similarity relations that may be relevant
for a particular purpose.
Khalidi (2013) agrees with Dupré in this respect. For Khalidi, there is no unique
best system of classification, since the choice of a particular systems depends on our
purposes. However, he raises the issue of whether there are some purposes that we
hold to better standards. In his case, he privileges epistemic purposes, understood as
the discovery of real divisions in nature. Other purposes, such as aesthetic purposes
(like classifying plants for gardening) do not map onto the causal network of the world,
and therefore do not capture a real taxonomy. Ultimately, he claims, there is no one
privileged taxonomy but there is a privileged class of taxonomies instead.
The argument I am advancing comes closer to Dupré’s than to Khalidi’s. I agree
with both, as well as with Hacking, that the idea of a unique taxonomy, privileged over
all others, is chimerical. If what matters about kinds is projectibility, and projectibility
can obtain in many different ways depending on what predicates and hypotheses we
take to be well-entrenched, then there is no single taxonomy to rule them all. There are,
instead, many taxonomies that shift focus from some properties to others depending
on what properties we take as relevant for our explanations.
However, I do not think that the taxonomies that are tailored according to these
epistemic purposes are privileged in capturing a hidden reality. In this respect, I
distance myself from Khalidi’s view that taxonomies in terms of natural or scientific
kinds must reflect a causal network present in the world. Again, adding the label of
‘Real’ to a set of taxonomies does not tell us why we adopt those taxonomies in the
first place. Furthermore, Khalidi’s view is premised on the idea that what underwrites
scientific kinds are causal relations, but this seems to fall back to the idea that there
must be a unique theory of natural kinds, one unique reason why all successful kinds
are projectible. In my view, there may be many reasons why we do certain projections
and integrate them into our scientific theories.
To summarize, I have claimed that the important question for a theory of scientific
kinds is not one about reality, but about how a particular scientific discipline makes
projections, i.e. how they pick the properties they hold relevant to their patterns of
explanation and classify things accordingly. As such, we can remain agnostic as to
whether these taxonomies capture something ‘Real’, and constrain ourselves to the
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study of scientific classification as a study of projection. I have not argued that we
should reject realism altogether, but rather than we can bypass the issue and still have
an informative account of scientific kinds. If there is still resistance though, I would
then let the reader add the adjective ‘real’ to our scientific taxonomies and move on
with our discussion.
4.2.2 Giving up ‘natural’
Now that we have established that the question at hand regarding scientific kinds is
not their whether they map to a further reality but rather their projectibility, one
may ask whether there is any benefit in maintaining the focus on ‘natural kinds’. In
other words, if the question of what makes certain kinds scientifically interesting need
not be formulated in terms of what makes them kinds ‘natural’ or ‘Real’ but rather
projectible, why keep on talking in terms of ‘natural kinds’ altogether?
Hacking (2007) raises this issue, and suggests giving up the notion of ‘natural kind’
altogether. As he puts it:
Some classifications are more natural than others, but there is no such
thing as a natural kind.
[...] In the language of classes, there is no well-defined or definable class
whose member are all and only natural kinds. Likewise there is no fuzzy,
vague, or only loosely specified class that is useful for any established
philosophical or scientific purpose, and which is worth calling the class
of natural kinds.
Nelson Goodman was right. If the word ‘kind’ is to be used as a free-
standing noun with a grammar analogous to ‘set’ [...] there are only rele-
vant kinds. (Hacking, 2007, p. 203)
In a similar vein, Ludwig (2018) claims that given the variety of accounts of natural
kinds, with their different emphases and focus, there is no interesting use for the notion
of natural kind. In his view, we should replace this notion with a multidimensional
framework that integrates different proposals and that helps us understand different
ways in which science classifies objects.
In contrast, Khalidi (2013) argues that we should retain the term ‘natural kind’ to
separate kinds that capture something in the world rather than arbitrary classifications
that we could call ‘nonnatural kinds’. Likewise, Ereshefsky and Reydon (2015) claim
that we can still talk about natural kinds as those kinds that allow a scientific program
to progress and that are empirically testable. In this sense, ‘natural kinds’ are those
kinds with, as they put it, “better epistemic credentials [than others]” (Ereshefsky &
Reydon, 2015, p. 984).
I agree, at least in part, with Hacking and Ludwig. In my view, we can drop
the adjective ‘natural’ and instead talk about ‘scientific kinds.’ As I have argued
before, claiming that a particular classification is more real than another does not
show why scientists hold it as a preferable basis for projection. The same applies to
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the adjective ‘natural.’ What matters is not whether a kind is natural in contrast to
nonnatural, in spite of Khalidi, but rather whether and how it fits into our scientific
classificatory schemes. Furthermore, even though I agree with Ereshefsky and Reydon
that we should be concerned with how classification aids the progress of a scientific
program, I suggest that we still drop the adjective ‘natural’ to make clear that what
we are discussing is scientific classification and not how nature is presumably cut at
its joints. The term ‘natural kind’ does not add much to our current discussion, and
hence it becomes a red herring. Consequently, given that the adjective ‘natural’ does
not inform our account of what makes certain classes better suited for projection in
scientific inquiry, I will now discuss the issue in terms of scientific kinds, and abandon
talk of ‘natural’ kinds hereafter.
One important consequence of this change in vocabulary is that it makes clear why
we ought to hold a pluralistic mindset when discussing scientific kinds. Given that
our interest is in how different scientific disciplines classify their objects of study, we
need not expect all types of kinds to be successful in projections for the same reason.
The motivation behind essentialism and the HPC account lies on what makes certain
kinds projectible, but we can still make some room for other types of kinds that are
projectible for reasons that fall outside the scope of these accounts. Such could be the
case of functional kinds, for instance. What we need in order to understand scientific
kinds is not a general theory of what makes all kinds useful, but it might be the case
that we need a pluralistic account of what makes different types of kinds meaningful.
In this sense, what we need is a taxonomy of the different types of kinds we use
in science, and to elaborate theories of what makes each type useful. Even if we can
generalize to some extent and capture a myriad of kinds under a common theory, the
end result might involve a set of different theories that account for different kinds.
In the last section, I will explore this view, and propose a plausible taxonomy of
scientific kinds and examine some prospects for theories that account for each type.
This taxonomy may not be exhaustive, but can give us some clues regarding what
makes some kinds useful. Moreover, it can give us some idea concerning the kinds
that were left out by the accounts mentioned above, and specifically, what sort of
kinds could emotions be.
4.3 A taxonomy of scientific kinds
Now we are after a taxonomy of different types of kinds, and exploring what dis-
tinctions can be made. The question is: in how many different ways do we justify
projection (and therefore induction)? Depending on how many ways we can find,
there will be different ways of constructing kinds. In what follows, I will present four
plausible types of kinds, and elaborate briefly on what makes them different form the
rest. Even if it is the case that there are other kinds available, or that some of the
kinds below can be reduced to another type, these will remain open questions for a
further theory of scientific kinds. Moreover, it is an empirical matter whether there
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are more or less types of kinds available in science, and whether these categories are
non-empty or not.
4.3.1 Essential kinds
The first type of kinds are the ones that gave rise to the intuition that natural kinds are
individuated by a common essence. These include canonical examples in the literature
on natural kinds, such as water and gold. What makes these kinds work for projection
is that if we know that they share a common essence, and the possession of this
essential property leads to the presence of other properties, then we are justified in
projecting the properties we find in a finite observed set of instances to the unobserved
set. Consider again the case of water. A projection on water can be phrased as: ‘If
water has the essence of being a molecule of H2O, then all instances of water are
necessarily molecules of H2O; this observed sample of water boils at 100°C at sea level
in virtue of being a molecule of H2O; thus, any other unobserved samples of water will
be molecules of H2O and will boil at 100°C at sea level.’
It is worth noting that some objections directed against essentialism imply that
essences must be cashed out at different levels, in spite of the tradition’s emphasis on
physical essences. One such objection comes from the claim that there is no clear cri-
terion to determine how coarse or fine grained our distinctions between essential kinds
should be. de Sousa (1984) defends this view. To illustrate this objection, consider
the case of water. Water is said to be an essential kind because it is individuated by
the essential property of being composed of molecules of H2O. But as de Sousa points
out, H2O is a chemical and not a physical characterization of water. At the level of
physics, there are three stable isotopes of oxygen, 16O, 17O, and 18O.39 All of these
isotopes may be present in water. Thus, at the level of physics, water is individuated
by a disjunctive property H162 O ∨ H172 0 ∨ H182 O. Unless we are prepared to accept
disjunctive properties as essences, we would be forced to conclude that water is not
an essential kind at the level of physics.40
What de Sousa’s argument shows is that it is unclear at which level should essential
properties be cashed out. Hence, the argument invites a multi-level picture of essences.
The properties that define essential kinds and that we may therefore be willing to call
‘essential’ depend on which level the generalizations are being made. In this view,
water is an essential kind defined by the property of being H2O even if this property
has different possible realizers at lower levels. What makes water an essential kind is
that the projections that are made across members of the kind are made in virtue of
them possessing the essential property. To put things differently, since the question
of how fine- or coarse-grained our distinctions should be depends on what we want
to explain, the characterization of the essence of an essential kind also depends on
39 de Sousa only mentions two isotopes, 16O and 18O, which are the most common ones. Chemical
peculiarities aside, his argument still stands.
40 A similar argument is proposed by Churchland (1985). Churchland argues that if we restrict
ourselves to kinds that figure in basic laws, then kinds such as water would not be natural (or
in my terms, essential). This is because water as such does not figure in any basic law, but only
atoms or more fine-grained micro-structures.
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how is the kind explanatorily relevant for a discipline. Water characterized as H2O is
relevant for chemistry, although I might not be for micro-physics.
The question remains how to characterize essences as such. I will not solve this issue
here, as this would imply dwelling into deep metaphysics (for a discussion see Roca-
Royes (2011)). However we characterize them, what is important for our purposes is
that essential properties may provide a basis for projection in cases where they explain
the presence of other interesting properties members of the kind possess. As presented
above, water’s being H2O explains why it boils at 100°C at sea level, why it freezes
at 0°C, and other properties that we observe. Hence, what we need is an account of
essences as special properties that explain other properties of the kind.
4.3.2 Historical kinds
The second type of kind are kinds individuated by their common history. These are
the sort of kinds that defenders of the HPC account often appeal to, the paradigmatic
cases being species and biological taxa. What individuates them, as seen in the case of
lilies, garlics, and onions, is that members of the kind have a common causal history.
In the case of species, this may be cashed out as a common evolutionary history. In
other cases, a common causal history may be cashed out as common design (in the
case of artifacts such as chairs, for instance) or common social development (as Bach
(2012) claims is the case of gender).
Historical kinds contrast with essential kinds, not only in that they are projectible
in virtue of their history rather than some essence, but also because, as Millikan
pointed out (although using the language of ‘natural kinds’), what individuates them is
dependent on the actual course of things, rather than an eternal property independent
of spatiotemporal considerations. In the case of biological species, what makes an
organism a member of species is sharing the same evolutionary history with other
members, and this history depends on the course of states of affairs that has been
the case in our actual world. This involves considering how things actually developed
rather than adopting an ahistorical perspective. The traits that are explanatorily
interesting in the case of species are thus dependent on how things unfolded in our
particular causal history.
To understand how projections based on historical essences might work, consider
the case of another biological species: tigers. We can expect other tigers to have
stripes because they have a shared evolutionary history. Moreover, even if a particular
tiger is born without stripes, it would still count as a tiger because it still shares the
same history and may share other traits such as sharp teeth and claws because of this
evolutionary history. In this sense, we project from one member of the kind to others
because sharing a common causal history can be taken as a good reason to expect
other unobserved members of the kind to have certain properties.
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4.3.3 Functional kinds
The third type of kinds in our taxonomy are functional kinds. These are the kinds
that, as I argued above, were left out by essentialist and HPC accounts, and they
include kinds in psychology, neuroscience, but also some biological (e.g. predator),
chemical (e.g. water41, and physical kinds (e.g. machine). They are characterized
by allowing multiple realization in different systems, and they owe there unity to the
functions they carry out.
Functional kinds are among the most problematic type of kinds, some even denying
that they may form interesting scientific kinds at all. The reason behind these doubts
is that properties of kinds that allow multiple realization cannot be projected, because
even if two systems realize the same function, they may differ in important properties
that may preclude one system to have the same properties as the other. This was
the sort of objection put forward by Millikan and that lies at the heart of resisting
the view that functional kinds are natural in any sense. In my view, we can resist
these objections and propose a scientifically interesting account of functional kinds by
recognizing that functional kinds are not projectible in virtue of any arbitrary property,
but rather in virtue of a property at a higher level of description. These higher order
properties provide interesting explanations and are not merely placeholders waiting to
be replaced by lower level properties. Hence, functional kinds are also scientific kinds
in their own right.
In the discussion above, I suggested that functional kinds should be considered
scientific kinds in their own right in virtue of their functional unity. Kinds such as
psychiatric categories, neuroscientific phenomena, etc., have proven to be scientifically
useful for the disciplines in which they figure. Consequently, instead of maintaining one
theory for all kinds that excludes functional kinds, I claim that we should formulate
a theory that accounts for the usefulness of these kinds, even if it turns out to be a
different theories than for the other types.
One classic way of framing the problem is in terms of reduction laws, as we find
in the discussion between Fodor and Kim. As explained above, Fodor (1974) claims
that kinds in the special sciences (i.e. functional kinds) are not reducible to lower
level kinds, and therefore they constitute autonomous kinds. The reason is that since
functional kinds are multiply realizable, higher level laws connecting functional kinds
of the form M → Q end up reducing to disjunctions such as (P ∨Q∨S) → (T ∨U∨V ).
Fodor thinks that the higher level laws are scientifically interesting in their own right,
and hence he takes this to be an argument for the autonomy of the special sciences.
Kim (1992), just like Millikan, is skeptical about this argument. In his view, if
Fodor is right that functional kinds do not reduce to lower level kinds, then we ought
to eliminate them rather than keep them as autonomous kinds. This is because the
functional kinds involved in psychology and other special sciences, which are the ones
Fodor has in mind, reduce not only to disjunctions but to predicates that are wildly
41 Water can be said to be a functional kind if we buy the idea discussed above that kinds defined
disjunctively at the physical level are multiply realized in different physical entities, such as
different isotopes of H2O.
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disjunctive or heterogeneous. These predicates, Kim thinks, are not projectible, and
therefore cannot be taken as scientifically interesting predicates. As he puts it:
There is nothing wrong with disjunctive predicates as such; the trouble
arises when the kinds denoted by the disjoined predicates are heteroge-
neous, “wildly disjunctive”, so that instances falling under them do not
show the kind of “similarity”, or unity, that we expect from instances falling
under a single kind. (Kim, 1992, p. 13)
The discussion between Fodor and Kim sheds light on the nature of functional
kinds. Kim and Fodor both recognize that functional kinds appear to be irreducible
to lower level kinds (e.g. physical kinds), but draw different conclusions. For Fodor,
these kinds are projectible and well-entrenched, whereas for Kim they are not. How
should we decide?
Kim and Fodor’s discussion is framed in the context of an axiomatic view of theo-
ries along with a nomological model of scientific explanation. In this context, scientific
theories are characterized as a set of laws spelled out in a basic vocabulary and an
interpretation connecting terms in the basic vocabulary to entities in the world. Mul-
tiple realization becomes problematic because higher level laws don’t reduce to lower
level laws without recourse to disjunctions. Since theories to be reduced to a basic
vocabulary, the irreducibility of functional kinds turns out to be an issue.
Given that the problem Fodor and Kim are discussing depends on our acceptance
of this picture of science, one possible move is to reject the picture altogether. This
is what Klein (2013) argues for. Klein holds that the traditional problems with mul-
tiple realizability stem from the axiomatic view of theories, and once we abandon the
axiomatic view, the problems dissolve. He suggests adopting a semantic view of the-
ories instead, a view in which theories are taken as a family of models with which we
represent the world. By doing so, we can account for functional kinds as being kinds
that we pick out in models in which realizers are irrelevant for the representational
purpose of the model. In the case of psychological kinds, for instance, they are just the
kinds that figure in models that represent an our mental lives. Given that this picture
does not demand reduction to a basic vocabulary, the problems that Fodor and Kim
discussed do not arise, at least in principle.
Shifting towards a modeling view does relieve some pressure, but this still does
not save functional kinds from being troublesome. Piccinini and Craver (2011) claim
that analyzing cognitive capacities in terms of functions does not lead to a full-fledged
explanation of the phenomenon, but rather to a mechanistic sketch. As such, classi-
fication in terms of functional kinds is merely an approximation towards explaining
phenomena, but actual explanation comes only when we complete the explanation
with an account of the mechanisms realizing these functions. In other words, func-
tional kinds are not genuinely explanatorily interesting kinds, but only placeholders
in an incomplete explanation.
In my view, the question is not whether functional kinds are scientifically useful
but rather how could they be so. As I argued above, there are a number of kinds in
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psychology and psychiatry that are individuated functionally and whose characteriza-
tion may disregard details about their realizers. Moreover, I also mentioned kinds in
other sciences that are individuated functionally, such as «predator» in biology and
«machine» in physics. What we need is then an account of what makes functional
kinds projectible if its not a property of the realizers or their causal history.
In general, we can understand functional kinds as kinds united by a given function
or capacity, i.e. a kind whose members contribute in similar ways to a system. Hence,
to identify functional kinds, we must first engage in functional analysis. In what fol-
lows, I will adopt the account of functional analysis put forward by Roth and Cummins
(2017). This account has the virtue of allowing an account of functional kinds while
tackling some of the issues above and being descriptively adequate, at least for the
purposes ahead. Given that a thorough discussion of functions and their role in science
requires a much deeper treatment, I will assume Roth and Cummins’s general account
without further discussion. A similar account can be found in Weiskopf (2011).
Roth and Cummins think of functional analysis as follows:
Functional analysis is the attempt to explain the properties of complex
systems [...] by the analysis of a systemic property into organized inter-
action among other simple systemic properties or properties of component
subsystems. This explanation-by-analysis is functional analysis because
it identifies analyzing properties in terms of what they do or contribute,
rather than in terms of their intrinsic constitutions. (Roth & Cummins,
2017, p. 35)
In terms of kinds, functional kinds are kinds formed by similarities in terms of what
a group of objects do or contribute, i.e. what functions they have. They disregard
details about their realizers insofar as these details are irrelevant for the explanation of
the capacity these objects have. As Roth and Cummins formulate it, functional terms
(which would pick out functional kinds) act as causal relevance filters that abstract
away from particular properties of the realizers and instead highlight a system’s func-
tional features. This makes functional kinds multiply realizable and hence different
from essential and historical kinds.
It is worth clarifying that this account need not imply that realizers are irrelevant
in general. Instead, the claim is that asking what the realizers of a given function
are implies asking a completely different question than those concerning how a system
carries out said function. It is quite plausible that we can reach a more thorough
understanding of certain systems by looking at the realizers (i.e. brains as realizing
psychological states), but this does not imply that functional analyses are incomplete
or that we need details about the realizers in every case. Moreover, as Sullivan (2016)
points out, the functional characterization of a capacity is often prior to the search for
its neural basis or its cellular and molecular mechanisms (in the case of neuroscience).
In this sense, functional analyses and functional kinds are genuinely interesting scien-
tific strategies and classifications in their own right.
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This view of functional kinds as kinds formed by functional analysis helps us tackle
the problems above. In this view, functional kinds are not placeholders in an incom-
plete explanation, but members of explanations that differ from the sort of mechanistic
explanation Piccinini and Craver have in mind, one in which details about the realizers
are vital.42 Furthermore, there is no pressure to have them figure in laws reducible to
lower levels because, first, the model of explanation at play is mechanistic rather than
nomological, and second, because functional explanations are taken as explanatorily
interesting in their own right without recourse to lower level realizers.
4.3.4 Social kinds
Lastly, we have the so-called social or human kinds. These include kinds such as
«money», «marriage», «racism», and the like. On a first approximation, we can think
of social kinds as kinds united by certain forms of interaction and the presence of an
institutional framework that gives meaning to these objects. Instances of money are
material (or even virtual) objects which we exchange for goods and services, marriage
is an activity where individuals declare a particular type of relationship, racism is a
systematic oppressive attitude towards a group of people in virtue of their race, etc.
What all of these have in common is that what unites members of the kind is the sort
of social world in which they acquire their meaning and role.
At a first glance, social kinds appear to be very different from at least essential and
historical kinds.43 What unites social kinds is not a property external to ourselves,
and hence they are in a sense not independent from us as human beings. This gives off
the impression then that social kinds are not natural kinds at all, but rather arbitrary
and mind-dependent categories. As such, they seem to differ in important respects
from the sort of kinds the tradition had in mind when developing accounts of natural
kinds.
In spite of this skepticism about social kinds, it is false that classifications in these
terms are arbitrary. The social sciences use social kinds to group phenomena which
they find relevant and explanatorily interesting. For example, while it is true that,
strictly speaking, any physical object can be used in a transaction and hence be used
as currency, it is not the case that the category currency is arbitrary. Objects used
as currency are objects that are used in a specific set of social practices and whose
dynamics are worth studying. In this regard, social kinds such as currency allow
generalizations and projections such as the ones we find in the social sciences.
One way in which we can start characterizing social kinds is following Searle’s
(1995) account of social facts. Searle starts by distinguishing two senses in which we
42 It is still unclear whether functional explanations are categorically different from mechanistic
explanations. If mechanistic explanations are explanations in terms of entities and activities,
then it could be argued that the entities in a mechanistic explanations may as well be abstract,
functionally characterized entities.
43 It is plausible that we can subsume social kinds under functional kinds if we adopt a broad account
of functions. Insofar as social interactions and institutions could be described functionally, social
kinds may be a subtype of functional kinds. At the very least, this is not obviously false. I will,
however, treat them as different types of kinds in what follows.
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can talk about objectivity and subjectivity, namely, an epistemic sense (which applies
to judgments) and an ontological sense (which applies to entities). In the epistemic
sense, a judgment is epistemically subjective when its truth or falsity depends on the
attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and hearers of said judgment,
and it is epistemically objective in the opposite case. For example, my judgment that
‘Coffee is delicious’ is epistemically subjective insofar as it’s truth depends on my own
attitudes towards coffee. Likewise, my judgment that ‘Coffee is an acidic drink’ is
epistemically objective, as it is true as a matter of fact and not because of our own
attitudes. As for the ontological sense, an entity may be ontologically subjective in case
its existence depends on the attitudes, feelings, and points of view of a perceiver, and
ontologically objective in case it does not. To use Searle’s example, pains are, in this
view, ontologically subjective, as they require a perceiver to exist, whereas mountains
are ontologically objective insofar as they would exist regardless of our own existence.
What Searle points out with this distinction is that social facts are ontologically
subjective but epistemically objective. They are ontologically subjective in the sense
that they require the existence of subjects to exist in the first place, but our judgments
about then are true not in virtue of our own attitudes but rather they are true in
virtue of the states of affairs of our social world. A fact such as «Transgender women
in immigration detention in the US are often victims of sexual assault and denial
to necessary medical care» (Frankel, 2016) is ontologically subjective insofar as the
existence of transgender women, immigration, detention, etc., requires the existence
of subjects in a society with an institutional framework that gives meaning to the
notions of sexual and gender identity, political borders, etc. However, it is epistemically
objective as its truth does not depend merely on us thinking this is the case or not.
Rather, it becomes a fact of our social world, and as such its truth conditions depend
on a particular social state of affairs.
If we accept Searle’s distinction, it would follow that social kinds are kinds united
in virtue of ontologically subjective, epistemically objective facts about our social
world. The kind «transgender women», for example, is comprised of the group of
people whose gender identity was assigned as male at birth and who have transitioned
into a different gender role, namely, that associated with womanhood. As a kind, it
allows us to do some generalizations and projections that enable us to understand a
range of social facts. Under Searle’s taxonomy, it is an ontologically subjective kind
in the sense that without human beings along with our historical attitudes towards
gender, the kind would not exist. Yet, our judgments about the kind are epistemically
objective in that they do not depend on what we think about the kind, but on social
facts about it.
Searle’s account provides an interesting starting point towards understanding social
kinds, but it does not cut it as an overall account. As Khalidi (2013) points out,
following Thomasson (2003), Searle’s account is too restrictive and only applies to a
subset of social kinds. While presenting his account, Searle has in mind kinds that
are indeed dependent on people having thoughts about them for their existence, such
as money or marriage. These do not exhaust social kinds though. Khalidi considers
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Thomasson’s example of «recession» as well as «inflation», «racism», and «poverty».
All of these constitute social kinds insofar as they depend on a social and institutional
framework, but they do not depend on the existence of thoughts about them. Even
before the development of economics as a discipline there was poverty and inflation,
and even before we constructed a concept to capture racism there was discrimination
in virtue of race.
Khalidi proposes a three-category taxonomy of social kinds, building on the argu-
ment above. The first type of social kinds are mind-dependent kinds in which human
mental attitudes need to be in place for the kind to exist but they need not be di-
rected towards the kind itself. This is the case of «recession» and «racism», kinds
for which certain attitudes towards commodities or racial groups need to be in place
for the kind to obtain, but that do not require human beings to be conscious of the
existence of the kind.44 The second type are mind-dependent kinds for which mental
attitudes need to be in place but that can be instantiated without attitudes towards
a particular instance. Khalidi illustrates this type with the case of «war». In order
for there to be wars, there need to be explicit attitudes towards wars, but an instance
of a war can obtain even if we don’t think about it as a war (perhaps we think of it
as a mere criminality problem or a set of battles rather than a war). Lastly, there
are mind-dependent kinds whose existence and instantiation both depend on mental
attitudes. This is the case of «permanent resident», which requires someone believing
a person has resident status in order to exist and be instantiated.
I find Khalidi’s taxonomy of social kinds plausible, although in his view, the third
type of social kinds do not constitute natural (in my case scientific) kinds. He claims
so because this type of kinds do not reflect causal patterns. The properties associated
with these kinds are not associated with it as a matter of causality but are instead
codified into the kind as a matter of explicit convention or law. Consider again the kind
«permanent resident». Properties associated with this kind depend on how a given
country defines the kind and the conditions whereby a person becomes a member of
it. Since Khalidi thinks that the presence of causal patterns is necessary for natural
kindhood, he excludes these kinds from the list of scientifically interesting kinds.
In my account, however, we need not exclude them. They are kinds whose pro-
jectibility depends on explicitly coded factors, but this need not imply that they are not
scientifically interesting. Politologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and many other
social scientists, to mention a few, may find a number of interesting facts about these
kinds and generalize successfully. It is also plausible that other scientific disciplines
find important generalizations based on social kinds, as can be seen in research in so-
cial psychology, evolutionary biology, and the like. If this is true, I submit that social
kinds do make it into the list of interesting scientific kinds.
44 Guala (2014) criticizes Khalidi for claiming that all social kinds are mind-dependent. He argues
that the presence of attitudes directed towards the kind itself is neither necessary nor sufficient
for social kinds to exist. As Khalidi presents his account though, the criticism seems misguided,
as Khalidi clearly accepts the existence of social kinds that do not require such attitudes towards
the kind itself.
132
4.4. Conclusion
To summarize, social kinds are those whose existence and projectibility depend on
the social and institutional framework in which we live. Some of them are conventional
insofar as they are defined by a set of rules or laws, but others need not be conventional
in this respect and can even exist without people having beliefs and attitudes towards
the kinds themselves. Furthermore, they are kinds of which we can make judgments
that are, as Searle puts it, epistemically objective, in the sense that we hold these
judgments true as a matter of a given state of affairs rather than merely subjective
attitudes.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented an account of scientific kinds that offers us different
alternatives to answer the question of what type of kind are emotions. I started with
the question of why are only some kinds scientifically interesting, and I presented some
traditional answers to this question following the tradition of Mill, Kripke, Putnam,
and Boyd. I accused this tradition of identifying scientific kinds with only one type of
natural kind (essentialist or HPC), hence attempting to pass one account of natural
kindhood as an account for all scientific kinds.
Instead of proposing one overall account of natural kindhood to explain scientific
kinds, I proposed tracing back what made scientific kinds interesting. I suggested
that what constitutes scientific kinds is that we can use them in projections and
generalizations. This opened up the possibility that different scientific kinds may be
projectible for different reasons, and thus that there may be different types of scientific
kinds identified with different reasons for projection. As a result, I argued that we need
to look into different projectibility patterns in science, rather than their correspondence
with some ultimate taxonomy or Reality. Lastly, I presented four types of scientific
kinds: essentialist, historical, functional, and social kinds.
With this taxonomy of scientific kinds at hand, we can now move forward to
the question: what type of kind are emotions? To tackle this question, we need to
make clear what sort of properties are associated with emotions and what makes the
category projectible in the contexts in which it figures. To do this, we must find a way
to characterize the phenomenon to be explained and subsequently construct scientific
concepts that will allow their integration into a scientific theory. In other words, we
must reconstitute the phenomena, as Bechtel and Richardson (2000/2010) put it. In
the next chapter, I will present reconstitution and argue that in the case of emotions,
we can carry out reconstitution by explicating folk emotion concepts. Once we have
clarified this strategy, I will apply it in chapter 6 and argue that emotions are best
understood as functional kinds.
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Chapter 5
Taking a step back
Reconstitution through explication
There are times in the course of the history of science when researchers must reconsider
their conceptualization of the phenomena to be explained. Maybe they have not
identified different kinds of phenomena, misclassifying them under a common category.
Maybe they have thought that a single phenomenon was present when there were
actually two different things at place. Or maybe they have not found a level of analysis
that would allow them to see the behavior they are interested in investigating. In any
of these cases, scientists need to take a step back and rethink the phenomena they are
after. In the literature on mechanistic explanation, this is what Bechtel and Richardson
(2000/2010) call reconstituting the phenomena.
In the previous chapter, I concluded that in order to overcome the challenges that
emotion research faces, we need to decide which type of kinds do emotions best conform
to. To do this, we need to make clear the type of inductive inferences we are interested
in making when it comes to emotions. Given that there are several options available
to us, we need some criteria to make this decision.
In this chapter, I will discuss reconstitution as a strategy to carry out such a
task. I will argue that given the past difficulties to identify emotion kinds, we need
to take a step back and reconceptualize the explanandum phenomenon at play in
emotion research. To do this, I start by introducing Bechtel and Richardson’s notion
of reconstitution in the framework of mechanistic explanation. I examine their case
study in genetics and discuss some of its consequences for a general philosophy of
science. Yet, this will only constitute the first part of my argument in this chapter.
In the second part of the chapter, I will consider some peculiarities when it comes to
concepts such as those about emotions. In my view, emotions, as well as other related
phenomena in psychology, are first encountered as part of our everyday practices. In
other words, emotions constitute folk phenomena, and we make reference to them by
the use of folk concepts. So far, this is not surprising. What is interesting, however, is
that this has consequences when it comes to reconstitution. When the phenomena that
we need to reconstitute are folk phenomena, then we have a clear strategy to carry out
reconstitution, namely, by analyzing folk concepts as ostensive devices to pick out the
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phenomena and working on their basis to construct scientifically adequate concepts.
In this sense, reconstitution becomes a matter of explicating folk concepts. Put slightly
differently, in the case of folk concepts, reconstitution takes the form of explication.
If my view is correct, this has direct consequences regarding the question of what
type of kinds emotions constitute: To make a decision about the type of scientific
kinds emotions are is to find the best level of analysis on which we can reconstitute
and explicate emotion concepts. By seeing reconstitution and explication as strategies
to pick out the correct scientific kinds, we end up at the gates of my final claim,
i.e., that the best way to reconstitute and explicate emotion concepts is by invoking
functional kinds.
As I already explained, I will start off by introducing Bechtel and Richardson’s
account of reconstitution. After discussing their case study of Mendelian genetics, I
draw some preliminary conclusions about the nature of reconstitution. Afterwards, I
discuss explication as a form of reconstitution. I introduce the traditional Carnapian
account of explication and discuss some recent modifications made to the account. I
conclude by examining the consequences of these ideas when it comes to the problem
of identifying emotion kinds.
5.1 What is reconstitution?
5.1.1 Reconstitution and mechanistic explanations
Reconstitution, on a broad construal, consists of the reconceptualization of a phe-
nomenon to be explained. Bechtel and Richardson (2000/2010) introduce reconsti-
tution in the framework of mechanistic explanation. Bechtel and Richardson are in-
terested in how scientists conceptualize phenomena in a way that enables localizing
and decomposing them into components and interactions that figure in mechanistic
explanations. Yet, much of what they say about reconstitution can be applied inde-
pendently of the mechanistic framework. What I am interested in is in their remarks
about when and how scientists reconceptualize phenomena in order to advance a sci-
entific research program. Still, let us introduce reconstitution in terms of mechanisms
and later generalize to general attempts to reconceptualize the phenomena.
Generally speaking, and at the risk of sounding circular, a mechanistic explanation
is an explanation of a phenomenon in terms of mechanisms. A mechanism, in turn,
can be characterized in different ways. As Craver and Tabery (2017) explain, there
are three often cited characterizations of mechanisms:
MDC “Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are produc-
tive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions”
(Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000, p. 3).
Glennan “A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that be-
havior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interaction between
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parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations”
(Glennan, 2002, p. S344).
Bechtel and Abrahamsen “A mechanism is a structure performing a function in
virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization.
The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more
phenomena” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005, p. 423) (adapted from Craver &
Tabery, 2017)
In all three characterizations, a mechanism is defined as a collection of entities
or parts arranged in a particular way such that they interact in order to function or
produce some phenomenon. A simple and familiar example of a mechanism presented
by Glennan (1996, pp. 56-58) is a float valve found in a regular toilet. A float valve
is a mechanism that regulates the water level inside a tank (phenomenon). It consists
of a float and a lever that opens or closes an intake valve. When the water level is
down, the float drops and causes the lever to go down. This in turn opens the intake
valve, allowing water to fill the tank. When the water level rises, it raises the float
and causes the lever to go up, closing the valve and stopping further water intake.
According to defenders of the mechanistic account, explaining how the float valve
amounts to indicating how the entities (float, lever, valve, and water) interact (causing
the float to lower or raise, causing the lever to go up or down, etc.) in order to produce
the phenomenon in question, i.e., the regulation of the water level. Hence, mechanis-
tic explanations depend on how the phenomenon is identified. Since mechanisms are
always mechanisms producing a phenomenon, characterizing the phenomenon ade-
quately is a necessary condition for a successful mechanistic explanation. I will come
back to this below.
Mechanisms and mechanistic explanations are ubiquitous in science, as New Mech-
anists stress. Consider Craver’s (2007) example of the explanation of neurotransmitter
release:
The mechanism begins, we can say, when an action potential depolarizes
the axon terminal and so opens voltage-sensitive calcium (Ca2+) channels
in the neuronal membrane. Intracellular Ca2+ concentrations rise, causing
more Ca2+ to bind to Ca2+ / Calmodulin dependent kinase. The lat-
ter phosphorylates synapsin, which frees the transmitter-containing vesicle
from the cytoskeleton. At this point, Rab3A and Rab3C target the freed
vesicle to release sites in the membrane. Then v-SNARES (such as VAMP),
which are incorporated into the vesicle membrane, bind to t-SNARES (such
as syntaxin and SNAP-25), which are incorporated into the axon terminal
membrane, thereby bringing the vesicle and the membrane next to one
another. Finally, local influx of Ca2+ at the active zone in the terminal
leads this SNARE complex, either acting alone or in concert with other
proteins, to open a fusion pore that spans the membrane to the synaptic
cleft. (Craver, 2007, pp. 4-5)
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Details and addenda aside, the explanation presented by Craver is a clear example
of a mechanistic explanation: it invokes entities and their interactions such that they
produce a given phenomenon. More specifically, the explanation presented here is an
explanation of the phenomenon of neurotransmitter release in terms of different parts
of the neuron, chemical compounds, and their interactions in terms of activities of the
membranes and chemical reactions.
In order to identify mechanisms, scientists employ a number of heuristic strate-
gies. Bechtel and Richardson (2000/2010) introduce two such strategies, namely, the
aforementioned decomposition and localization strategies. Decomposition consists of
subdividing the explanatory task in separate parts to make it more intelligible. In the
first example above, we may decompose the action of the float valve into opening and
closing the intake valve, the raising or lowering of the lever, and the floating of the
float. In the second, we may divide the overall synaptic mechanism into the binding
of Ca2+ to Ca2+/Calmodulin dependent kinase, the incorporation of v-SNARES into
the axon terminal membrane, and the like. Each of these actions can be studied as
a mechanism in their own right, i.e., as consisting of entities and interactions that
explain how a given phenomenon obtains. Hence, we can localize it as carried out by
a subset of the entities involved in the overall mechanism (e.g., raising or lowering the
level as localized in the float valve or binging of Ca2+ to Ca2+/Calmodulin dependent
kinase in the synaptic receptor).
When decomposition and localization fail, Bechtel and Richardson argue, scien-
tists pursue reconstitution. This happens when scientists believe that they have had
identified the phenomenon to be explained wrongly, precluding us from adequately
decomposing the phenomenon into components and their interactions and localizing
them appropriately. As a result, when failure ensues, we need to reconceptualize the
phenomenon produced by the mechanism, i.e., we need to reconstitute the phenomena.
5.1.2 Bechtel and Richardson on Mendel
Bechtel and Richardson present reconstitution through a discussion of Mendel’s (1865/2009)
findings on inheritance. Prior to Mendel, ideas about inheritance were present, but a
proper theory of inheritance was lacking. Mayr (1982, p. 634) mentions some of these
prior ideas, including that only one of the parents transmits elements to the offspring,
that the contributions of the father and the mother are quantitatively and qualitatively
different, or that both contributions are blended into an average. With Mendel’s stud-
ies, not only did genetics receive an initial formulation of currently accepted laws of
inheritance, but also a paradigm that would constitute the basis of future work.
Mendel’s experimental paradigm is rather simple. He crossed a number of different
varieties of peas with each other, keeping track of how different traits were passed on
across generations. Initially, Mendel observed seven different traits, including the form
and color of the seeds, the position of the flowers, and the length of the stem, among
others. He noticed that among different pairs of traits (e.g. yellow vs. green seeds),
the first generation exhibited the traits in a 3:1 proportion. In other words, for every
three plants with yellow seeds, there would be one with green seeds. This led him
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to claim that one trait would have priority over another one, hence coining the terms
‘dominant’ and ‘recessive,’ respectively.
In the second generation, however, things were different. Among the plants that
were bred from plants exhibiting dominant traits, there were now offspring that exhib-
ited recessive traits. Specifically, Mendel saw that among the offspring of dominant-
exhibiting plants, one third exhibited these recessive properties. Consequently, the
overall proportion in the second generation as 1:2:1 (for every four plants, one had
pure dominant traits, two had mixed traits, and one had pure recessive traits). Fur-
ther generations would continue to obtain in this proportion, suggesting a common
pattern.
Mendel’s findings yielded what later came to be known as Mendel’s laws of inheri-
tance. Bechtel and Richardson focus on the first two laws, the law of segregation and
independent assortment:
Law of segregation Each parent passes on only one allele [a variant of a given gene]
to each offspring.
Law of independent assortment How alleles segregate at one locus is independent
of how they segregate at another locus (adapted from Griffiths & Stotz, 2013, p.
14).
Of special interest to Bechtel and Richardson’s discussion is the law of indepen-
dent assortment. To understand its importance, it is vital to go over some clarifica-
tory notes. The notion of «allele» and—more importantly—«gene» were not part of
Mendel’s vocabulary (nor was the term «law» for his conclusions). In this sense, we
must first approach «gene» as a hypothetical or a black-boxed unit. A gene in this
sense is merely whatever transmits a trait from the parent to the offspring.45 Similarly,
an allele must be understood as whatever determines a given trait, and presumably a
part of a gene. On this initial interpretation, the laws state that whatever passes on
to the offspring is only one determinant of a trait (law of segregation) and this pass-
ing on is independent from other passing-on’s that might occur (law of independent
assortment). This construal will help us understand the problem with these laws later
on, and the subsequent reconstitution as construed by Bechtel and Richardson.
As Bechtel and Richardson explain, these laws led to the assumption, or were
based on the assumption, that one gene would correspond to one trait. This is com-
monly referred to as the ‘one gene-one trait’ hypothesis. What is crucial to Bechtel
and Richardson’s discussion, and what introduces reconstitution, is that in the years
following the rediscovery of Mendel’s work, findings did not match the expectations
yielded by this assumption. This led to reconceptualizing the phenomenon at stake
when it comes to formulating a theory of inheritance, i.e., to reconstitution.
45 Mendel talked about each reproductive cell being “provided with the material for creating quite
similar individuals.” See Mendel (1865/2009, p. 67)
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The Drosophila challenge
After presenting the background of Mendelian genetics, Bechtel and Richardson intro-
duce one of the first important challenges: Thomas Morgan’s studies with Drosophila
megalonaster, a species of flies. In the early twentieth-century, Morgan conducted a
number of experiments crossing D. megalonaster. He noticed a male mutant variant
that exhibited white eyes, and crossed it with a wild-type red-eyed female. In the
first generation, all of the offspring exhibited red-eyes, while in the second generation,
Morgan observed the 3 red-eyed to 1 white-eyed ratio Mendel had observed in the
peas before. Interestingly, when including whether the offspring was male or female,
Morgan noticed that all white-eyed offspring were male, even though the distribu-
tion between males and females was balanced. This suggested that there might be a
relationship between sex and the mutant-variant gene, a result that contradicted in-
dependent assortment. If independent assortment was true, sex and white-eyes would
have to be independent from each other.
A student of Morgan, Alfred Sturtevant, later found more evidence against inde-
pendent assortment as previously understood. Bechtel and Richardson discuss two of
his findings, both coming from experiments with D. megalonaster. First, Sturtevant
showed that the eye color of the D. megalonaster could be altered under the influ-
ence of surrounding tissue. If independent assortment were true, the expression of a
given eye color would have to be independent from these kind of factors. Second, the
researcher found that in some variants of the D. megalonaster, genes were brought
into adjacent positions inside the chromosome (by this time, researchers had already
localized genes in the chromosome; see Darden & Maull, 1977). When this happened,
individuals would exhibit different characteristics than others with the same genes in
different positions. Again, if independent assortment were true, the position of a gene
inside the chromosome would have no bearing on its expression.
These findings, as discussed by Bechtel and Richardson, challenged the idea that
genes worked independently of each other. Furthermore, they also challenged the ‘one
gene-one trait’ hypothesis. The presence of a given gene would no longer predict the
presence of a trait, since the presence of a trait was now found to depend on other
factors (sex, surrounding tissue or the position of the gene in the chromosome). In this
sense, the theory of inheritance proposed by Mendel and developed by his followers did
not explain traits. Put differently, decomposition of inheritance into genetic factors
directly altering traits, and the subsequent localization of these relations, fell under
pressure. This forced researchers to find a different level of analysis, a different level
at which genes acted and that would be the phenomenon explained by the Mendelian
theory of inheritance. As Bechtel and Richardson show, this was the level of enzymes.
From genes to enzymes
After the studies of Morgan and Sturtevant, scientists continued studying inheritance
in more detail. One particularly important study is the one by George Beadle and
Edward Tatum. Beadle and Tatum studied Neurospora crassa, a type of bread mold.
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Given the paradigm Mendel had developed and that had become the standard in ge-
netics, their study is straightforward. The basic idea was to obtain different mutant
variations of N. crassa and observe how different variations in their genes led to dif-
ferent traits. In this case, however, they induced mutations using X-rays (rather than
waiting for a mutation as in the case of D. megalonaster).
After obtaining a number of mutant variants, the researchers transferred the spec-
imens into minimal environments on which wild-type variants could thrive. Due to
the mutation, a number of mutant variants were not able to survive in this minimal
environment. According to the researchers, this was because the mutants were not
able to synthesize some substance necessary for their survival, a substance wild-type
variants could produce. However, once the researchers added different substances to
the minimal medium, the mutant N. crassa were able to grow. Some of these mutant
variants survived in a medium supplemented by arginine; some by either arginine or
citrulline; and others by arginine, citrulline, or ornithine.
At a first glance, all that was needed for N. crassa to survive was a simple two-
step process: wild-type variants synthesized ornithine into citrulline, and citrulline
into arginine, which warranted survival. Hence, in the mutant variants, one of these
reactions was impeded. If the first reaction was blocked, adding either citrulline or
arginine to the medium would suffice for the mutants to survive. If the second reaction
was blocked, arginine was required. Finally, if the synthesis of ornithine was blocked,
either of the three substances was sufficient.
Even though the process was more complex than presented above, since arginine
could also be turned into ornithine and urea, the moral of the story is the following.
By intervening on specific genes, Beadle and Tatum showed that what was blocked
was the synthesis of a specific enzyme, which in turn could or could not affect the
synthesis of other enzymes and subsequent proteins, ultimately affecting some trait
(in this case, surviving). As a result of these experiments, the ‘one gene-one trait’
hypothesis shifted to a lower level of analysis, becoming the ‘one gene-one enzyme’
hypothesis.
Reconstituting the phenomena
The shift from the ‘one gene-one enzyme’ hypothesis, as presented by Bechtel and
Richardson, offers an interesting case study for reconstitution. At the beginning of the
story, scientists pursued an assumption regarding the phenomenon to be explained by
genetics, namely, the direct influence of genes on expressed traits. Later, through a
shift in the level of analysis, scientists reconceptualized this phenomenon, now cashing
out the influence of genes at the level of enzymes. This move rescued the law of
independent assortment, which now could be taken to hold at the level of enzymes,
and allowed further progress in genetics. In Bechtel and Richardson’s words:
Genes are thought of as specific in their action and as acting in relative inde-
pendence of other genes. There is independence at the level of the enzymes
they produce. Conceived in terms of the observable phenotypes, genes have
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a complex role in the development and metabolism, and a complex orga-
nization. Simplification followed only on understanding the phenotype
differently. A characterization of the phenomena in terms of observable
traits was replaced by one couched in terms of biochemical products. This
was still localization and decomposition, but this time the reconstitution
of the phenomena with a shift to a lower level allowed us to retain local-
ization and decomposition in the face of complex organization. (Bechtel &
Richardson, 2000/2010, p. 194)
As the discussion of the development of genetics shows, scientists often do not give
up their hypotheses in presence of conflicting evidence. Rather, they revise some of
their assumptions, even reconceptualizing what they thought was the phenomenon to
be explained in order to preserve other parts of their theories and research programs.
In other words, there are times in science where what we need is to rethink what is
it that we wanted to explain, and find other ways of describing the phenomenon that
allow us to advance our research. This, I take it, is what Bechtel and Richardson have
in mind when it comes to the notion of reconstitution.
As informative as Bechtel and Richardson’s discussion might be, the overall notion
of reconstitution is still unclear. Specifically, we can raise the following questions: how
do scientists carry out reconstitution? That is, how do they determine the level of
analysis that allows them to reinstate localization and decomposition? Additionally,
is reconstitution always linked to mechanistic explanations? In order to answer these
questions, let us discuss reconstitution in more detail.
5.2 Examining reconstitution
To approach the question of what are the conditions for a successful reconstitution,
let us first observe that reconstitution is a broader strategy than the one presented by
Bechtel and Richardson. In the case of genetics, reconstitution consisted in a reconcep-
tualization of the phenomenon by shifting to a lower level of analysis. Nevertheless, as
Kronfeldner (2015) argues, reconstitution can also happen by shifting to a higher level,
i.e., by abstraction. If this is true, then this raises the issue of determining whether
we should move to a lower or a higher level of abstraction in presence of problematic
findings.46 Let us elaborate on this claim.
Kronfeldner makes her case by considering an example of an explanation of human
height, and a hypothetical controversy that illustrates how this shift could also qualify
as a form of reconstitution. Imagine two scientists discussing data on changes in human
height since the fifteenth century. They observe that height has increased throughout
the centuries, and that males tend to be taller than females at any given point within
46 Furthermore, it also suggests that reconstitution might not be intrinsically linked to mechanistic
explanations, at least in terms of lower level mechanisms. Whether or not we would call higher
level explanations mechanistic is a topic that lies outside the scope of the present discussion,
however. Since the mechanistic framework allows different levels of mechanisms, I will assume
that moving to a higher level of abstraction still yields a mechanistic explanation. For a discussion
on levels, see Craver (2007, ch. 5)
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this timeframe. Facing these phenomena, the scientists raise the question of what
explains the data at hand.
For the first scientist, a biologist, the data are better explained in terms of genetics.
This is because they observe that there are differences between males and females that
can be explained in terms of different genotypes associated with sex. This explanation
posits that the environment does not play an important role in the differences at
hand, since the differences remain constant independently of the time and place of the
observation.
The second scientist, an anthropologist, proposes a presumably rival explanation
of the data. The anthropologist notices that height has increased throughout the
centuries, thus suggesting that something must have happened as time went by that
allowed people overall to grow more. Furthermore, this must be independent of factors
such as sex, since both males and females have grown taller as time passed. The
anthropologist then hypothesizes that this difference is due to changes in nutrition,
which respond to changes in the environment and the development of technical artifacts
that enabled better crops.
So, which of the two scientists better explains the data at hand? When we examine
this situation, we see that the question is ill-posed. The reason is that the two scien-
tists are interested in different phenomena altogether. The biologist is interested in
differences between males and females, regardless of time; the anthropologist, on the
other hand, is interested in differences across time independent of sex. This calls for
a reconceptualization of the phenomenon to be explained. Initially, the two scientists
thought they were explaining the data. After some disagreement and controversy, they
realize that they are actually explaining different aspects of the same data, but not
the same phenomenon. Hence, they redescribe what they wanted to explain, i.e., they
reconceptualize the explanandum of each of their theories.
On this scenario, the both scientists have reinstated their explanations by shifting
to different levels of analysis. Interestingly, the anthropologist has moved, not to a
lower level, but to a higher one. What the anthropologist is interested in is not a lower
level mechanism explaining differences in height, but rather more abstract interactions
leading to those differences. As Kronfeldner puts it, the anthropologist is interested,
not in a single difference, but in a “difference of differences."
If this assessment of the situation is correct, it follows that what the anthropolo-
gist has done is reconstitute the phenomenon by abstracting, rather than going into
a lower level. Consequently, reconstitution works both ways. We can reconceptualize
phenomena by either shifting to a lower level, as the biologist and the cases in genetics
discussed by Bechtel and Richardson, or by shifting to a higher level, as the anthro-
pologist does. How can we determine then where to go? How do we decide which level
is the correct level for our explanandum?
143
Chapter 5. Taking a step back: Reconstitution through explication
5.3 How to carry out reconstitution
Consider first Kronfeldner’s case of the anthropologist and the biologist with competing
explanations and explananda. What leads the anthropologist to reconstitute their
phenomenon by shifting to a higher level of analysis is, as Kronfeldner presents the
case, the research question they intend to answer. It is because they are interested in
answer the question “Why are people taller nowadays than they were in the fifteenth
century?” that they shift to an abstract level of inquiry and reconceptualize their
explanandum. So construed, reconstitution needs fixing a phenomenon that is already
given, in this case, the differences in height at two points in time.
How do we fix the phenomenon in order to reconstitute it? We need some way
of pointing to the phenomenon. In Kronfeldner’s discussion, the anthropologist uses
a piece of data: measurements of height at two points in time. This allows them to
use the data, or a representation of the data (e.g. a graph), to make reference to
the explanandum of their interest. In this sense, when discussing with the biologist,
the anthropologist takes a step back and uses a device to ostensively shift to a dif-
ferent explanandum. Put differently, the anthropologist points to the phenomenon of
their interest in order to clarify that they are not aiming at explaining the same phe-
nomenon as the biologist. This justifies their reconceptualization of the phenomenon
in a vocabulary that captures the explanations they are interested in.
We can construct a similar case for Bechtel and Richardson’s story. On the face
of conflicting hypotheses and results, reconstitution by shifting to a lower level of
analysis occurs when scientists obtain a device to make reference to the phenomenon
of their interest. In the development of genetics, scientists were interested in a range
of observable phenomena. These include, first, differences between offspring of a given
species (peas, D. megalonaster, or N. crassa). But second, and most importantly, they
intend to explain the fact that certain properties are inherited independently of others,
i.e., some form of independent assortment.
In a similar fashion to the anthropologist, we can imagine the following scenario.
One geneticist claims that independent assortment is plainly false, since they had
evidence that some observable traits did not pass on independent from each other
(e.g. white eyes and sex in the D. megalonaster). Another geneticist, after Beadle and
Tatum’s results, might reply ‘Independence assortment does obtain, but at the level of
enzymes. It doesn’t matter if it does not obtain at the level of observable traits, since
differences in inheritance in general, such as these [pointing at the differences in how
N. crassa thrive] are what I want to explain.’ By pointing to the phenomenon of their
interest, they can know look for the level of analysis that allows them to construct a
theory and an explanation, that is, to reconstitute the phenomena.
In sum, reconstitution requires, as a first step, taking a step back and finding a
device that allows scientists to make reference to the explanandum of their interest. In
some cases, this may be the product of an experiment or a representation of obtained
data. In any of these cases, these devices serve an ostensive function: they allow the
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scientists to ostensively fix the explanandum and look for a level of analysis that allows
them to cash it out and offer an explanation.47
Once researchers have fixed the explanandum, the next step towards successful
reconstitution is picking out the level of analysis. This amounts to deciding which
inferences are researchers interested in doing. Depending on the level of the inferences,
researchers can then pick out the correct theoretical vocabulary to construct new
concepts and hypotheses that will figure in the reconstituted phenomena.
Going back to our previous cases, the procedure can be spelled out as follows. In the
case of the anthropologist, once they pick out their explanandum as the differences in
height across time, they can specify which inferences they intend to make. In this case,
these are inferences in terms of social factors such as culture and history as influencing
nutrition. Hence, they will cash out the explanandum as a social phenomenon, rather
than a merely biological one as the biologist does.
A similar case obtains in the scenario of genetics. Once researchers pick out their
explanandum as differences in inheritance, they proceed to specify the level of infer-
ences. In this case, they concede that they can make important inferences by going
into a lower level of abstraction, to a biochemical level, as in this level they observe
the phenomenon in question as well in the form of differences in producing enzymes.
Since this level reinstitutes their capacity to decompose and localize mechanisms, this
enables them to carry out inferences again and hence constitutes a possible route to
reconstitution.
This step of identifying the level of inferences that scientists want to make has a
crucial consequence for the project at hand. In the previous chapter, I claimed that the
decision of which scientific kinds are involved in a given classification amounts to the
decision of the level of inferences we want to make. Hence, this step in reconstitution
leads to a selection of the type of kinds we want to construct. In other words, this step
in reconstitution dictates the type of kind the explanandum phenomenon will figure
in. As I will explain later, this is central to the case of emotions, as with this procedure
we can make clear what type of kinds emotions constitute. In my view, this can be
carried out by recognizing folk emotion concepts as ostensive devices that allow us to
pick out the phenomena to be explained and carry out reconstitution.
Lastly, once scientists are clear on the explanandum phenomenon and the sort of
inferences they intend to draw, the last step is finding the vocabulary to redescribe the
explanandum and spell out their inferences of interest. This can occur by adopting
the vocabulary of an already given scientific theory. This is the case of integrating
the question of inheritance with the vocabulary of biochemistry. This might also be
the case of the anthropologist in Kronfeldner’s scenario. As I have presented it, the
anthropologist might describe the phenomena they are interested in in terms of a social
theory.
47 This is not to say that all uses of representations in science are ostensive or that scientific concepts
are formed through ostension. I am only claiming that when disputes about explananda happen,
concepts and other representational devices in science may serve an ostensive function.
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Given this account of reconstitution, we can now address the question of how a
reconstitution of emotions could work out. Following the aforementioned steps, we
must identify a way of fixing the explanandum, an ostensive device that allows us
to make reference to the phenomenon we are interested in. Once we have such a
device, then we can examine how to describe that phenomenon in a target scientific
vocabulary.
5.4 Explication
The first step in reconstituting emotions is to identify the vocabulary to describe the
explanandum phenomenon. In my view, this is the vocabulary of folk-psychology.
Emotion concepts, first and foremost, are folk-psychological concepts. It is in our ev-
eryday interactions that we describe our behavior as that of fear, anger, sadness, happi-
ness, etc. Hence, reconstituting emotions requires an analysis of our folk-psychological
vocabulary. With this analysis at hand, we can then establish a theoretical vocabulary
that captures the inferences we are interested in making and that do justice to the
pretheoretical characterization of the explanandum.
This procedure of taking a given concept, specified by a set of pretheoretical tools
(in this case folk-psychological concepts), and reworking it in terms of a scientific
theory amounts to what philosophers of science call explication. This means that
reconstituting emotions (and perhaps other folk-psychological phenomena) takes the
form of explicating folk-psychological concepts. In what remains of this chapter, I will
present an account of explication as applied to emotion concepts. This will set the
stage for the next chapter, where I discuss the features of folk emotion concepts and
how they can be applied in the construction of a scientific theory of emotions.
The traditional account of explication is due to Carnap. In one canonical formu-
lation of explication, Carnap (1950/1963) presents it as follows:
The task of explication consists in transforming a given more or less exact
concept into an exact one or, rather, in replacing the first by the second.
We call the given concept (or the term used for it) the explicandum, and
the exact concept proposed to take the place of the first (or the term
proposed for it) the explicatum. The explicandum may belong to everyday
language or to a previous stage in the development of scientific language.
The explicatum must be given by explicit rules for its use, for example, by a
definition which incorporates it into a well-constructed system of scientific
either logicomathematical or empirical concepts. (Carnap, 1950/1963, §2)
Carnap’s classic example of an explication concerns the everyday concept of fish
in terms of the biological concept of fish or piscis. In everyday language, fish includes
organisms which, from the perspective of biology, do not qualify as fish, such as whales
and seals. Hence, biology introduces a new concept, piscis, as an explicatum of fish.
Piscis better captures the inferences that biologists make, hence providing a more
fruitful classification than fish.
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According to Carnap, a successful explication is one that fulfills four criteria:
Similarity The explicatum must bear enough similarity to the explicandum so that
the explicatum can be used in most cases where the explicandum has been used.
Exactness The explicatum must be characterized in exact terms in order to introduce
it in a well-connected system of concepts.
Fruitfulness The explicatum must be fruitful in that it must be explanatorily use-
ful.48
Simplicity The explicatum should be as simple as all other criteria permit. (adapted
from Carnap, 1950/1963, §3)
It is central to highlight that in Carnap’s construal, there is not one correct explica-
tum, but a number of them. The reason is that since the explicandum is relatively less
exact than the explicatum, there will be a number of possible explicata that capture
different ambiguities present in the explicandum. In the case of fish and piscis, the
second captures most instances of fish but excludes whales. Other possible explicata
may be constructed to capture whales, however, depending on the purpose of the ex-
plication. For example, if we were classifying animals by their habitats, an explicatum
of fish may be constructed as “animal that lives in the ocean,” hence including whales.
Whether or not this explication is successful or not depends on whether it satisfies the
purposes of the explication. In the case of biology, it certainly does not, given that
biology draws inferences in terms of evolutionary history. Nevertheless, the success of
an explication remains relative to a particular project. As Carnap explains:
[...] if a solution for a problem of explication is proposed [an explicatum],
we cannot decide in an exact way whether it is right or wrong. Strictly
speaking, the question whether the solution is right or wrong makes no
good sense because there is no clear-cut answer. The question should
rather be whether the proposed solution is satisfactory, whether it is more
satisfactory than another one, and the like. (Carnap, 1950/1963, §2, my
emphasis)
Understanding the last step of reconstitution as explication has interesting conse-
quences for our project. It allows us to restrict the possible paths on which we carry
out reconstitution, and clarify how this procedure can lead to scientifically interesting
concepts. By restricting reconstitution to successful explication, we get some criteria
to evaluate whether the proposed reconstitution is satisfactory.
In this line, a successful reconstitution must be one that not only reinstitutes ca-
pacity to draw inferences, or to decompose and localize mechanisms, but one that
48 Carnap’s original claim is that the explicatum must be useful for the formulation of many uni-
versal statements. This commits explication to a limited version of science in which science
only cares about the formulation of universal statements. We can however relax this criterion
to better capture Carnap’s intended meaning: that an explicatum must serve the explanatory
purposes for which it is proposed.
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leads to the construction of concepts that capture the explanandum phenomenon ad-
equately (similarity condition), can be integrated into scientific theories (exactness
condition), and that is ideally presented in the simplest form possible. Also, following
Carnap’s remarks on explication, some of these criteria are more useful than others.
As in Carnap’s account, the most important criteria are the fruitfulness and similar-
ity conditions, while the others are desiderata that should be fulfilled only as best as
possible.
Yet, Carnap’s account of explication needs further clarifications if we are to apply
it to emotions. The reason is that the methodology of explicating folk concepts carries
with it an important tension that we have to bear in mind. This is the tension
between maintaining reference to the target phenomenon, i.e., avoiding a change of
subject, while offering a fruitful scientific construal. In what is left of this chapter, I
will explore this tension and offer some remarks on how to best avoid its pitfalls.
5.4.1 Strawson contra Carnap
One influential argument against Carnap’s account of explication was put forward by
Strawson (1963). Strawson sets off by identifying the explication as part of the project
of clarifying everyday concepts. He describes Carnapian explication as follows:
A pre-scientific concept C is clarified in this sense [explicated] if it is for
certain purposes replaced (or supplanted or succeeded) by a concept C’
which is unlike C in being both exact and fruitful. The criterion of exact-
ness is that the rules of use of the concept should be such as to give it a
clear place ‘in a well-connected system of scientific concepts.’ The crite-
rion of fruitfulness is that the concepts should be useful in the formulation
of many logical theorems or empirical scientific laws. (Strawson, 1963, p.
504)
Strawson criticizes this account of explication by arguing that clarification, in the
sense of introduction of scientific concepts in place of those in everyday life, is a change
of subject. In his words:
[. . . ] however much or little the constructionist technique is the right means
of getting an idea into shape for use in the formal or empirical sciences, it
seems prima facie evident that to offer formal explanations of key terms of
scientific theories to one who seeks philosophical illumination of essential
concepts of non-scientific discourse, is to do something utterly irrelevant—
is a sheer misunderstanding, like offering a text-book on physiology to
someone who says (with a sigh) that he wished he understood the workings
of the human heart. (Strawson, 1963, pp. 504-505)
As is clear from the quote above, Strawson thinks that because language has many
uses, it is a mistake to think that the language of science could supplant all other
uses besides explanation and prediction. In his view, either the operation of clarifying
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everyday concepts in this way would be unfeasible, or it would yield concepts so
different from the originals that we could no longer say that they are doing the same
thing (i.e. change of subject).
Even though Strawson’s argument is undoubtedly one of the most influential ver-
sions of this worry, he was not the only one to frame it, nor is it unique to Carnap’s
account of explication. In its broader construal, this worry has been called the paradox
of analysis. Dutilh Novaes and Reck (2017) formulate it as follows:
In its simplest form, the two premises of the paradox are: for an analysis
to be correct, the analysans must be identical to the analysandum; but
for the same analysis to be informative, the analysans must be somehow
different from the analysandum. The conclusion is that no analysis can be
both correct and informative: if an analysis is correct, it is not informative;
if it is informative, it is not correct. (Dutilh Novaes & Reck, 2017, p. 212)
Besides formulating the paradox, Dutilh-Novaes and Reck discuss a solution. In
their view, and in the spirit of Carnap’s view, Dutilh-Novaes and Reck claim that
we can reject the first premise of the argument, that in order for an analysis (or an
explication) to be correct, it must be identical to the analysandum (or explicandum).
There can be successful analyses or explications that lead to concepts that are not
exactly identical to those they intend to clarify. Granted, there will be a mismatch
between the two sides of the analysis, but we must be prepared to allow some degree
of mismatch.
Consider again the case of fish and pisces. It is clear that these concepts are
not identical with each other, as the first includes whales while the other does not. In
this case, we have some degree of mismatch between the folk concept of fish and its
explicatum pisces. Nevertheless, this mismatch need not imply that the explicatum
does not offer a correct analysis of fish for the purposes of biological classification. For
biology, classification in terms of pisces covers most of the instances covered by fish
while providing a more fruitful concept, as it allows inferences in terms of evolutionary
history. Furthermore, fish and pisces still share extensions to a robust degree, and
they can even be applied interchangeably in a number of contexts (as when referring
to trouts or salmon).
As a result, some degree of mismatch between the folk concept and its explicatum
is to be expected, given that scientific discourse differs from folk discourse. Yet, this
does not imply that explication is doomed to failure. Mismatch does not need to
constitute a change of subject. As long as there is still a robust degree of similarity
between the explicandum and its explicatum, we can offer concepts that are not co-
extensional but still refer to a great number of the same cases and that provide more
fruitful conceptual tools with which we can construct scientific theories.
This line of reply has some central consequences for our project. First, it prepares
us to accept some degree of mismatch between our folk concepts and the concepts we
obtain after we carry out reconstitution and explication. This means that the explicata
we propose for emotion categories need not be exactly identical with folk concepts.
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The precise extent to which this mismatch can obtain, however, must be spelled out. I
will tackle this problem below. For now, it suffices to say that some degree of mismatch
is acceptable, and does not imply immediately a change of subject.
Second, the tension between these types of concepts can be used to shed light on
another important aspect of reconstitution, at least in the context of folk vocabulary.
Scientific discourse is not isolated from our folk concepts. We come in contact with
scientific concepts in a number of ways. Since these scientific concepts differ in some
respects from folk concepts, but are nonetheless in contact with them, we can expect
interesting interactions between these two. In other words, we can expect scientific
concepts to lead to changes in our folk concepts. If scientific concepts are fruitful so as
to lead a progressive research program, it is plausible that they shift our folk concepts
as science progresses.
This brings to light an important aspect of reconstitution and explication, namely,
that they are continuous processes by which both science and prethereotical intuitions
can change. As folk concepts change, we reconstitute and explicate the folk concepts
into new scientific ones. And as science progresses, it generates conceptual change in
the folk realm that eventually call for further reconstitution and explication.
Leaving this observation aside, let us pay attention to a second problem with Car-
napian explication in the context of reconstitution. From Strawson’s objection, we
learned that we must bear in mind that there will be some mismatch between expli-
canda and explicata, but we must be careful not to propose concepts that end up in a
change of subject. This worry is particularly present in an influential argument regard-
ing the characterization of emotions as natural kinds, one proposed by Scarantino when
characterizing different aspects of emotion research. Let us examine this argument in
detail.
5.4.2 Scarantino’s two emotion projects
Besides the worry that explication is inherently irrelevant since it risks a change of
subject, there is also a worry coming from the opposite side, that is, a worry that
making scientific concepts match too closely with folk concepts will prevent progress
in scientific research. In the case of emotions, this worry is present in Scarantino’s
(2012) suggestion to keep folk emotion concepts and scientific concepts separate. I
have mentioned Scarantino’s worry above, but now I will discuss it in detail.
Scarantino’s worry stems from a discussion of traditional accounts of emotions. In
his view, traditional accounts have assumed that we ought to map emotions onto some
homogeneous theoretical construct, whether in terms of neurobiological mechanisms,
social constructions, etc. In any of these cases, for each of the main attempts to carry
out such a mapping, there are a number of counterexamples that seem to falsify the
candidate scientific construction of emotions. This leads to what he calls the problem
of scope:
Problem of Scope For every scientific theory T that tells us that an
emotion/an-ger/fear/ etc. is X, we can find counterexamples con-
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sisting of things called “emotion”/“anger”/ “fear”/etc. in English that
are not X, and/or things not called “emotion”/“anger”/ “fear”/etc. in
English that are X. (Adapted from Scarantino, 2012, p. 361).
For Scarantino, the assumption leading to the problem of scope is that we must find
some unity in traditional emotion categories. In other words, Scarantino takes issue
with the claim that folk-psychological concepts themselves refer to a homogeneous set
of phenomena and thus demand a homogeneous theoretical construction if they are to
be integrated in a scientific research agenda.
To reject this assumption, Scarantino distinguishes what he calls the Folk Emotion
Project and the Scientific Emotion Project :
Folk Emotion Project Offer a descriptive definition of the conditions of member-
ship of traditional emotion categories such as emotion, anger, and so on.
Scientific Emotion Project Offer a prescriptive definition of the conditions of mem-
bership of natural kinds of emotion, natural kinds of anger, and so on. (Adapted
from Scarantino, 2012, p. 364).
On this construal, the Folk Emotion Project has only descriptive aspirations, as
it is only the project of describing how speakers use emotion concepts. The Scientific
Emotion Project, however, does away with how speakers use emotion concepts and
focuses on the correspondence between emotions and natural kinds.49 In Scarantino’s
view, we must be prepared to accept a plurality of natural kinds for each emotion cate-
gory (both for emotion as a general category as well as particular emotion categories).
For all we know, “anger” as a folk-psychological term might map onto many natural
kinds of anger, each demanding its own description by means of different theoretical
frameworks.
Presented in this way, Scarantino’s account separates folk emotion terms from
scientific categories in order to avoid problems with mapping the first one-to-one onto
the latter. Nevertheless, without further constraints, making this excision between
these two vocabularies leads directly to the risk of changing the subject that Strawson
worried about and that I have invoked at several points throughout this work. The
reason is that whatever kinds we find for emotions, we need to have good reason to call
them kinds of emotion. Suppose we find a kind that presumably is a kind of anger.
Whatever this kind is, there must be criteria to call it a kind of the phenomena we
call “anger.”
These problems bring out a tension when it comes to reconstitution and expli-
cation. When we reconstitute the phenomena, we pick out the phenomenon we are
interested in and proceed to construct a scientific vocabulary to describe it. The result-
ing scientific construct must overlap to some degree with our pretheoretical conception
of the phenomenon, otherwise leading to a change of subject. However, making this
49 I shall use the term “natural kind” to make justice to Scarantino’s proposal, in spite of my
skepticism about the term presented in the previous chapter. I will present some clarifications
of this use below.
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overlap too demanding can lead to assumptions that stagnate scientific progress, as in
the case of assuming that emotions must map one-to-one onto natural kinds. Conse-
quently, there must be some mismatch between pretheoretical and scientific constructs
(as with the Folk Emotion Project and the Scientific Emotion Project) but it must be
a constrained mismatch so as not too lose track of the phenomenon of interest.
Scarantino offers two constraints to solve this tension between folk and scientific
categories. In his words:
A good prescriptive definition of emotion/anger/fear/etc. should specify
the condition of membership of a natural kind of emotion/anger/fear/etc.,
namely a transformed category provisionally called “K” such that (a) K’s
members are the maximal class of items that tend to reliably share induc-
tively and explanatorily important properties on account of one or more
causal mechanisms (naturalness condition), (b) most or all of K’s members
are members of the traditional emotion categories of emotion/anger/fear/etcetera
(similarity condition). (Scarantino, 2012, p. 366)
According to Scarantino then, a given construct candidate to offer a scientific
description of an emotion must be such that the construct specifies a maximal class
of objects that share a cluster of properties in virtue of a mechanism (i.e., form a
natural kind according to Boyd’s HPC account of kindhood), and whose members are,
to some degree, members of the traditional emotion category that the kind is supposed
to be a kind of. As I explained in the previous chapter, I do not think that Boyd’s
HPC account is the only way to construe scientific kinds. Nevertheless, let us follow
Scarantino in this use for the time being.
Figure 5.1 displays different possibilities for mappings between these kinds and folk
emotion term. Let E be a folk emotion term such as “fear” or “anger,” and let K1...K6
be natural kinds in Scarantino’s sense. On Scarantino’s view, E involves two or three
natural kinds. K1 and K2 are members of E because all of their instances are also
instances of E. K3 is also arguably a kind of E, since a vast majority of its members
are members of E, even if some are not. In turn, K5 and K6 illustrate cases of kinds
that do not belong to E because few or none of their members belong to the general
category, respectively.
Scarantino’s proposal does offer some clues in the right direction. In order to avoid
changing the subject, there must be some robust degree of overlap between our emotion
categories and the natural kinds, or in my case scientific kinds, corresponding to them
in a given scientific theory. Yet, Scarantino’s criteria require further development.
The proposed criterion that most instances of an emotion kind must correspond to
instances of the folk emotion concept requires clarification, as there may be cases
where membership to the folk emotion concept might be ambiguous.
The contrast between K3 and K4 displays the problem with the proposal. Suppose
that in the case of K4, half of its members are members of E while the other half are
not. Is K4 a kind of E? If so, would it follow that in order for a kind to count as
a member of a category such as E, at least half of its members must be members of
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Figure 5.1. Scarantino’s view of the relation between folk emotion terms and natural
kinds of emotions.
E designates an emotion term such as “fear” or “anger.” K1...Kn, in turn, refer to
natural kinds of emotion which may or may not be instances of E.
E? If not, why is K3 a kind of E while K4 is not? As Scarantino has formulated the
constraint, it would be presumably because in the first case, most cases belong to E
whereas in the other they do not. But where should we draw the line? In sum, how
are we to decide whether a kind counts as a kind of E or not?
This ambiguity opens up an important problem and a crucial decision to be made
when theorizing about emotions. In the spirit of Carnap’s account—which is arguably
the inspiration of Scarantino’s constraints—one option is to count K4 as a kind in
case doing so provides an advantage when it comes to grounding inductive inferences
and explanations, that is, in case it satisfies the fruitfulness criterion better than not
counting it as a kind of E. But then, how are we to decide when does the inclusion of
K4 is more fruitful than its exclusion?
Scarantino’s account depends on the underlying mechanisms producing the prop-
erty clusters K1...K6. This makes the decision lie in the clusters themselves, not in
their fruitfulness for scientific theories. As I have constructed the case, however, the
decision cannot be made merely in terms of mechanisms, as these make it so that only
half (or even half plus one) of the instances of K4 are members of E. What we need,
in my view, is to relax these constraints.
One way to make progress in this direction is to appeal to different types of kinds
as I argued in the previous chapter. By appealing to only a specific type of scientific
kinds (namely, HPC kinds), Scarantino restricts the possible inductive and explanatory
patterns that can account for emotions. If my view on scientific kinds is correct, we
can relax this criterion to accommodate other types of scientific kinds beyond HPC
kinds. According to my account, a kind Kn counts as a kind of E if its members share
inductively and explanatorily relevant properties in terms of what makes these kinds
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projectible. By appealing to their projectibility, we introduce helpful concepts that
enable us to clarify the situation above.
An advantage of a pluralistic account of kinds is that it allows comparing how strict
or liberal a given taxonomy can be depending on the criterion on which it construes its
kinds. For example, on an essentialist construal, a kind might be more restrictive than
on a historical construal, since under the essentialist framework, all members of a given
kind must share exactly the same concrete microstructural properties, whereas the
historical framework appeals to causal histories which allow more variation across the
kind. In some cases, such variability is desired, as in the case of species. By construing
species historically, we make more categories that work better for the projections that
biologists are interested in making than by appealing to an essentialist model. Hence,
if the historical construal leads to a more projectible taxonomy, then that construal
ought to be preferred. Put differently, we can cash out the fruitfulness criterion in
terms of which model helps scientists make better projections. In the case above,
historical kinds are more fruitful in this regard.
This offers one way to resolve problems about whether a kind is a member of
an emotion category. Whether or not K4 is a member of E or not depends on how
well including K4 in E helps scientists make projections across E. If we can find a
framework to construe more powerful scientific kinds among the ones presented in the
previous chapter (essentialist, historical, functional, and social), then membership to
E will depend on whether that framework would lead to the inclusion or exclusion of
K4. For instance, it is quite likely that an essentalist construal would exclude K4 from
E, given that not all instances of K4 share the same properties as other instances of
E. In turn, it is plausible to construe E in terms of a social or functional kind that
includes K4 in spite differences in microstructures. Depending on which framework
leads to more projectible categories, we will have a criterion to include or exclude the
kind, thus disambiguating this situation.
This appeal to projectibility introduces an important meta-criterion to choose
among different kinds and hence to disambiguate the case above, namely, entrench-
ment. As I explained in the previous chapter, whether or not a kind is projectible
partly depends on whether it is well entrenched, that is, how successful its use has
been in past projections. Resolving whether or not the inclusion of a kind in an emo-
tion category is more or less fruitful must thus involve questions about how we have
characterized that category and that kind in the past. This would give us clues about
how well entrenched a given characterization is and thereby which taxonomy leads to
better projections.
In this sense, the decision of whether to include K4 is at least partially pragmatic.
If all possible frameworks to construe scientific kinds of emotion lead to equally pro-
jectible categories, then we can look at past inferences to see which one fits best with
past successes, i.e., which one is more entrenched. This is an interesting consequence
for two reasons. First, it makes the situation potentially resolvable even if the choice
between different construals of scientific kinds cannot decide the matter. It would be
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up to emotion researchers to pick the kinds that best fit their previous explanatory
practices.
This leads to the second upshot of this proposal, namely, that it gives space to con-
siderations about how scientists actually use emotion categories and to the pragmatics
of scientific research and the history of emotion science. In this account, explicating
emotions is not a task done over and above actual scientific practice, but an integrated
part of it. In order to explicate emotions, we must not only work towards projectible
categories, but we must do so considering past projections that have been successful
in advancing emotion research.
In sum, I concede to Scarantino that a robust number of instances of the kinds
we identify with emotion categories must also be members of the folk category. In
ambiguous cases, the decision to count a kind as a given emotion kind, however, must
depend partly on pragmatic criteria appealing to projectibility and fruitfulness. To
make this clear, I will synthesize the previous discussion under the following proposal.
5.5 Conclusion: How to explicate emotions
To close this chapter, I will sketch a strategy to explicate folk emotion concepts and
create new, fruitful scientific concepts. I will do this by following what I take are the
main lessons we can learn from the different discussions presented above, namely, that
on reconstitution, explication, and the tension between folk and scientific concepts of
emotion. In the next chapter, I will apply this strategy to defend a functionalist model
of emotions.
Recall first the two-step account of reconstitution I proposed above. According
to this account, we reconstitute the phenomena by (1) having some ostensive device
that allows us to point to the phenomenon of interest; and (2) picking out the level of
analysis with which we will construct scientific categories to study that phenomenon,
i.e., decide which framework of scientific kinds fits best to our explanatory purposes.
In the case of emotions, as I claimed above, the first step, finding an ostensive
device to point to the phenomena of interest, can be done by analyzing folk emotion
concepts. Folk emotion concepts provide the first approximation to what emotions are,
hence enabling us to detect what the explanandum of a scientific theory of emotions
is.
Given the appeal to folk emotion concepts as a first step in the construction of
a scientific theory of emotions, the second step, finding the correct level of analy-
sis, amounts to explicating emotion concepts in terms of one of the aforementioned
frameworks of emotion kinds. The choice of framework will depend on how well each
framework captures properties that characterize emotions in our folk psychology while
allowing the formulation of projectible kinds. In other words, we must pick the best
framework in terms of how well they mirror the properties emotions have in our folk
psychology.
In my view, this procedure will allow us to abstract away from folk terms into
scientifically tractable ones. Instead of maintaining folk concepts as they are and
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Figure 5.2. Sketch of the difference between folk and scientific emotion concepts.
As in Figure 5.1, E designates a folk emotion concept and K1...Kn candidate natural
kinds for emotions. In this case, we now see E’ (delimited by the dotted line) as a
scientific emotion concept for E, which does not map one-to-one onto each case of E
(hence allowing some mismatch) but which overlaps robustly with E.
attempting to use them in science, this procedure yields new concepts that are robustly
similar to the original ones (meeting the similarity criterion) while being scientifically
fruitful.
Figure 5.2 displays the result of this reconstitution procedure for a given emotion
concept. Just as in the case of Scarantino’s proposal, E represents a folk emotion
concept, and K1...K6 represent property clusters that are either associated or not
with that emotion concept. These can be neural, physiological, or behavioral property
clusters (or a combination thereof). In some cases (K1 and K2), all of the members
of the kind are members of E. In other cases (K3.K4, and K5) only some members
of the kind are members of E. In this picture, rather than changing E to make it fit
these kinds, we can construct a new scientific concept E’ which will include the kinds
that it requires to make a scientifically tractable, projectible kind. In this scenario, E’
includes the members of kinds K3 and K4, but not members of K5.
As we can see in the figure, there is some degree of mismatch between E and E’.
This mismatch prevents us from overfitting scientific categories to the folk concept
in question, hence allowing some freedom for science to determine whether certain
instances will count as members of an emotion category depending on whether the
inclusion or exclusion of these instances make the category projectible. This helps
meet Scarantino’s worry that by forcing science into using folk categories, we stagnate
scientific progress.
Additionally, the account sketched here also prevents changing the subject, as it is
clear how E’ is constructed. As I have explained above, E’ is constructed by analyzing
the folk concept E and, when it comes to borderline cases, evaluating whether or not
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the inclusion of marginal kinds K3,K4, and K5 makes a more fruitful category. This
makes it clear what the connection is between the scientific concept E’ and its folk
relative E.
One interesting consequence of this account of the reconstitution and explication of
folk emotion concepts is that it renders the mismatch between these concepts and their
scientific counterparts productive. Since scientific concepts need not have exactly the
same extension as folk concepts, but they maintain a robust degree of similarity, they
can push folk concepts into new directions. This allows for an account were scientific
findings inform folk concepts and lead to conceptual change in line with scientific
progress. Additionally, if there is such conceptual change in folk concepts, we can also
expect scientific theories to be reworked to accommodate new pretheoretical intuitions
and maintain in sight the phenomena of interest. Hence, the account I sketch here
provides an image where folk psychology and scientific theories are not in opposition,
but work together in a continuous fashion, while avoiding collapsing scientific categories
into folk taxonomies.
In the next chapter, I will apply this strategy to reconstitute emotions and answer
the question of which framework to construct scientific kinds works best for emotion
research as it currently stands. If this strategy is successful, we have good reasons to
be optimistic that the Theoretical Challenge can be overcome. In turn, this will shed
light on how to approach the Empirical Challenge as well, thus making an important
step towards the construction of a scientifically respectable theory of emotions.
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Chapter 6
A Functionalist Approach to
Emotion Kinds
In this chapter, I explore the issue of how we can successfully reconstitute emotions
for the purposes of scientific investigation. I will follow the procedures sketched in
the previous chapter (chapter 5), and integrate them into the picture about kinds
developed in the chapter before that (chapter 4). This procedure calls for an analysis of
our pretheoretical commitments in the form of diagnostic features that help us identify
the phenomenon we want to construct as a scientific kind. In the case of emotions,
I will examine some features that are present in our folk-psychological vocabulary.
Afterwards, I will approach the question about kinds by discussing each type of kind as
presented before, and I will argue that among the types discussed, functional kinds are
the most suited to construct scientific concepts of emotions. In the rest of the chapter,
I will defend this view against some objections and explore some of the advantages of
this account.
To be clear, this chapter does not propose a theory of emotions in itself. These
observations are intended as meta-theoretical observations, that is, as regarding how
we can conceive and construct candidates to successful theories of emotions. These
remarks do have important consequences for specific theories emotions, as it allows
us to cast doubt on current theories and offer support for others. Nevertheless, my
positive view focuses on the conditions for success, rather than a particular version of
the view I am proposing. In other words, I am offering an account of how to develop
scientifically interesting concepts and theories of emotions, while leaving the specifics
of what these concepts and theories are to scientists.
6.1 The Folk-Psychology of Emotions
Many studies on emotions have investigated what we can call the folk-psychological
picture of emotions. These studies pertain to what Scarantino called the Folk Emo-
tion Project. While many of these studies are not intended primarily as studies on
folk-psychology, they do provide interesting sources of information as to how folk-
psychological concepts of emotions work. Thus, since we are interested in how the
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folk-psychology of emotions makes reference to diagnostic features, I will pay special
attention to studies on emotion concepts and emotion attribution.
Additionally, some of the features I shall list below will be included by appeal to
facts about how we talk about emotions more generally. By analyzing evidence and
arguments in these directions, we can make ourselves an idea of the properties that
emotions have in the folk-psychological domain, which we will later try to capture in
terms of scientific concepts. Hence, in this section, I will go over empirical evidence that
can be put to use to tap into facts about our folk-psychological account of emotions,
and that can provide a stepping stone to carry out an empirically informed form of
conceptual analysis later on.
6.1.1 (Relatively) Uncontroversial features
Many researchers agree on some of the features emotions exhibit in our folk-psychology.
Among these, perhaps the most prominent features are valence and arousal. Valence
refers to the positivity or negativity of each emotion. Arousal, in turn, refers to the
level of excitation or inhibition that we feel when having an emotion. For example,
happiness is a positive emotion that excites us; sadness, a negative emotion that leaves
us unenergetic. While I do not think that emotions are reduced to valence and arousal
(see chapter 1 on constructionism), these are still important features present in our
folk-psychology.
Evidence for the importance of valence and arousal in how we conceptualize emo-
tions pretheoretically can be found in studies on dimensional models of emotions. One
such early model was Russell’s circumplex model of affect. Russell (1980) conducted a
number of studies to develop this model. In one study, subjects mapped descriptions
of emotions onto emotion categories. These descriptions made reference to whether an
emotion was arousing or not, pleasurable or unpleasurable, distressing or contentful,
and exciting or depressing. In another study, subjects rated how accurate adjectives
in a list were with regards to a set of emotions. These studies showed that the main
dimensions that accounted for the observed variance were arousal and pleasure (i.e.,
valence). This means that emotions can be described in these terms to some extent.
Later studies would sophisticate this model, but the mapping of emotions onto valence
and arousal remained (Remington, Fabrigar, & Visser, 2000; Russell, Lewicka, & Niit,
1989; Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 2011).50
Besides emotions being valenced and arousing states, researchers also agree that
emotions motivate actions. All of the theories of emotions discussed in chapter 1
share this common theme. For basic emotion theories, emotions are related to actions
regarding survival; for appraisal theories, emotions are syndromes leading to actions
according to an appraisal; for constructionists, emotions are acts of categorization
50 This interpretation is much weaker than Russell’s. Russell takes these studies to support the view
that emotions have not only this conceptual structure, but that they are constituted by these
dimensions. This will later become the basis for the construct of core affect. I do not endorse this
interpretation for the arguments offered in previous chapters (see chapter 1 on constructionism).
Yet, the weaker interpretation allows us to make use of these results in terms of what they tell
us about the folk-psychological structure of emotion concepts.
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that can bring about actions. This recurrent theme stems, I believe, from the fact
that in our folk-psychology, emotions are thought of as closely related to motivation.51
Empirically speaking, there is evidence to support this association between emotion
and action. Much of the literature explored in sections §2.2.3 and §2.2.5 suggest that
our emotion concepts are linked to action tendencies such as wanting to escape, fight,
flee, attack, approach, and the like.
There is also evidence that emotions are considered to be embodied by our folk-
psychology. By embodiment, I mean that they involve physiological reactions. Scherer
and Wallbott (1994) provide interesting evidence in this direction. They conducted
a study in which subjects answered open-ended questions about how they describe
their emotions. Importantly, this study included several cultures, including European,
Asian, American, and African countries. Overall, subjects described their emotions as
involving physiological symptoms such as breathing changes, muscles tensing, stomach
trouble, and differences in felt temperature. This means that across different cultures,
folk emotion concepts are thought of as involving bodily reactions.
In a recent study, Hietanen, Glerean, Hari, and Nummenmaa (2016) showed a
similar result in how children learn emotion concepts. In this study, the researchers
investigated the development of bodily sensations associated with basic emotions in
6 to 17 year olds. They used a paper-and-pencil version of emBODY, a tool to map
emotion categories to bodily activity. Participants were given an A4-sized piece of
paper showing two outlines of a human body and an emotion word between them.
Participants read the emotion words and colored the bodily regions whose action
typically felt becoming strong and faster on the left body or weaker and slower on
the right body when feeling each emotion.
The researchers found that as a child’s emotion concepts become more refined, they
exhibit associations between each emotion category and bodily features. For example,
happiness is thought of as involving activity in the upper part of the body, whereas
sadness involves a general feeling of inactivity. These results suggest that in our folk-
psychology, the body plays an important role in how we distinguish between different
emotions.
Another important feature of emotions in the folk-psychological realm is their
appeal to phenomenality. It is common to describe our emotions as feelings of a certain
kind. This may be associated with feelings in the body, as shown by studies such as
the one by Hietanen et al. (2016) mentioned before. They can also be associated with
experiential states more generally, as seen in phrases we use when we say things like “I
feel sad” without appealing to a specific body part. It is worth noticing that, however,
as Ortony, Clore, and Foss (1987) remark, emotional vocabulary usually accepts both
constructions with the verb ‘to feel’ and the verb ‘to be’. This is to say, for emotional
words, we can apply them in sentences such as “I feel afraid” and “I am afraid” without
changing their intended meaning.
51 Whether or not this relation is one of causation or not, I will not address at the moment. See
Scarantino (2017) for a discussion.
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The fact that we can apply both constructions helps distinguish emotions from
other related phenomena in our folk-psychological vocabulary. For example, using
both constructions without a change in meaning does not obtain for other words,
such as ‘abandonment,’ to use Ortony and colleagues’ example. When we say “I feel
abandoned,” we may be expressing that we feel certain emotions provoked by the belief
that we are abandoned. In my view, we could even be implying that we believe we
are abandoned, although we do not have conclusive evidence to back up our claim. In
contrast, when we say “I am abandoned,” we are expressing a state of affairs or a fact,
i.e., we are asserting that we are indeed abandoned.
This linguistic fact about folk emotion concepts highlights the importance of feeling
in how we think about emotions. Later I will argue that this should not be confused
with the claim that emotions are to be understood as mere feelings, nor does this
imply that we must include phenomenality as a central piece in the construction of
a theory of emotions. For now, let it be noted only that the appeal to feelings and
phenomenality is a feature of emotions as understood by our folk-psychology.
One last relatively uncontroversial feature of emotions is their intentionality. When
we claim that we or someone is experiencing an emotion, we say that the emotion is
about some object or event. Intentionality is clearly seen in phrases such as “I am angry
that...” or “I am sad about...,” where the ellipsis can be replaced by a proposition or
an object or event, respectively. Few studies have addressed intentionality explicitly
though. Nevertheless, it is worth including in the list of features that help us point to
the phenomena we call emotions.
The features discussed above offer at least an approximation to the phenomenon
a theory of emotions must explain. It is worth clarifying that these do not constitute
necessary or sufficient properties for a state to qualify as an emotion. As I explained
before, they only constitute heuristic features that help us make reference to the ex-
planandum phenomenon. Before I discuss how different models can accommodate
these features, however, I would like to add two features which, I believe, are of im-
portance but often neglected in discussions about emotions. These are the sensitivity
of emotion attribution to contextual factors, and cases of attribution of emotions to
non-human animals.
6.1.2 Context-sensitivity
In section §2.2.4, I mentioned some evidence that cultural factors influence how and
which emotions we attribute to others. Here I will add evidence for context-sensitivity
effects, focusing in how contextual cues aid in individuating emotions. Evidence in
this direction can be divided in two groups. On one hand, we may ask how we identify
emotions in ourselves, and how our context helps us make this identification. On the
other hand, there is the question of how context affects our attribution of emotions to
others.
Regarding the first question, one canonical experiment is that by Schachter and
Singer (1962). Subjects in this experiment were told that they were in a study on the
effects of vitamin supplements on vision. The experimenters told the participants that
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they would be given a small injection of ‘Suproxin’, a fake drug which would affect
their visual skills. In reality, subjects were given either epinephrine (i.e., adrenaline)
or placebo. Those that received epinephrine were divided into three groups. The first
group was informed of the effects of the epinephrine, such as accelerated heart rate,
pupil dilation, etc. The second one told that their feet would go numb, some parts of
their body would itch, and that they might get a headache. This was meant misinform
subjects about their own states to avoid the information given from biasing subjective
reports. The last one was told nothing about the effects of the injection.
After being injected with either epinephrine or placebo, subjects were taken into
a room where they were asked to wait for 20 minutes while the ‘Suproxin’ took effect.
Afterwards, they would be asked to do some vision tests. While waiting in the room,
the experimenters would bring in a stooge, introduced as another subject. The stooge
and the room were controlled to induce a given emotion. On one condition, the
room would be slightly disorganized, but the experimenter would apologize, invite the
participant to help themselves to scratch paper, rubber bands, and pencils, and the
stooge would play around in the room. This was meant to induce euphoria. On the
other condition, the experimenter would give the participant and the stooge five-pages
long questionnaires designed to ask personal and insulting information. During this
task, the stooge would complain about the shots and make annoying remarks about
the questionnaire. This was meant to induce anger.52
According to Schachter and Singer, the idea was to investigate the role of cognition
in emotion. In their view, if participants were given an explanation for their bodily
symptoms, they would not think of these reactions as part of an emotional state. In
other words, if they knew about the effects of epinephrine, any subsequent reaction
would be attributed to the drug. However, if they did not have such information,
subjects would think that they were in an emotional state. This state, Schachter and
Singer hypothesized, would depend on contextual cues leading to a specific subjective
interpretation of the situation (which is what Schachter and Singer mean by ‘cognition’;
see Reisenzein, 1983). In their words, “Given a state of physiological arousal for which
an individual has no immediate explanation, he will “label” this state and describe
his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him” (Schachter & Singer, 1962,
p. 381). To manipulate these cognitions or interpretations, the researchers fabricated
contexts meant to lead the subject to judge their state as either euphoria or anger. As
a result, they created a situation in which, presumably, two participants in the same
physiological state of epinephrine-induced arousal may have had different emotional
states depending on the context.
52 There is a problem in the distribution of subjects into each of these conditions. While the
experiment calls for a 4x2 design (Epi. Informed, Epi. Ignorant, Epi. Misinformed, Placebo vs.
Euphoria, Anger), the Epi. Misinformed plus Anger condition was not included. The researchers
argue that this is because they thought the Epi. Misinformed plus Euphoria condition would
suffice to account for the effects of information. However, this introduces a problem: if there are
differences within the Euphoria condition, they cannot rule out that the effects are specific to
Euphoria.
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Schachter and Singer report that in the epinephrine conditions, subjects showed
significant increased pulse rate, palpitation, and tremor. When comparing between
the epinephrine-ignorant and the epinephrine-misinformed conditions in the context
of euphoria, subjects reported similar levels of euphoria. In both cases, they reported
being more euphoric than in the epinephrine-informed condition. This suggests that
in both cases, subjects relied on the context to identify their emotion and not on their
physiological state, consistent with the investigators’ hypotheses.53, 54
More recent evidence supports the claim that context affects how we attribute
emotions to ourselves. Sabini and Silver (2005), for instance, hold that emotions are
attributed in a three-sided context: the person having the emotion, the person de-
scribing the emotion, and the audience for the description. They claim that speakers
decide how to describe emotional experiences based on information in all of these
sources. In other words, it is pragmatics that decides how an experience is described
and which emotion concept is appropriate. Consequently, distinctions between emo-
tions are traced as a function of the context, rather than appraisals (as in appraisal
theories) or mere experience.
To argue for their claim, Sabini and Silver present a series of examples of context-
sensitivity effects. Two of the more salient ones concern the distinctions between envy
and anger, and between shame and embarrassment. Regarding the first, they suggest
that envy occurs when “a person recognizes that another’s accomplishment make [sic]
him or her look bad to self [sic] and (or) others” (Sabini & Silver, 2005, p. 4). If
the person that looks bad makes an unwarranted accusation against an accomplished
person, the first will be seen as envious. Nevertheless, from a first-person perspective,
the envious person feels anger, and they are attributed envy only insofar as others know
that their anger is unwarranted. In other words, anger and envy are distinguished from
each other only in that envy depends on contextual factors which include someone’s
accomplishment and another’s unwarranted anger towards that accomplishment.
Regarding the case of shame and embarrassment, the authors claim that these
emotions are differentiated in terms of the quality of a perceived flaw in the self. Let
53 For the anger condition, subjects did not report feelings angry or irritated. According to
Schachter and Singer, only after de-briefing did subjects confess being annoyed by the ques-
tionnaire. This makes it problematic to interpret the results, since it is unclear to which extent
did the manipulation work. Yet, the researchers report that subjects in the epinephrine-informed
condition were less angry (i.e. happier, as they used the same happiness measure in both emotion
contexts) than in the epinephrine ignorant and placebo conditions. Despite the problems with
these results, the researchers take them as supporting their hypotheses.
54 As influential as it has been, the Schachter and Singer experiment is problematic. Reisenzein
(1983) explores some criticism of this experiment. He mentions a number of studies that at-
tempted to replicate the results without success. For example, Marshall and Zimbardo (1979)
tried unsuccessfully to replicate the euphoria condition following Schachter and Singer’s design.
They included several dosages of epinephrine, and found that subjects that had received the drug
showed a tendency towards negative feelings rather than positive ones. Yet, other studies with
similar paradigms on other emotions find some effects, albeit weak or indirect. For instance, in
Cooper, Zanna, and Taves (1978), subjects who had been administered amphetamine and were
asked to write a counterattitudinal essay subsequently change their attitudes in the direction
implied by their behavior in contrast to subjects who had been given a placebo. The authors
infer that cognitive dissonance, taken as an aversive state similar to an emotional one, had been
intensified by the drug-induced arousal.
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us elaborate. According to a study by Sabini, Garvey, and Hall (2001), the previous
consensus that shame occurs when there is a violation of a moral norm, while em-
barrassment corresponds to the violation of a social convention, is misguided. Sabini
et al. argue that (1) moral transgressions are not the only causes of shame, and (2)
people can feel embarrassed when they are clumsy rather than violating social conven-
tions. In their view, these emotions are distinguished in that in shame, agents believe
that an event has revealed a real flaw of their self (moral or otherwise), whereas in
embarrassment, the event has appeared to reveal a real flaw but it has really not. If
the audience believes there is a real flaw, the reaction tends towards anger rather than
embarrassment.
To test this, the researchers asked participants in an experiment to imagine a
scenario where a colleague helps them move from one office to another. While moving,
their colleague discovers some pornography among their stuff. In one condition, the
pornography belonged to them. In another condition, the pornography belonged to the
former occupant of the office, even though their colleague thought it belonged to them.
In the first case, participants reported feeling both ashamed and embarrassed, while in
the second, they reported feeling more embarrassed than ashamed. This result suggests
that the difference between instances of shame and embarrassment lies in contextual
factors. In this experiment, whether the participant felt shame or embarrassment
depended on whether they owned the pornography (leading to a situation showing a
fault in their selves) or not (leading to a situation where the fault is not in their selves,
although it would appear as it were). Further studies on the physiology and expression
of these emotions support Sabini and Silver’s hypotheses (see e.g. Crozier, 2014).
Context-sensitivity effects can also be seen in cases where we attribute emotions
to others. Conway and Bekerian (1987) tested how knowledge about a given situa-
tion could help subjects infer an ensuing emotion. They gave participants a list of
sentences describing a situation, and asked them to decide which emotion might be
associated with it or which emotion might someone feel in that context. They found
that for all emotions, subjects named the same emotions equally homogeneously. In
other words, subjects agreed significantly on which emotions corresponded to which
situations. This suggests that contextual information plays at least a heuristic role in
identifying emotions.
Ngo and Isaacowitz (2015) also studied the role of context in identifying emotional
expressions. They presented subjects with a set of faces paired with a context, and
asked subjects to specify the corresponding emotions while ignoring the context. In
spite of this instruction, the researchers found that subjects were still influenced by
contextual cues of the scene. Specifically, they report that subjects would often report
the emotion corresponding to the context even if it was not supposed to match the
given expression. If subjects saw a fearful expression in a context that would normally
induced anger, they were prone to report the corresponding emotion as one of anger
rather than fear, for example. In a follow-up study, they replicated these findings
even when comparing participants who were told that the context was irrelevant with
participants who were told the opposite. This indicates that regardless of the instruc-
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tion, subjects would inform their decision based on the scene and not on the emotional
expression alone. Similar findings can be found in Hareli, Elkabetz, and Hess (2018).55
All in all, there seems to be evidence that emotions are context-sensitive, at least
to some degree. That is to say, how an emotion is identified and individuated depends
at least partially to factors of the context. This is true regardless of whether people
are told to ignore contextual cues, suggesting that this phenomenon might be quite
automatic. This will become important later on, since in my view, essentialist and
historical models have problems accommodating this feature.
6.1.3 Minimal attribution and non-human animals
In closing this section, I want to discuss the question: what are the minimal criteria
on which we attribute emotions to others? It is uncontroversial that emotions exhibit
various degrees of complexity, ranging from basic responses such as fight-or-flight ones
in the case of fear, to sophisticated instances such as embarrassment due to failing to
meet a cultural norm. To identify what is common to all of these instances, it is useful
to think about the most simple cases with the hypothesis that whatever properties
are present there can be extrapolated to more complex ones. Put differently, we can
think of the minimal cases as providing a basis and later cash out more sophisticated
cases as additions to that minimal case. I believe that attribution of emotion to non-
human animals is an interesting minimal case. If at least some animals are said to have
emotional reactions, this provides a case where we can put aside social and cultural
factors involved in our folk-psychology of emotions.
To what extent to we attribute emotions to non-human animals? Often we describe
animal behavior as emotional, such as when we say that our dog is happy to see us
or when we say that our cat is angry because we have bothered it. To make these
attributions, there must be something in the animal’s behavior that leads us to apply
emotion concepts to it. What properties then does non-human animal behavior exhibit
such that we attribute emotions, at least in some cases?
In raising these questions, I draw from one of the most influential emotion re-
searchers that focused on non-human animals: Darwin. Darwin thought that an in-
vestigation on the nature and mechanisms behind human emotional expression must
include animals as well. The reason is that by looking at the similarities between hu-
man and animal expression, we can generalize to obtain general principles that explain
how these expressions come about and how they allow organisms to signal each other.
In his words:
[...] I have attended, as closely as I could, to the expression of the several
passions in some of the commoner animals; and this, I believe to be of
paramount importance, not of course for deciding how far in man certain
expressions are characteristic of certain states of mind, but as affording
55 Studies on clinical populations might also support the claim that emotions are naturally tied to
context. Rottenberg, Gross, and Gotlib (2005) found that individuals suffering from depression
are much less sensitive to the context when attributing an emotion.
166
6.1. The Folk-Psychology of Emotions
the safest basis for generalization on the causes, or origin, of the various
movements of expression. (Darwin, 1872/2009, p. 24)
The underlying assumption in this approach is, therefore, that animals do have
emotions, and that these emotions share important similarities with our own. In
Darwin’s view, instead of supposing that human psychology was different from that of
animals only in degree, but not in kind. Thus, we must look at the properties shared
between our own psychological capacities, including emotions, and theirs.
At the folk-psychological level, attributing emotions to non-human animals is not
a rare event. Wilkins, McCrae, and McBride (2015) investigated different factors that
might explain why we attribute emotions to animals and which emotions do we at-
tribute the most. The animals they included in their list were mammals (ranging from
rats and squirrels to cats, dogs, and horses), birds (pigeons, chickens, and parrots),
reptiles (cobras, crocodiles, and tortoises), fish, and invertebrates (cockroaches, fruit
flies, and honey bees). They found that belief in the idea that animals have minds is
the most important predictor of emotion attribution in animals in general. In other
words, if we believe that animals have minds, then we tend to be willing to attribute
certain degree of emotionality. So far, this is not very surprising. More interestingly
though, they found that primary emotions (sadness, anger, joy, and fear) are attributed
with significant frequency. Secondary emotions (guilt, pride, and jealousy), although
less frequently, are also attributed in some cases.
Morris, Doe, and Godsell (2008) replicated similar findings. In this study, the in-
vestigators compared attributions between primary and secondary emotions to animals
ranging from birds and rats to cats and dogs. They included not only the emotions
mentioned above, but also primary emotions like anxiety and surprise, and secondary
emotions such as grief, empathy, embarrassment, and shame. Their findings show that
primary emotions are more frequently attributed than secondary emotions, with the
exception of jealousy. Nevertheless, all emotions tested were attributed at least with
some frequency and with relative confidence.
These studies show that we do in fact attribute emotions to animals. What drives
these attributions? As I explained above, Wilkins, McCrae and McBride found that
belief in animals having minds is an important predictor, although this may be easily
explained by the fact that when we project our mental lives onto animals, we are open
to the idea that they share many of our mental capacities. However, the fact that only
primary emotions are attributed with a relevant degree of frequency and confidence
shows that we do not hold animals capable of the same range of emotions as ourselves.
What these studies show is that we project those emotions that we consider primary,
that is, less cognitively demanding and less ingrained in our social lives. For instance,
in Morris, Doe, and Godsell, social and moral emotions such as embarrassment and
shame are the least frequent. In a similar vein, animals with less similarities to us such
as birds and invertebrates are often considered less emotional than mammals.
Other factors that influence emotion attribution to animals include familiarity and
ownership. Wilkins et al. showed that if participants are asked to rate emotions in
animals intended for use (e.g. lab mice, pigs for meat) or pests (e.g. cockroaches,
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rats), they attribute less emotionality overall in comparison to pets. The researchers
explain this effect by appealing to the cognitive dissonance between our attribution
of mental states and emotions, and our willingness to use and kill these animals.
Whatever the explanation may be, this shows that the closer we feel to animals, the
more psychological capacities we are willing to attribute. This, however, does not
depend on the number of animals one owns or is related to. Morris, Lesley, and
Knight (2012) showed that pet owners attribute a wide range of emotions to a number
of animals including dogs, cats, and horses, but this effect is present if participants
have at least one animal (there is no difference if they own more than two).
Lastly, it is interesting to see that the neural mechanisms behind these attribu-
tions are the same as those involved when we attribute emotions to humans. Spunt,
Ellsworth, and Adolphs (2017) investigated these mechanisms using fMRI. They pre-
sented subjects with pictures of human faces, non-human primate faces, dogs, and a
control scrambled picture. In one implicit task, they just presented the stimuli inside
the scanner. In another explicit condition, they presented the stimuli and asked sub-
jects to tell whether the stimulus matched with a description. In one condition, the
description describes the emotion, asking whether the face is one of boredom, sadness,
excitement, etc. In another condition, the description describes the expression itself,
asking whether the human or animal is baring teeth, gazing up, opening its mouth, etc.
They found that subjects did match the emotional description in all cases, and that
the neural mechanisms involved in attributions to humans and animals were relevantly
similar. These include activation in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), lat-
eral orbitofrontal cortex (LOFC), and anterior superior temporal sulcus (aSTS). These
areas are involved in theory of mind and reward processing.56 Hence, the researchers
conclude that there is no human-unique mechanism underlying emotional attribution,
but rather a general mechanism that also applies to animals.
Besides purely folk-psychological attribution, it is worth mentioning that many
of our scientific theories and discoveries regarding emotions are based precisely on
these pretheoretical criteria of attribution as well. Consider studies such as those on
fear conditioning in rats. Classical paradigms to study this phenomenon often use a
stimulus that, prior to conditioning, evokes a particular response (i.e. an unconditioned
stimulus). For example, when a rat is given an electric shock, it freezes and its heart
rate and blood pressure elevate. Now, when researchers pair this shock with a tone
and give the rat some time to learn this pairing, the rat starts freezing and presenting
the same defensive behaviors even in the absence of the shock (i.e. the shock becomes
a conditioned stimulus). This paradigm has been used to study the neural mechanisms
underlying fear responses, and lead to the idea that the amygdala is involved in fear
reactions (LeDoux, 2000).
This paradigm is based on the idea that the sort of response evoked by the shock
in the rat is indeed a fear response. Why should we think so? On the surface, we call
this a fear response because there are important similarities between what we call fear
56 The researchers found some differences in activation between conditions, but they explain them
as differences in conceptual familiarity, rather than in attribution.
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in humans and the rat’s behavior. For example, when we feel fear, we tremble, we
feel our hearts pumping, etc. Furthermore, we also feel fear when shocked and other
analogous situations. In this sense, we easily extend our concept of fear to the rat,
and claim that we are evoking a fear response which we will later investigate. Similar
to Darwin, we project our emotion concepts to animals in virtue of certain patterns
that are shared across species.
Only after some reflection did researchers question the idea that the concept of
«fear» applies to the rat in these cases. In this particular case, the reasons adduced
are that fear necessarily involves a feeling to which we don’t have access in the case
of the rat, and thus we cannot justify this application (LeDoux, 2012). Nonetheless,
this requires a particular theory of what emotions involve. Insofar as we are concerned
with our folk-psychological attributions, it seems plausible that we can easily think
(rightly or wrongly) that rats do have fear responses in virtue of its behavioral cues.
6.2 How do emotions fit together?
Having gone over the diagnostic features of emotions, now it is time to raise the
question: how do emotions fit together? In other words, where does the unity of
emotions lie? First, let us recap what I take to be the most prominent diagnostic
features of emotions according to our folk-psychology. These are:
Arousal Emotions involve some state of arousal or intensity.
Valence Emotions are related to things seen as beneficial or harmful to ourselves.
They inform us of our relations with objects in our environment.
Embodiment Emotions are associated with activity or feelings in different parts of
our bodies.
Motivation Emotions motivate action. They lead us to act in particular ways, to
react to different situations in a particular fashion.
Phenomenality Emotions thought of as involving feelings or experiential states.
Intentionality Emotions have intentional objects. They are about objects or events
in the environment.
Flexibility Emotions are flexible in several respects. Emotions are triggered by a
variety of objects, and expressed in a variety of ways. Additionally, emotion
concepts are fuzzy, and they change across different cultures and languages.
Context-sensitivity Emotions are sensitive to the context in that one reaction may
be categorized as an emotion or another depending on factors beyond our bodily
reactions.
Attribution to non-human animals Non-human animals are described as having
at least some emotions which are considered less cognitively demanding and that
do not involve social norms.
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With these features in mind, what is the best way to describe them in a scientific
framework? Which type of scientific kind best accommodates to this phenomenon? In
what follows, I will discuss each type of model according to the taxonomy of scientific
kinds present in chapter 4. Since I intend to argue for a functionalist model, I will offer
reasons to eliminate the other three models first. Before this, however, it is important
to evaluate which features are the most important to tackle this question. In my view,
not all features are central to our discussion. This is because either they are easily
accommodated by all of the models under consideration, or because they do not offer
a useful standpoint to abstract from them into scientific kinds.
6.2.1 Considering the relevance of folk-psychological features
As I explained above, some of the features I have listed can be accommodated by all
models under consideration. In my view, this is clearly the case of arousal, motivation,
and less straightforwardly, valence. Other features, as I will show below, can be set
aside since they do not offer grounds on which to construct scientifically meaningful
concepts of emotions. Specifically, I believe this is the case of phenomenality. Features
that are accommodated by all models or that are irrelevant to the question at hand
can be left out of the discussion, as they do not help us compare the advantages and
disadvantages of different models of emotions. With this in mind, let us briefly go over
each of these features and separate those that I will consider central to my argument
from those that can be provisionally ignored.
First, let us consider features that can be accommodated by all models. In my
view, these are arousal, motivation, and valence. Arousal can be understood in terms
of patterns of physiological arousal, including increases in heart rate, skin conductance,
and the like. Essentialist and historical models can include these reactions as part of
the essential or evolved mechanisms corresponding to an emotion, respectively. In the
case of functional models, they can either accommodate arousal also in physiological
terms as the realization of a functional profile, or, as social models can also do, in
terms of dispositions to engage in energetic behavior or practices. In any of these
cases, arousal seems to pose almost no problem.
Motivation can also be accommodated in a number of ways. We can understand
emotions motivating action in terms of the effects of neural and physiological patterns
that would presumably individuate emotions in the case of essentialist and historical
patterns. This is how basic emotion theorists, particularly those appealing to affect
programs, cash out emotional motivation. According to these theories, affect programs
are instantiated in circuits which lead to automatic forms of action, explaining the
motivational role that emotions play. These circuits may be then understood as part
of an emotion’s essence or as part of the realizers that have evolved to support it.
When it comes to functionalist and social frameworks, we can spell out the fact
that emotions lead to action in terms of the behavioral dispositions involved in the
functional description of an emotion or in the social practices that would identify each
emotion, respectively. For the functionalist, the emotion itself would have behavioral
dispositions as constituents. For the defender of a social model, emotions could also
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be individuated in terms of behavioral dispositions, only that this time they are dis-
positions to engage in a determinate set of social practices.
When it comes to valence, things might not be so straightforward. Yet, it is
plausible to offer a story about how valence fits into these frameworks. On essentialist
construals, an emotion’s valence must be cashed out in terms of how an emotion’s
mechanisms produce states of pleasure or displeasure, as well as avoidance or approach
reactions. If an emotion’s mechanisms lead to displeasure or avoidance, this suggests
that the emotion is a negative one. Conversely, if it leads to pleasure or approach, we
can think of the emotion as positive. Even though such an account requires specifying
how pleasure or displeasure can be mapped onto specific and consistent structures in
the brain and body, it is presumably possible to offer such an account.
Regarding the remaining frameworks, similar stories can be offered. Historical
models are well prepared to accommodate valence, given that they can appeal to a
historical background that has led to an emotion having adaptive value. If the emo-
tion’s adaptive value is tied to the avoidance of objects in the environment, we can
say the emotion is negative; in the opposite case, if an emotion is adaptive because it
encourages approach behavior, the emotion can be said to be positive. Functionalist
models can also appeal to dispositions of approach or avoidance behavior to draw a
similar distinction. Lastly, social models can appeal to social values, hence accommo-
dating valence without insurmountable problems.
Besides these features, it is also worth considering features that may not be infor-
mative even if explicated. As I explained above, I believe this to be the case of phe-
nomenality. As I argued in section §2.2.5, descriptions of an emotion’s phenomenology
can lead to two outcomes. First, if we interpret phenomenality in terms of qualitative,
subjective experience, then any explication of phenomenality must offer an answer to
the explanatory gap problem. While this could be in principle possible, as I claimed
before, this is still contentious.
Second, a different approach would be to understand an emotion’s phenomenality
in terms of second-order states. As I argued in the discussion on phenomenological
patterns, these descriptions end up collapsing into behavioral dispositions and even
physiological outcomes at best, features that we have included in terms of motiva-
tion and embodiment, or again end up demanding a solution to the explanatory gap
problem altogether. Thus, on this second interpretation, phenomenality is not an in-
dependent feature in the best case, but rather points to forms in which other features
figure in how we describe our emotional episodes in our folk-psychology.
If these arguments are correct, then the most relevant features to decide between
different models of scientific kinds are embodiment, intentionality, flexibility, and
context-sensitivity, as well as how emotions are attributed to non-human animals.
In the next section, I will then compare each of the frameworks with regards to how
well they accommodate these features. In other words, I will examine which type of
model provides the best candidate to explicate emotion categories into scientifically
tractable kinds.
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6.2.2 What emotions are not
Essentialist models
Traditional theories emotions have assumed that the unity of emotions lies in a hidden
essence, perhaps in specific and consistent patterns of neural and physiological activa-
tion (Barrett, 2006; Panksepp, 2008). This way of understanding emotions construes
them then as essentialist kinds. The idea is that an instance of an emotion a member
of that emotion category if it is produced by the same underlying neural or physio-
logical mechanisms as other members in the category. In the most general case, an
essentalist model of emotions appeals to a common underlying concrete structure to
all instances of an emotion category.
In my view, critics of traditional accounts of emotions are right in their skepticism
about this construal. On one hand, empirical evidence on the realizers of emotions
does not support the view that emotions can be individuated according to underlying
essences. As the debate stands, this seems to be at least an approximate consensus.
Most of the evidence for concrete structures underlying emotional reactions suggests
that mapping emotions onto specific and consistent brain regions or physiological mea-
sures have failed, as I showed in chapter 2.
Furthermore, however, I believe that our folk-psychological understanding of emo-
tions does not support the essentialist model either. The way in which we categorize
emotions in our folk-psychology is not due to hidden essences in terms of neural or
physiological mechanisms, or other mechanisms for that matter. An essentialist con-
strual of emotions would have problems explaining emotions’ flexibility and context-
sensitivity. According to such a construal, the flexibility of emotions would have to
be described either as a divergence from standard cases that do possess the essential
features of emotions, or as different emotions altogether.
Consider two instances that we would classify as fear: fear of snakes and fear of
failing an exam. Fear of snakes, which is the canonical example of essentialist models
of emotions, can presumably be cashed out under the essentalist scheme by appealing
perhaps to amygdala activity. Let us assume this is correct. What about fear of
failing an exam? We can easily imagine someone being afraid of failing an exam
without constant amygdala activity.
On an essentalist account, such a case would have to be construed either as a
deviation from the standard, or as a different emotion altogether. On the first horn,
most of our everyday instances of emotions would count as non-standard, given the
variety of ways in which emotions obtain. Any non-basic instance of fear would be a
non-standard instance. This is undesirable as it would be unclear how the standard is
fixed in the first place, since most of the actual explananda phenomena (our everyday
fear behavior) would be considered non-standard. On the second horn, we would be
forced to split the two emotions even though there is a clear sense in which we describe
the latter case one of fear. If any slight variation leads to systematically splitting
the kind, then we risk exploding our taxonomy of emotions and hence creating an
problematic mismatch between our folk and our scientific taxonomy.
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To make this case clearer, consider an analogy with a quintessential essentialist
kind: H2O. Instances of water that we encounter in our everyday interactions, and
which fix our pretheoretical concept of water are not substances containing only
H2O. In a sense, what we call “water” in our everyday interactions, waterP 57, as it
were, is not the same as the water referred to when we use the concept in a scientific
way, waterS . This mismatch is clarified in ordinary language by means of expressions
such as “Tap water is not pure water.” For most cases, this clarification works fine:
tap water is not a standard case of the kind we make reference too when we refer to
water in a scientific sense.
If we apply this to emotions, however, the problem quickly comes to the surface.
For many cases in our everyday interactions, we will be forced to say that they are
not “pure” instances of fear, anger, sadness, etc., and only those conforming to the
essentialist construal will qualify as “pure.” This way of understanding emotions ren-
ders most of our pretheoretical concepts, which I have argued fix our explanandum,
“impure” cases. A scientific theory of emotions that renders most of our emotions
impure, I submit, is not a good theory. What we want is a theory that takes emotions
in our everyday interactions seriously, since that is precisely what we want to explain.
Taking the other strategy to deal with this, dividing emotions into different scien-
tific concepts of emotions, is also problematic. This would quickly lead to a change
of subject, since most of our ordinary emotion concepts would have to be divided and
lumped together in a taxonomy that no longer would be translatable to our folk tax-
onomy. Hence, there would be good reason to doubt that our theory refers to emotions
as an explanandum at all. In sum, in any of these cases, cashing out emotions in terms
of hidden essences yields an overly restrictive framework that does not fare well when
contrasted to what we have identified as the explanandum of our theory.
One possible reply is that while empirical evidence does not support past essen-
tialist construals, it is not in principle impossible that we will be able to offer one.
In other words, we must only postpone the identification of essential properties tying
emotions together. In my view, this strategy is misguided for various reasons. First,
as I will defend below, there are other models that currently fare better with empiri-
cal evidence and that preserve our pretheoretical taxonomies better than essentialist
construals. In terms of comparison, we have better alternatives on the market.
Second, as I discussed in chapter 4, there are problems with essentialism about
kinds in general, as it seems that essentialism does not capture actual scientific prac-
tices and metaphysical assumptions (Khalidi, 2013). Furthermore, similar to the com-
parison regarding empirical evidence, we have other accounts of kindhood available
that are better suited to explain how scientific taxonomies work. Here I have defended
a pluralistic account of kinds which admits other models. Given these alternatives,
remaining tied to essentialism is not warranted.
Lastly, and most importantly, essentialist models would force ignoring empirical
evidence until we find evidence in its favor, when we already have evidence that emo-
57 I will use the subscript P to distinguish pretheoretical concepts from scientific ones. I will use
the subscript S for the latter.
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tions do not correspond to specific and consistent microstructures that would qualify
as the essences of emotions. Keeping an essentialist model would deny evidence in
favor of variability, which I showed in chapter 2 to be convincing. The essentialist
would not only be postponing an account of emotions until evidence in their favor is
found, but would be denying that past evidence speaks against their view.
At best, essentialists could relax their criteria for what counts as an essence. I have
taken essences to be necessary microstructural properties. In the case of emotions, I
have linked them to specific patterns of neural or physiological activity. The essentialist
could reply that we need not map emotions onto essences in these terms. Perhaps an
emotion’s essence lies in a corresponding functional network, as found by multivariate
analyses. This would imply relaxing the concept of an essence to admit higher level
properties.
While this move may sound convincing, I believe there are also reasons to resist it.
Relaxing the criteria for essences to admit higher level properties would risk rendering
essences uninformative, as essences would either collapse into other types of kinds or
would apply to any arbitrary definition we can offer. For any set of objects, we can
define a higher level property that we could count as their essence, hence counting this
set as an essentialist kind.
Historical models
Crossing out essentialist kinds as a candidate to construct emotions as scientific kinds,
we are left with historical, functional, and social kind models. Each of these models
have noticeable advantages when compared to the essentialist model. All of these
models can deal better with variability. A historical construal would accept variability
as long as causal history remains constant, i.e., instances of emotions with a common
phylogenetic and/or ontogenetic developmental history would still qualify as members
of the same category in spite of variations. This would work akin to biological concepts
for different species. Two instances of the class tiger would be considered tigers in
spite of them differing in important respects as long as there is an evolutionary line
connecting the two. Regarding functional kinds, their compatibility with multiple
realization buys us variability in terms of different forms of realization of a given
emotion category. As long as there is a common functional pattern that can describe
commonalities across instances, variations are not only tractable, but expected. Lastly,
social kinds would admit variation in terms of variations in our social world. Since
our social institutions are fluid, malleable, and changeable, it is also expected that
emotions, construed as such, would exhibit different forms across instances. Given
these advantages, let us explore each type of model in turn.
Historical models of emotions, besides allowing some degrees of variability, also
enable us to fit emotions into an evolutionary framework. This makes them attractive
for those interested in the role of emotions in our ancestry. For example, a histori-
cal construal of emotion would serve to motivate hypotheses regarding the origins of
language and communication (Bar-On, 2017), or to ground theories of emotions along
the lines of Darwin’s views.
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One such historical model of emotions is the one suggested by Griffiths (1994,
1997). Griffiths suggests that emotions—specifically those captured by Affect Pro-
gram Theory—are better cashed out using a cladistic approach. He argues that the
cladistic approach can go beyond merely describing emotions in terms of tasks, since
it enables questions about underlying causal mechanisms. This is because, in contrast
to alternative approaches such as an ecological or a functionalist approach, a cladistic
approach can use the resources of evolutionary theory to explain what emotions are
and how they have come to be. In his words:
We do not yet have a general theory of the relationship between organism
and environment (“general” meaning that it applies to diverse lineages of
organisms). The historical nature of the evolutionary process may mean
that no such theory is possible. We do, however, have a sophisticated
practice for determining evolutionary relationships (homologies). We know
that this system of classification reflects the actual process which accounts
for the diversity of life and the clustering of individuals into groups with
shared features. This is as true of features at the level of task description
as of features at the computational or implementation levels. To attempt
to develop a science of emotion using general ecological categories instead
of categories of homology would be to choose a set of categories with a
poorly understood and possibly very weak causal homeostatic mechanism
over a set of categories whose causal homeostatic mechanism approaches
the traditional ideal of a natural kind. (Griffiths, 1997, p. 240)
I find Griffiths’s approach inadequate for a number of reasons. As I already ex-
plained above (see chapter 3.2), Griffiths fails to address why a general theory of
emotions is impossible in principle. The argument offered here has the same flaw. The
fact that we do not yet have a non-cladistic (i.e., ecological or functionalist) theory of
emotions does not entail that such a theory cannot be offered. While this may be true
for other accounts as well, there are additional reasons to resist historical construals
such as Griffiths’s.
First, Griffiths’s view is explicitly premised on the idea that a proper account of
emotions must cash them out as kinds in terms of Boyd’s HPC account. In chapter
4, I offered reasons to think that this is an overly restrictive approach to kinds. If we
abandon the idea that all scientific kinds must be understood in the same framework,
Griffiths’s commitment to Boyd’s account becomes problematic. While it might be
true that if emotions were to be understood on such an account, the best approach
would be a cladistic one, we can resist the premise that we must spell out emotions
as HPC kinds. With more kinds to choose from, there is no need to follow Griffiths in
this regard.
A consequence of shifting to a pluralistic account of kinds brings out a second
reason to resist Griffiths’s arguments. Griffiths’s skepticism about the ecological and
functionalist projects is overly speculative. He limits himself to claim that we do not
understand ecological and functionalist categories as well as homological ones. The
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only reason to prefer homological categories is that they fit better with the HPC
account. Again, I resist such a commitment. Moreover, I find the functionalist project
more promising than what Griffiths does. In my view, there are a number of successful
generalizations on functional kinds. These even include categories in physics such
as “machine” and psychiatric categories such as “depression.” Hence, I do not find
Griffiths’s pessimism about functional kinds warranted. If there are genuine scientific
kinds that generalize on functional profiles, then they must still be considered as
candidates to construct emotion kinds.
So far, my arguments only cast doubt on Griffiths’s recommendation to use a
cladistic approach to construct emotions as historical kinds. Now let me offer reasons
to resist the historical model altogether.
First of all, I believe historical models still have problems when dealing with some
forms of variability. Even though they can handle some degree of variability relative
to essentalist models, they are still limited in this regard. Consider two instances of an
emotion we are tempted to label ‘fear.’ Let us assume that these two instances have
different underlying mechanisms with different phylogenetic histories. On a historical
model of emotions, this would force us to categorize these instances into two different
kinds. Yet, we can raise the question of what makes it that we are tempted to label
them instances of ‘fear.’
In my view, we can offer good reasons to categorize them as such. For example,
if the subject in both of these instances displayed similar behavioral outcomes, it
would make sense to say in both cases that they are afraid. We can imagine them
trembling, sweating, and running away from danger, even if the mechanisms underlying
these reactions differed in their phylogenetic origin. This, I believe, is how our folk-
psychological attribution of emotions work. We do not attribute emotions to others
by looking at the mechanisms underlying their reactions and from there apply one or
another emotion concept. Instead, we look at how they behave in certain situations
and attribute the corresponding emotion.
If this is true, then it follows that cashing out emotion categories in terms of his-
torical pattern misses out on forms of variation that our folk-psychological attribution
is well prepared to handle. The fact that two instances of an emotion vary in their
underlying mechanisms and historical origins is not a reason to split categories. This
fact about our taxonomies of emotions cannot be accommodated under a historical
model, since the historical model forces us to divide up kinds when we normally would
not.
Besides this issue with variability, I believe historical models also have problems
when it comes to explaining social factors involved in our folk emotionality. For exam-
ple, explaining shame and embarrassment in historical terms would demand a historical
account of social and moral norms in order to cash out these emotions as reactions
to perceived failures to meet them. Even if such an account could be offered (see
Schlingloff & Moore, 2017, for reasons against this), this would hardly mirror ordinary
instances of these emotions. For instance, consider an account of shame that would
apply across our evolutionary history. Even if this account could fit shame into our
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overall story regarding our ancestry, it would not easily account for more prototypical
cases of shame such as feeling ashamed that we have stood up a good friend or that
we have not called someone that was expecting us to do so.
Overall, historical models do not fare significantly better than essentialist models.
Even though they admit some degree of variation, they do not admit the kinds of
variation present in our folk-psychology. Additionally, they raise difficulties when it
comes to explaining some of the more socially complex emotions by demanding a his-
torical account of social factors. Since these cases constitute part of our explanandum,
historical accounts, while more permissive than essentialist ones, still come out as too
restrictive for the purposes of our theory.
Social models
The arguments above leave us with two contenders on the ring: functional kinds and
social kinds. As I have already signposted at several points in this work, I believe that
functional kinds are a better framework than social kinds. To argue for this claim, let
me first consider the advantages of social kinds over the other models, so as to motivate
the claim that functional kinds also share many of these advantages plus others.
First, an account of emotions in terms of social kinds would be well prepared to
handle high degrees of variability. Such an account would find unity in terms of un-
derlying mechanisms fairly irrelevant, since unity would obtain at the level of social
practices. Whether or not a given emotion has a homogeneous set of underlying mecha-
nisms is not an important question (even if we found such homogeneity). Furthermore,
such a model would be well suited to handle the social aspects of some emotions as in
the cases of shame and embarrassment presented above.
Other advantages of a social model of emotions would be that it can easily ac-
commodate the flexibility of emotions, their valence, and their context-sensitivity. If
emotions were understood as kinds of social practices, it would be easy to explain why
they are triggered by different objects, why they are expressed in different ways, in
which sense they can be positive or negative, and why they vary depending on the
context. For example, we could offer an account in which emotions are learned reac-
tions to objects that are socially positive or negative, hence explaining their variability
in terms of objects and explaining valence. Furthermore, we could invoke rules of ex-
pression and behavior to account for how they are expressed in different contexts as a
function of the social norms that are at play. Additionally, a social model of emotions
could also easily explain why and how our emotion concepts vary throughout cultures
by appealing to the different practices involved.
In chapter 4, I presented Khalidi’s distinction between different types of social
kinds. These are:
• Kinds that require mental attitudes to be in place, but not necessarily towards
the type nor towards tokens (e.g. racism).
• Kinds that require mental attitudes to be in place towards the type, but not
towards the token (e.g. war).
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• Kinds that require mental attitudes to be in place towards the type and the
tokens (e.g. permanent resident).
When evaluating social models of emotion kinds, we can raise the question of which
type of social kinds would suit emotions best. First of all, in any of these cases, the
claim that emotions form social kinds amounts to the claim that they require mental
attitudes of some sort to be in place. This is because these mental attitudes will
provide the basis to constitute emotions as social practices. A social model of emotion
kinds could cash out these attitudes in terms of evaluative attitudes. What emotions
require, in this sense, would be mental attitudes towards the objects they are about.
This would integrate intentionality into the account from the outset.
Nevertheless, this already introduces a problem, namely, that is makes emotions
highly cognitively demanding. If emotions require evaluations to be understood as
attitudes, then emotions require the cognitive capabilities that attitudes require, ar-
guably including propositional thought and shared concepts. While this might be true
for some emotions anyway (especially social and moral emotions), it is not a plausi-
ble claim for basic cases such as fear of snakes or anger bouts. These emotions are
best understood in terms of automatic mechanisms, which is why they are the gold
standard for basic emotion theories. Spelling them out in terms of mental attitudes
makes them more cognitively complex than is required to explain how they work. Let
us however assume that this can be addressed and further discuss the plausibility of
such models.
Provisionally conceding that all emotions could require mental attitudes to be
in place, the next question is whether they require attitudes towards types, that is,
whether emotions require attitudes towards emotion categories. Recall the example of
war presented in chapter 4. For there to be instances of war, there must be attitudes
towards battles and conflicts which we categorize as wars. It is possible however that
there are wars that, at the time they obtain, are not categorized as such. Hence, for
there to be wars there must be attitudes towards the type but not towards specific
tokens.
Assuming that emotions require mental attitudes towards the type does not seem
to demanding at first. Social accounts of emotions might stress that this precisely
shows why emotions very across cultures, since different societies might have differ-
ent attitudes and hence different taxonomies. Yet, this requirement would entail that
before emotion concepts were developed, there were no emotions in the first place.
Attributing emotions to societies without such concepts would be anachronistic. This
becomes particularly problematic if we want to integrate emotions into an evolution-
ary story. If emotions are to have adaptive value in the sense of providing automatic
evaluations of the environment, a social account of this sort becomes highly implausi-
ble. The reason for this is that in this case, early groups that lacked emotion concepts
would not have the right type of attitudes required to have emotions in general, hence
precluding an evolutionary explanation of emotions.
This problem becomes even more dramatic if we claim that emotions require mental
attitudes both towards types and tokens. In this case, we would require not only that
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there are types of which we are conscious, but that each time someone felt emotion,
there would be someone attributing that emotion to them. Consider the analogy with
the example of this type of social kind above, permanent resident. Without someone in
an institutional framework declaring a person a permanent resident, a person cannot
be said to be a permanent resident at all. If this were the case for emotions, emotions
would necessarily require others to attribute the emotion for an emotional episode to
obtain.
Someone might reply that such attribution can be self-referential. In other words,
it is possible that an emotion obtains if one attributes that emotion to oneself, thus
satisfying the criterion that there is some attitude towards the token. However, this
would imply that we cannot be wrong about our own emotions. If I can successfully
instantiate any emotion that I attribute to myself, there is no possibility of error. This
claim is highly questionable, as there are a myriad of cases both in our everyday lives
and in controlled settings in which we are wrong about our own emotions. This is
precisely why we seek therapy to recognize and manage emotions that we are unclear
about. Hence, at the very least, a defender of this sort of account must either accept
that we are infallible regarding our own emotions, reject that attribution leading to
the instantiation of an emotion can be self-referential, or offer an account of error
that is compatible with this sort of self-referential attribution. As I have claimed, the
first seems improbable. Regarding the second, this would require emotions to always
be instantiated in the presence of others, which is quite counter-intuitive. Finally,
concerning the third option, I do not see how such an account can be offered.
In sum, social models of emotions can make recourse to two types of social kinds:
kinds requiring attitudes but not towards types or tokens, or kinds requiring attitudes
towards types but not tokens. Both options require a degree of cognitive sophistica-
tion that might run counter to an evolutionary picture of emotions that claims that
emotions have adaptive value. It would force either giving up the integration of a the-
ory of emotions with an evolutionary story, or explaining which and how the mental
attitudes required for emotions arose and conferred an evolutionary advantage while
still constituting social kinds.
Additionally, this also makes it difficult to account for the folk-psychological at-
tribution of emotions to non-human animals. In my view, we should consider this
problem seriously. The main reason for this is that, as I showed above, attributing
emotions to non-human animals is part of how we attribute emotions in our daily
lives, and hence qualifies as part of the explanandum of our theories of emotions. A
satisfactory theory of emotions, in this sense, should at least be compatible with the
possibility that animals do have emotions, even if it turns out as a matter of empirical
fact that they do not. A theory that from the outset posits overly demanding con-
straints that preclude animals from having emotions would not reflect an important
part of our folk-psychological understanding of the phenomenon.
Besides this degree of sophistication, social models must clarify whether the mental
attitudes that need to be in place for emotions to obtain are also attitudes towards
types. While an account in this direction might still be possible, I believe there are
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good reasons to doubt of its promise. Again, this makes it even more difficult to inte-
grate emotions into an evolutionary picture and runs counter the claim that subjects
may have some emotions (e.g. fear) even if their social background lacks the require
concepts.
Lastly, I believe that social models of emotions overstate variability in a number of
ways which may turn out to be problematic for a number of reasons. Social accounts
of emotions, such as the one offered by Lutz (1988), claim that emotions are social
phenomena because they involve different objects and concepts in different cultures.
One of the examples driving her view is the case of song, which she translates to
“justifiable anger.” The following anecdote illustrates this emotion:
While in the field, I had twice been mailed a bottle of liquor by well-
meaning friends. The first—a bottle of wine—I shared with the two women
who had become my closest friends, but greatly regretted doing so the next
day. As women do not drink except in secret and when given the local
coconut toddy by one of the men who manufacture it daily, and as we
had the misfortune to be observed, Tamalekar and the brothers of the two
women were justifiably angry (song). When a bottle of whiskey arrived for
me many months later, I decided that the best course of action would be to
give the bottle to Tamalekar. As he drank from it that evening and became
progressively more intoxicated, he repeatedly and it seems pointedly made
reference to the fact that his daughter had given him a bottle of liquor.
(Lutz, 1988, p. 37)
In Lutz’s view, song is different from anger in that it is bound to moral trans-
gressions, not to events that people merely dislike (as in anger). Because of these
differences, Lutz claims that we can only understand song in the cultural context in
which it obtains. In her book, Lutz presents other interesting examples to support her
claim.
I believe Lutz points out interesting facts about emotion concepts and their cultural
variations. A scientific account of emotions should take into consideration the fact that
an emotion can be elicited and described in different terms and with different concepts
across cultures. Yet, I do not think this implies that emotions can be reduced to social
practices.
The examples which Lutz discusses are examples of emotions with two variations
relative to a Western characterization: objects and expressions. In the case of song and
anger, what differs in the first place is the object of the emotional reaction. Whereas
in the case of song, objects of the emotion must involve moral transgressions, objects
of anger do not. Yet, both emotions share important features, albeit more abstract
ones. Both are negative emotions, and both are elicited by a sense of transgression
and offense. Thus, there are descriptions that capture both emotions while admitting
that they vary in their objects. Moreover, these descriptions are what enables Lutz
to compare the two emotions. Without such a description, no translation between the
two would be possible.
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A second type of variation that Lutz discusses extensively in her work are vari-
ations in expression. Following the case of song, Lutz notes that anger in Western
contexts is an emotion whose expression ought to be suppressed. As she explains,
expressing anger—at least violently—is a sign of immaturity. In the ideal case, people
are expected to suppress their anger and calmly resolve conflicts. This is not the case
among the Ifaluk, the community that Lutz studied. While the Ifaluk are a pacific
society, they expect others to express song, especially adults. Expressing song is taken
as a sign of maturity, of sensibility to moral transgressions.
Taking variations in expression of this sort as criteria to divide the two emotions
overstates the differences and neglects important similarities. In both cases, there are
common ways of expression which Lutz recognizes. These are:
[...] refusal to speak or, more dramatically, eat with the offending party;
dropping the markers of polite and “calm” speech; running away from the
household or refusing to eat at all; facial expressions associated with dis-
approval, including pouting or a “locked” mouth, “lit-up” or “lantern” eyes;
gestures, particularly brusque movements; declarations of song and the rea-
sons for it to one’s kin and neighbors; throwing or hitting material objects;
and in some cases, a fast or the threat of suicide or other personal harm.
(Lutz, 1988, p. 174)
All of these reactions are also present in anger. What is different in the two cases
is what is considered a socially adequate response. For Western societies, any openly
emotional expression is to be suppressed, and a “cold-headed” form of expression is
to be expected. For the Ifaluk, this is not the case. Yet, there is a relevant sense in
which we can say that both societies experience the same emotion, but that they have
different norms regarding how it is to be handled.
The objections against Lutz’s view can be generalized to other purely social models
of emotions. By focusing only on the social variations of emotional behavior, social
models neglect similarities in terms of broad patterns of behavior. This leads them
to a problem of translation. If there are no similarities between Western concepts of
emotions and other cultures’ concepts, then there is no sense in which we can under-
stand their behavior as emotional. Conversely, if we can understand their behavior as
emotional, it must be because there is something relevantly similar between instances
of their emotions and ours, in spite of cultural differences. Hence, I think, we must
look for a description that allows us to admit variations while making these similarities
explicit.
It is true that social models can be amended in order to avoid some of these
shortcomings. We could construct a social model of emotions that does not overstate
variability, yet generalize across emotion categories individuated in terms of social
practices. Nevertheless, I believe that social models are still at a disadvantage when
compared to functional models. While emotions do involve social components that are
important to consider, we need not individuate them because of their sociality.
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In my view, strictly speaking, we can apply emotion concepts independently of
social practices. Consider a person in isolation who sees an dangerous animal ap-
proaching or that has run out of food and sees their survival threatened. Regardless of
their social context, which in this case is absent, there is a clear sense in which we can
say this person is afraid of the animal or anxious about their means of nourishment.
We can do this because, plausibly so, this person would have dispositions to behave in
ways which we can describe as fearful or anxious. For example, this person would run
away from the dangerous animal, or urgently seek for food by any means available.
These dispositions warrant the application of emotion concepts, suggesting that we
can individuate emotions without social practices involved.
Someone might object, however, that there are emotions which cannot be described
without appeal to the social context. These may be cases of embarrassment, for
instance, understood as a hiding reaction due to the belief that one has failed a social
norm. Without recourse to social norms, the objection would hold, we cannot make
sense of this emotion. While I concede that this may be the case for social emotions,
I believe these factors can be integrated into a functional framework which applies as
well to the simple cases I appealed to before. This is because functional descriptions
can also accommodate social practices while not being committed to the claim that
social practices are necessary in every instance of an emotion. If this is true, this
shows why functional models are more powerful than social models, since they allow
generalizations that social models would preclude. To see this in detail, let us elaborate
on how a functional model can be cashed out.
6.2.3 Why a functional model?
At last, we come to functional models of emotions. As I understand functional kinds,
they are kinds projectible in virtue of a common functional profile. We can charac-
terize a functional profile in terms of relations between inputs, intermediary states,
and outputs (Block, 1978; Putnam, 1960/1997). These outputs are taken to be the
contribution of the functional system to the overall behavior of a system, as I discussed
in chapter 4. Examples of these kinds include the aforementioned cases of machines
in physics and psychiatric categories. A lever, for instance, can be spelled out as a
physical system which takes in a force and outputs a different force. Different objects
may be said to realize this function if, when engaged in a relevant system, the object
transforms force in the way specified by the functional profile description.
As I explained before, functional kinds allow multiple realizability, in the sense that
it is possible for a number of realizers to fulfill the functional profile. For example,
in the case of the lever, levers can be made out of a variety of materials. What
makes an object be a lever is that it allows force to be transferred in a particular
way, independently of what the object is made of. This is why functional descriptions
can be understood, following Roth and Cummins (2017), causal relevance filters, since
they filter out details about the realizers which are irrelevant to the object carrying
out its function (e.g. a lever’s color).
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One way of cashing out emotions as functional kinds, following Prinz (2004), is
by individuating them in terms of Lazarus’s core-relational themes. On this view,
an emotion is, first, a relation between an organism and its environment. Different
emotions involve different such relations. Lazarus (and Prinz) present the following
core relational themes:
Anger A demeaning offense against me and mine.
Anxiety Facing uncertain, existential threat.
Fright Facing an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger.
Guilt Having transgressed a moral imperative.
Shame Having failed to live up to an ego-ideal.
Sadness Having experienced an irrevocable loss.
Envy Wanting what someone else has.
Jealousy Resenting a third party for loss or threat to another’s affection.
Disgust Taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea (metaphorically
speaking).
Happiness Making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal.
Pride Enhancement of one’s ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or
achievement, either our own or that of someone or group with whom we identify.
Relief A distressing goal-incongruent condition that has changed for the better or
gone away.
Hope Fearing the worst but yearning for better.
Love Desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated.
Compassion Being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help. (Lazarus,
1991, p. 122)
These characterizations of each emotion can be interpreted as a part of the func-
tional profile that individuates each emotion. In the first place, they point out a set
of inputs for each emotion category. Anger, for example, requires the perception of
an offense; envy, the desire to possess an object someone else has, etc. Yet, these
descriptions are not sufficient to specify a full functional profile. In many of the cases
above, what is described is merely a situation. Emotions are not just these situations.
They are reactions to such situations. Anger, for example, is not merely the presence
of an offense against me. It is a reaction to an offense against me. These reactions
constitute the outputs of each emotion.
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What characterizes these reactions? In my view, these reactions are, primarily,
dispositions to engage in specific patterns of behavior. It is when we are bound act
in particular ways to these situations that we describe ourselves as experiencing an
emotion. To continue with the example of anger, not every reaction to an offense is
an instance of anger. If I perceive an offense against me, but I am indifferent to it, we
would hardly describe me as angry. Instead, what warrants describing me as angry is
that I behave in a way that involves some form aggression or violence.
Consider a different case such as fear (or fright, in the list above). Describing
someone as afraid means describing their state as being disposed to react to facing
danger. The behaviors this person would be disposed to engage in might involve fleeing
from the object of danger, fighting for self-preservation, or freezing and trembling.
Again, other ways of dispositions would not constitute instances of fear, such as being
indifferent or, to draw on more border cases, laughing in the face of danger.
Hence, we have two items in my account of emotions: dispositions to engage in
specific patterns of behavioral reactions as outputs, and situations we react to that
instantiate relations between the subject and its environment as inputs. There is yet
another ingredient to be added to the mix. This is the fact that emotions involve
objects, reasons, and also often involve beliefs and other cognitive states (though not
always; see Pérez 2013). It is easy to imagine such cases. Consider feeling afraid of
failing an exam, or being happy that one has succeeded in passing it. In both of these
cases, there must be mediating states of believing that the exam was difficult, the
desire to pass the exam, and the belief that one has passed the exam successfully in
the last case. These can be introduced as intermediary states that allow the system
to output the specific dispositional responses for each emotion category.
In the more complex cases, this feature of emotions has led some to believe that
emotions are judgments (see e.g. Nussbaum, 2001; Solomon, 2003). In my view, these
need not entail such a conclusion. First, not all emotions require propositional atti-
tudes. To draw on an example by Pérez and Gomila (2014), someone can be afraid of
spiders without having propositional attitudes about spiders. This would constitute a
basic case of fear, but a case of fear nonetheless. Second, even though more complex
emotions might require cognitive states, this does not mean that these emotions are
merely judgments. Cases of shame or embarrassment arguably do require some me-
diating states such as the belief that one has failed to meet a moral or social norm,
respectively. Yet, we can cash out these emotions as dispositions to react in particular
ways such as hiding oneself under the belief that one has failed a moral or a social
norm in a given situation.
Overall, what I take to be the moral of these observations is that a proper model of
emotions must be compatible with their relations to other cognitive states to account
for cases where this relation obtains, without making such relation necessary. In
other words, a theory of emotions must spell out emotions in such a way as to allow
emotions to relate to complex cognitive states, but not in a way that makes these states
necessary. This would allow our theory to capture a variety of cases, ranging from
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simple cases such as fearing spiders, to more complex cases such as feeling ashamed or
embarrassed.
I believe that functionalism allows just that. On a functional description of emo-
tions, we can admit that emotional states involve other cognitive states in some cases,
but do not require them at the core. All that is necessary for an emotion to obtain
is that there is some pattern of behavior in a situation that instantiates a relation
between the organism and the environment that has bearing on its well-being.58
Hence, I submit that emotions can be spelled out as dispositions to engage in pat-
terns of behavior which may involve other mental59 states, and that are elicited by
situations that involve specific relations between the organism and its environment.
These elements—dispositions to engage in patterns of behavior, other mental states,
and relations between the organism and its environment—are what constitutes a func-
tional description of an emotion. They are an emotion’s outputs, intermediary states,
and inputs, respectively.
Cashing out emotions as functional kinds has clear advantages. First, as I said
above, functional descriptions allow for multiple realization. This can help us accom-
modate the embodiment of emotions. In my view, emotions are embodied in that
the body is the realizer of the functional profiles that specify each emotional state.
For example, when we say that fear is characterized by trembling, it is a body that
trembles. When we say that we have a tendency to attack when we are angry, it is
our bodies that prepare to attack. What multiple realizability buys us is that we need
not map emotions one-to-one onto specific bodily states. Emotions can be realized by
a variety of bodily states, as long as these bodily states can be described as part of
the satisfaction of the functional description at hand.
This way of taking advantage of multiple realizability already makes functional
models more adequate than essentialist or historical models. The difficulties I raised
against these latter models are not present for functionalist ones. Consider the case of
fear in cases where one fears snakes or fears taking an exam. As I presented the case,
the first might involve amygdala activity, while the other does not. On the essentialist
model, categorizing both cases as fear demanded either fixing the first as the standard
and the other as a deviant, or splitting the kind. On a functional model, this can
be easily accommodated in terms of different instantiations of the same overarching
patterns. What makes both cases instances of fear is that there is a perceived danger
and a reaction to it (fleeing from the snake, sweating during the exam). Whether or
not there is an common concrete underlying structure is not important, since it is the
abstract structure that unites the two cases.
With regards to historical models, I argued that they ran into difficulties integrat-
ing social aspects of our emotional lives. Functional models, however, enable us to
58 This line of argument separates my account from a purely behaviorist account. I am not claiming
that emotions are just dispositions to engage in patterns of behavior, but I am allowing mediating
states to be add in what characterizes an emotion.
59 I do not restrict the mental states involved to cognitive states. Without an account of what
constitutes a cognitive state (in contrast to other possible types of mental states), I will remain
agnostic as to such a specification. To be safe, I shall use the term "mental" broadly.
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take these aspects into consideration. In the discussion above, I claimed that for some
emotions such as shame or embarrassment, historical models demanded a historical
account of social and moral norms. We can see how functional models can accom-
modate these norms without such an account by noticing that functional descriptions
allow for complexity and relations with other mental states. We can account for shame
or embarrassment by describing them as emotions that require the belief that one has
failed to meet a norm. How we acquire these beliefs is a task for social and cognitive
psychology, but on this account, we need not reduce these to evolved mechanisms. A
higher order account of the observation of norms would suffice to construct a model
of these emotions at an abstract level. Hence, adopting a functional framework opens
the door for models that overcome this disadvantage of historical ones.
Lastly, we can also see some advantages in contrast to social models. Functional
models can resist overstating differences in the intentionality of emotions, which I
argued was a problem for social accounts. As I explained above, social accounts of
emotions make a jump from the fact that emotions differ in their intentional objects
across cultures, to the claim that emotions differ categorically across cultures. A func-
tional framework does not make this jump, since we can understand two emotions in
different cultural contexts as functionally similar. In the case above, song and anger
can be said to be the same emotion insofar as they are both negative reactions to an
offense, be it a moral transgression or an event that frustrated our personal endeavors.
On this abstract way of describing the emotion, both emotions share important fea-
tures, such as violent reactions and attack tendencies. The fact that they are triggered
by different objects in different cultures does not entail a split of the kind.60
Second, adopting a functional framework can help us make sense of why and how
we attribute emotions to non-human animals, which I claimed was part of our folk-
psychological attribution of emotions. On this view, when we claim that animals
have emotions, it is because we notice that their behavior satisfies the functional
characterization of a given emotion. For example, when we say that our dog is happy
to see us or that our cat is angry, we do so because our dog exhibits energetic behavior
or because our cat reacts violently and attacks, respectively. On these descriptions, we
even attribute objects to their emotions in similar ways to how we attribute objects
in the case of humans. In the example of the dog, we say that the dog is happy
to see us because its energetic behavior happens after they notice our presence, and
because they jump around us. As I argued above, a social model of emotions would be
60 We can think of the intentionality of emotions by appealing to the distinction drawn by Kenny
(1963/2004) between formal and material objects. Formal objects are described abstractly, while
material objects are described in concrete terms. For example, when we say that one fears snakes,
we must distinguish between the snake described as an instance of danger (formal object), and
the snake described as a concrete object (material object). Since different concrete objects can
be described under a common abstract description, we can say that two instances of an emotion
have the same formal object (danger) but different material objects (snakes or, say, spiders).
The upshot of appealing to functional kinds is that formal objects can be described functionally.
Hence, we open the door for an account of the intentionality of emotions. An account in this
direction was offered previously by Prinz (2004).
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incompatible with this description insofar as such this would require sharing a social
world with animals, a claim that is at the very least implausible.
Lastly, functional models can make sense of the application of emotion concepts in
both social and non-social contexts. This is because functional descriptions can include
situational elements which may involve social practices, but do not require them from
the outset. Hence, from a functionalist perspective, we can spell out emotions that
either require or do not require social practices. This makes functional frameworks
more generalizable than social ones.
In sum, functionalism offer the best of the models above while avoiding their most
pressing pitfalls. From essentalist and historical models, functionalism allows account-
ing for embodiment and the presence of neural and physiological mechanisms by taking
them to be the realizers of functional profiles. In contrast to these models, however,
functionalism does not demand strict mappings that preclude variability. From social
models, functionalism can also integrate social aspects of the more complex emotions,
while enabling descriptive accounts of the embodiment of emotions, making sense of
our attribution to non-human animals, and avoiding confusions that stem from the
intentionality of emotions.
In what is left, I will address some of the most salient objections to functional-
ism coming from both general discussions in philosophy of mind and from local ones
regarding emotions proper. After I tackle these objections, I will draw some conse-
quences of this strategy and come back to the main question of this work: how can we
offer a general framework for a scientific theory of emotions and how can it deal with
empirical demands.
6.3 Objections to functionalism
6.3.1 Functionalism is not falsifiable
One common objection against functionalism is that it cannot be falsified in principle.
The main reason for this, skeptics claim, is that we can describe anything functionally.
Hence, no amount of empirical evidence can falsify a candidate functional descrip-
tion. This makes functionalist frameworks scientifically unattractive, according to
these skeptics.
This objection was framed by Churchland (1981) against functionalism in general.
In his presentation, he invites us to consider a functional description of alchemical
kinds such as the “spirit mercury." Substances that were “ensouled by mercury" could
be characterized functionally in terms of their disposition to reflect light or liquify
under heat. If positing functional kinds were a promising scientific strategy, there
would be then good reasons not to eliminate these kinds, Churchland argues.
A similar argument can be put forward using the case of phlogiston and other
eliminable kinds. In Churchland’s words:
The alchemical example is a deliberately transparent case of what might
well be called “the functionalist strategem," and other cases are easy to
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imagine. A cracking good defense of the phlogiston theory of combustion
can also be constructed along these lines. Construe being highly phlogis-
ticated and being dephlogisticated as functional states defined by certain
syndromes of causal dispositions; point to the great variety of natural sub-
strates capable of combustion and calxification; claim an irreducible func-
tional integrity for what has proved to lack any natural integrity; and bury
the remaining defects under a pledge to contrive improvements. A similar
recipe will provide new life for the four humors of medieval medicine, for the
vital essence or archeus of pre-modern biology, and so forth. (Churchland,
1981, p. 81)
The functionalist strategem, as Churchland calls it, cannot save these kinds from
elimination. In Churchland’s case, it cannot save folk-psychology. Applied to our case,
it cannot save emotions.61
The application of this argument to emotions has also been put forward by Barrett
(2016). She claims that under the functionalist framework, definitions are stipulated,
not discovered. She argues that an emotion can be associated with a variety of func-
tions. If this is so, we can ask: how can we find the correct functional profile that
corresponds to an emotion? According to Barrett, this can only be done by stipula-
tion. As a result, claims about emotions corresponding to functional profiles are not
empirical claims, but conceptual ones that are immune to falsification.
This line of argument depends on the premise that functional characterizations are
always stipulated and cannot be subject to empirical investigation. According to this
objection, appealing to a functional profile is an ad hoc move that cannot lead to a
progressive scientific research program. Yet, I believe this view conflates two kinds of
functionalism.62 They are what Block (1978) called Functionalism (with a capital F,
also called Analytic Functionalism) and Psychofunctionalism:
One can [...] categorize functionalists in terms of whether they regard
functional identities as part of a priori psychology or empirical psychology.
The a priori functionalists (e.g., Smart, Armstrong, Lewis, Shoemaker)
are the heirs of the logical behaviorists. They tend to regard functional
analyses as analyses of the meanings of mental terms, whereas the empirical
functionalists (e.g., Fodor, Putnam, Harman) regard functional analyses as
substantive scientific hypotheses. (Block, 1978, p. 67)
For Analytic Functionalists, as Block explains, a functional characterization is
indeed an a priori truth. It is a matter of logical analysis whether an object satisfies a
61 There is an important difference between folk-psychological kinds, or at least emotions, and the
kinds that Churchland invokes in his examples. Churchland appeals to kinds that are arguably
candidates to chemical kinds. Yet, the sort of inferences done in chemistry rely on microstruc-
tures, hence on a presumably essentialist model of kindhood. In other words, in chemistry,
inferences are projected in virtue of concrete shared structures rather than functional profiles.
This is why it is possible to eliminate these kinds from chemistry. As I argued before, I do not
think this is the case of folk-psychological kinds, or at least of emotions.
62 Churchland acknowledges this distinction, but does not consider it in his argument.
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functional description. This is the case of some of the functional kinds I have invoked
before, such as levers. Describing a lever as an object that allows force transfer in a
specific way is a matter of analysis, not of empirical fact. In other words, the functional
description specifies what it means for something to be a lever, not a fact about these
objects.
Yet, not all functional kinds are stipulated. Consider the kind "photosynthetic
organism," a central kind in biology. Photosynthetic organisms are quite varied, even
carrying out photosynthesis in a myriad of ways. Still, the kind of photosynthetic
organisms is a functional kind. It is the kind that consists of those organisms that
carry out photosynthesis, however that may be. This kind is not merely stipulative,
as it is a kind discovered by biology. Furthermore, membership to the kind does not
happen by an act of stipulation, but as a matter of empirical fact. In other words,
whether or not an organism is a photosynthetic organism is not part of what defines
these organisms. Rather, organisms that count as photosynthetic organisms count as
such in virtue of possessing means to carry out photosynthesis, even if these are not
realized in the same way in different members of the kind, and whether or not an
organisms has such means is a matter of empirical fact. If this is true, it follows that
attributing a functional profile can be a scientific hypothesis, not a stipulation.
This kind of process is what Psychofunctionalists have in mind when they claim
that mental states can be cashed out functionally, and that I have in mind when I claim
that emotions can be constructed scientifically as functional kinds. For Psychofunc-
tionalists, it is up to empirical psychology to find the best functional characterization
of the phenomena it is interested in. In my view, this applies to emotions. When we
claim that fear is a quick reaction to perceived danger, we can submit that to empirical
investigation. On my account, this happens in two ways.
First, recall the process of reconstitution as explication developed in chapter 5.
This process called for an analysis of folk concepts which then would be explicated in
a target vocabulary, in this case a functional vocabulary. While this may seem as a
task of pure conceptual analysis of folk concepts, this analysis can also be empirically
informed with regards to how we attribute emotions to others and to ourselves. In the
first part of this chapter, I presented a number of experiments in psychology which
brought out a number of features that help us pinpoint the phenomenon we intend to
explain. All these experiments relied on subjects’ pretheoretical concepts to attribute
emotions to others and themselves, and showed that emotional attribution depends
on bodily and expressive cues, contextual factors, and so on. It is important to notice
that these facts can change in different historical moments and across different cultures,
and constitute a contingent basis on which we can carry out subsequent exercises of
explication and theory construction. Insofar as our folk concepts change through time,
it is a matter of ongoing investigation how these changes occur and how they change
the ways in which we attribute emotions and hence make reference to the phenomenon
to be explained.63
63 It might be possible to open space for experimental philosophy approaches in this regard as
well. I will not pursue that at the moment. For the time being, I submit that many of the
189
Chapter 6. A Functionalist Approach to Emotion Kinds
Second, whether or not the candidate functional characterization adequately cap-
tures the phenomenon identified through the aforementioned diagnostic features is also
a matter of empirical investigation. We could in principle find instances of an emotion
that do not fit the candidate functional characterization, leading to a refinement of the
candidate altogether. For example, under Lazarus’s core relational themes presented
above, sadness is characterized as the experience of an irrevocable loss. By looking
at instances of sadness in depression, for instance, we could find out that this is not
an adequate characterization, as there may be instances of sadness that do not arise
from a perceived irrevocable loss. If we confirm this, we must look for a different way
of cashing out sadness functionally. Again, this can be done through empirical means
by investigating how well the candidate characterization fits actual instances of the
emotion. As a result, whether or not a functional description captures a given emotion
is a hypothesis, not a stipulation.
When we consider that functional descriptions can also be quite complex, the em-
pirical nature of the functionalist project becomes even clearer. As I presented it
above, a functional description of emotions in my view must consider three aspects:
organism-environment relations (situations), relations to other inner states, and be-
havioral dispositions. On the account I am offering, the task for a science of emotions
is to find how these three parts fit together for each emotion. We must therefore inves-
tigate which situations lead to specific emotions, what other inner states are required
for that emotion to obtain, and what description fits the organism’s reactions and
dispositions. From this perspective we can formulate a number of testable hypotheses,
and allow for empirical research to offer the best account.
6.3.2 Functionalism is teleological
Another objection put forward by Barrett (2016) is that functionalism appeals to
teleology. This objection is directed towards a specific functional model of emotions,
namely, the one proposed by Adolphs (2016, see also Adolphs and Andler 2018). Yet,
it is an objection worth considering, as it introduces an important caveat for functional
models overall.
In Adolphs’s view, emotions are biological functional states that regulate complex
behavior both in humans and animals. On this account, emotions serve the function
of coping with environmental changes in a flexible, predictive, and context-sensitive
manner. This appeal to functions as goals or benefits in our evolutionary history is
what is known as a teleological account of functions.
Against Adolphs, Barrett claims that teleology is an act of mental inference, not
of identification of a phenomenon. When we attribute a teleological function to an
emotion, or any other psychological phenomenon for that matter, we are inferring
what that emotion or phenomenon is adaptive for, rather than describing the actual
phenomenon itself. As I understand Barrett, she argues that a science of emotions must
deal with what she calls “action identification” rather than inference. She contrasts
questions that we can approach with experimental philosophical methods can be approached
with psychological methods as well.
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the claim that “eyes widen in fear to increase vigilance” with “eyes widen to expand
peripheral vision.” The first claim, a teleological claim, makes an inference about the
purpose of the eyes widening, but it does not describe the action that leads to the
satisfaction of that purpose. The second claim does describe the action, without any
reference to purposes. It is merely the claim that eyes widen and as a result, peripheral
vision is enhanced. Since functionalist models such as Adolphs’s make claims of the
first sort, instead of the second sort, they fail as models that identify what is going on
and instead constitute models of a speculative nature.
Barrett’s presentation of the argument is quite unclear. First, the assumption that
science must only deal with action identification and not with what she calls mental
inferences strikes as implausible. This is because “mental inferences” are quite ambigu-
ous here. Barrett relies claims that teleological language is metaphorical, a claim she
attributes to Mayr (2004).64 What she means by “metaphorical” however is not speci-
fied. As I read Barrett, what she has in mind is that attributing a teleological function
to a phenomenon is speculation. She holds that teleology involves a “metaphorical lan-
guage that cannot be verified in physical terms” (Barrett, 2016, p. 34), and therefore
it involves “mental inferences or attributions [...] of psychological functions.”
On a naïve reading, Barrett’s objection is weak insofar as all of our scientific
hypotheses are inferential in some sense. When we formulate scientific hypotheses, we
do not know yet whether the hypotheses are well confirmed. All we know is that given
a phenomenon, it is plausible that some other phenomenon is going on. In this sense,
criticizing teleology for being speculative in this sense is confusing at best. On a more
charitable reading, I believe that what she is objecting is that there are no criteria to
determine which teleological claims are true. This is why she appeals to the idea that
teleology cannot be verified in physical terms. On this interpretation, all there is is
our speculation about what might be the purpose of a given phenomenon. This would
mean that teleological vocabulary is unsuited for scientific theorizing and would make
her case at least plausible.
Yet, Barrett is confusing two senses of functions that it is vital to keep separate.
These are what Godfrey-Smith (1993) calls “Wright functions” and “Cummins func-
tions” (named after Wright (1973) and Cummins (1975)). Wright functions are the
sort of functions that appeal to teleology, and that are used in evolutionary biology
and other related disciplines. They are initially analyzed in the following terms:
The function of X is Z means
(a) X is there because it does Z,
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X ′s being there. (Wright, 1976, p.
81, cited in Godfrey-Smith 1993, p. 197)
This analysis, as Godfrey-Smith presents it, is meant to account for explanations in
evolutionary biology. For example, evolutionary biology ascribes functions in virtue,
64 As far as I can see in the work Barrett refers to, Mayr does not make any claim about teleology
being metaphorical.
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not only of their effects, but how those effects explain why the function has been
passed on across generations. To say, for instance, that the function of claws is to
aid in hunting is useful insofar as the effects of having claws for an organism that
hunts explains how that organism has survived and the trait has been passed on. In
this sense, the standard interpretation of Wright functions is as answers to ’Why?’
questions (Mayr, 1961; Millikan, 1989).
On this reading of functions, functions are indeed teleological as Barrett thinks. In
Barrett’s example, the claim that the function of the eye widening in fear is to enhance
vigilance aspires to be explanatory in that the ascription of said function to the eye
widening would presumably explain why organisms have evolved in such a way that
their eyes widen in fear, namely, because it has enhanced vigilance in the past and led
to better chances of surviving.
Here we can introduce a first counter-argument against Barrett: in spite of Barrett’s
conviction, it is not clear that this analysis of functions is not scientifically useful. As
the example shows, biologists do make use of these patterns of explanation successfully.
Moreover, they do not need reduce them to physical vocabulary in order to render them
empirically testable. What a biologist would need to show to support their hypothesis
that the eye widens in fear to enhance vigilance is to show how increased vigilance
aids in the survival and subsequent reproduction of ancestor species. The explanation
only requires that we have good evidence that this effect of the widening of the eyes
leads to increased survival, explaining why eyes widening has been passed on through
generations. This is a matter of empirical fact, not mental inference or speculation, as
Barrett would have it.
Yet, let us examine the second sense of functions presented by Godfrey-Smith:
Cummins functions. Cummins functions are more akin to what Barrett calls “action
identification.” They are functions ascribed in terms of how an effect contributes to
a more complex capacity or an overall system. For instance, saying that the function
of the heart is to pump blood is to ascribe it a role in the overall working of our
body as a system. This need not require any story about how that function came
to be or aids in the survival of an organism. All that it requires is that we identify
how a phenomenon contributes to a system, i.e., identify its actions. According to the
standard interpretation, Cummins functions respond to questions of the form ’How?’
(Mayr, 1961; Millikan, 1989).
If we can ground functions in this second sense, this is a final blow against Barrett’s
objection. It is simply not true that functionalism is inherently teleological, since it can
appeal to functions in terms of roles and capacities rather than purposes. But even if
it were teleological, it is unclear that this would render it unsuitable for science. Many
scientific explanations arguably take teleological forms. At best, Barrett would have
to offer a stronger argument against teleology in science in general, and offer reasons
why functionalism applied to emotions is inherently teleological. These two claims I
find highly implausible.
In Barrett’s favor though, there is an important caveat that this reply entails.
Adolph’s particular account, as Scarantino (2018) shows, oscillates between these two
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senses of functions. This is a problem since they lead to very different empirical pre-
dictions and each account is suited for different types of explanation.65 As Scarantino
puts it:
[Adolphs and Andler (2018)] cannot have it both ways: either the rele-
vant functional roles emerge from an observation of current capacities and
duplicates have our emotions since they share such capacities, or the rel-
evant functional roles emerge exclusively from a past history of selection,
but then the current capacities we observe cannot shed light on functional
roles. (Scarantino, 2018, p. 203)
What Scarantino correctly points out is that a functional model of emotions must
make a decision between teleological and dispositional accounts of functions. As I
said before, this is because these accounts lead to different empirical predictions, thus
shaping the empirical content of the theory proposed, and because each account of
functions has different explanatory demands and offerings.
Making such a decision lies outside the scope of this work, since it requires an in
depth discussion of functions. Nevertheless, let me offer arguments in favor of applying
an etiological account of functions to emotions rather than a teleological account.
First, in my view, dispositional accounts better capture our folk-psychological con-
cepts than teleological ones. Consider an everyday case of emotional attribution.
When we say that someone is afraid, angry, happy or sad, we mean that they have dis-
positions to entertain certain thoughts and to behave in certain ways. This makes no
reference as to the adaptive purpose of the emotion, but to its role in how the subject
as a psychological system behaves. This way of talking about emotions functionally
appeals then to the emotion’s contribution to the system’s (i.e. agent’s) behavior.
Second, the question about how to individuate emotions scientifically is not the
same as the question of why emotions have evolved. Emotions might have evolved for
a number of reasons, but, in my view, they are individuated by how they contribute
to an agent’s overall behavior. In other words, emotions help explain how an agent
behaves, rather than why it has acquired those forms of behavior. Hence, I submit
that Cummins functions are a better account than Wright functions, at least when it
comes to cashing out emotions as functional kinds.
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that this does not mean that teleology is
irrelevant for a science of emotions. As I have claimed before, the question of what
adaptive value emotions have is an important question in its own right, and it may
call for a teleological answer. To make things clear, all I want to claim is that for the
purposes of characterizing emotion kinds, we should apply a causal, Cummins-style
account of functions rather than a teleological one. For the purpose of integrating
emotions into an evolutionary framework, however, we may go with a teleological
account.
65 See however Neander (2017) for an opposing view to this claim.
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6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have applied the methodology sketched in chapter 5 to answer the
question set out in chapter 4, namely, what is the best framework of scientific kinds to
construct scientific concepts of emotions. I analyzed some of the features figuring in
our folk-psychological, pretheoretical account of emotions, and have argued that the
best type of model available to construct scientifically meaningful concepts of emotions
is a functional framework. This can be understood as an empirically informed type of
conceptual analysis.
In the first part of the chapter, I presented arguments based on theoretical re-
marks and empirical research on emotion attribution suggesting that emotions in our
folk-psychology involve features such as arousal, valence, being motivating states, em-
bodiment, phenomenality, intentionality, flexibility, context-sensitivity, and that folk-
emotion concepts apply meaningfully to non-human animals. I claimed that some of
these features could be cashed out by the four available models of scientific kinds.
Specifically, I argued that this is the case for arousal, motivational roles, and valence.
I also suggested that phenomenality is not a feature worth considering, given that it is
scientifically uninformative. This lead me to restrict the space of features relevant to
decide between different models of emotions to embodiment, intentionality, flexibility,
context-sensitivity, and the application of emotion concepts to non-human animals.
With these features in mind, I proceeded to analyze the prospects of constructing
scientific concepts of emotions that did justice to them. I argued that essentialist
models were not suited to capture flexibility and context-sensitivity, as well as having
problems with defining essences in general. Against historical models, I suggested that
even though they fare better than essentialist models, they are still overly restrictive in
the sorts of flexibility and context-sensitivity that they allow from emotion categories.
Furthermore, both of these models were not well suited to tackle the social aspects
involved in some higher order emotions. This prevents them from being plausible
candidates to propose an overarching theory of emotions.
Regarding social models, I discussed three different possibilities following Khalidi’s
three-fold distinction between different types of social kinds. I argued that only two
of these kinds were plausible candidates to cash out emotion concepts, namely, kinds
requiring mental attitudes to be in place but not necessarily towards the type, or kinds
requiring such attitudes to be in place towards the type but not the tokens. Nonethe-
less, I discarded these models as prime candidates to construct emotion kinds given the
sorts of cognitive sophistication demanded by these models, which prevent a theory
of emotions from being integrated with evolutionary biology and psychology. Addi-
tionally, I claimed that social models overstate variability, which can be understood
in functional terms without the pitfalls of previous social accounts.
This left only functional models on the table, which I suggested could be supported
by an account of emotions that integrates situational aspects with behavioral dispo-
sitions and relations to other mental states. I then presented Lazarus’s and Prinz’s
individuation of emotions in terms of core-relational themes as a possible model and
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example of such an endeavor, and proceeded to present some of the advantages of
functional models. Particularly, I stressed the advantage of having a model which al-
lows for multiple realizability, allowing integrating variability, flexibility, and context-
sensitivity without sacrificing unity. Additionally, I argued that functional models
could capture a range of complexity that would allow proposing an account of emo-
tions that covers basic as well as higher order emotions.
In the last section, I responded to some of the main objections raised against func-
tionalist models in the literature. First, I rejected the claim that functionalism is not
falsifiable, recommending a psychofunctionalist approach which takes correspondences
between emotion categories and functional descriptions as a matter of empirical hy-
potheses rather than conceptual truths. This enables functionalist theories to provide
scientifically interesting hypotheses which are falsifiable and testable. Second, I dis-
cussed whether functionalist accounts must be committed to a teleological account of
functions, and argued for an etiological account of function instead. As a result, I
concluded that emotions must be understood in terms of the contributions they make
to an agent’s overall patterns of behavior, being combinations of situational factors,
behavioral dispositions, and relations to other mental states.
If these arguments are correct, then we can be optimistic that we can propose a
scientifically interesting theory of emotions from a functionalist perspective. In what
is left, I will revisit the challenges presented in Part I and explain how my account fits
together to respond to these challenges. In closing, I shall also explore some limitations
of this approach and avenues for future research.
195

Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
In this work, I set out to answer the question: how can we construct a scientifically
meaningful theory of emotions? In Part I, I offered an analysis of the problem. I
divided the problem in two challenges which scientific theories of emotions must face,
namely, the Theoretical Challenge and the Empirical Challenge. In chapters 1 and 2,
I spelled out these challenges in the following terms:
Theoretical Challenge Provide a systematic theoretical framework that provides
empirically testable hypotheses and explains all and only the phenomena under
the vernacular term “emotion” under the same explanatory resources and under
an overarching generic concept of emotion.
Empirical Challenge Provide a scientifically meaningful theoretical framework that
establishes correspondences between emotion categories and well-coordinated
patterns of neural, physiological, and behavioral responses.
Regarding the Theoretical Challenge, I presented Griffiths’s arguments to claim
that none of our best theories of emotions could successfully overcome it. I then
updated Griffiths’s arguments, which relied on an outdated landscape of scientific the-
ories of emotions, and argued that even in this updated version, the challenge had not
been overcome. This is because neither Basic Emotion Theories, Appraisal Theories,
or Psychological Constructionist theories were apt to provide a sound framework that
would capture all and only the phenomena under the term ‘emotion’ without relying
on problematic constructs or rendering emotion taxonomies arbitrary. Hence, a new
theory of emotions must be proposed if we are to overcome the Theoretical Challenge.
Concerning the Empirical Challenge, I presented Scarantino’s analysis of the Vari-
ability Thesis, the claim that is thought to support empirical arguments against the
possibility of proposing a scientifically tractable overarching account of emotions. The
Variability Thesis, understood as the claim that emotions are naturally heterogeneous
phenomena, was divided into two separate theses, namely, the No One-to-One Cor-
respondence Thesis (NOC) and the Low Coordination Thesis (LC). I then analyzed
each of these theses and their relations, and argued that previous attempts to draw
conclusions from them were flawed in that these theses hide important conceptual
ambiguities.
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After suggesting that the Variability Thesis is best understood as a disjunction of
these two claims, I claimed that even having cleared up some of the logical issues with
these theses, an important issue must be resolved before drawing empirical conclusions
in support of them, namely, that these theses require an account of what counts as
a pattern in the neural, physiological, behavioral, expressive, and phenomenological
domains. This led to an examination of each of these domains and their relevance to
claims about variability. I argued that only the neural, physiological, and behavioral
domains provided relevant sources of evidence for claims about variability. This is
because, on one hand, phenomenological and expressive patterns are either scientif-
ically intractable, provide irrelevant evidence to the individuation of emotion kinds
(specifically claims about the universality of emotional expressions), or they fall back
into behavioral patterns altogether. With this arguments in place, I suggested that
the best accounts of patterns for the remaining domains are adopting a pattern as-
signment strategy in the neural domain, clarifying causal and correlation claims in the
case of physiology, and spelling out behavioral patterns in terms of action tendencies
or behavioral dispositions.
Before concluding Part I, I integrated the analyses of the Theoretical Challenge
and Empirical Challenge offered in the previous chapters in order to evaluate the
prospects of overcoming them. I claimed that even though these challenges have not
been met yet, we should not opt for an eliminativist strategy. Instead, I suggested
that by analyzing the notion of natural kinds present in these arguments and their
relation to folk-psychological concepts, we could see why other theoretical resources
are still available to propose scientifically meaningful theories of emotions. As a result,
I suggested that a revisionist approach could be fruitful in overcoming these challenges,
an approach that I sketched out in Part II.
The solution proposed in Part II was divided into three parts. First, I discussed
the notion of natural kinds, a central concept in the debates about scientific theories
of emotions. I argued that appealing to a unique notion of natural kinds leads to
an overly restrictive picture of how science constructs projectible categories. But
putting projectibility and entrenchment at the forefront, I argued that we should
instead frame questions about kinds in terms of scientific kinds, i.e., on which criteria
do different scientific disciplines construct projectible category. These criteria can
be varied, leading to a pluralistic account of scientific kinds. I identified four types
of kinds, namely, essentialist, historical, functional, and social kinds. Having drawn
these distinctions, the question concerning emotion kinds then becomes which type of
kinds best suits emotions as an explanandum phenomenon.
To tackle this question, I proposed engaging in what has been known in the lit-
erature on mechanistic explanations as reconstituting the phenomena. Reconstitution
occurs when scientists take a step back and recharacterize the phenomenon they intend
to explain. I proposed a two-step procedure to reconstitute the phenomena in which
scientists first find an ostensive device to make reference to the phenomenon, and
then proceed to find the level of analysis that will allow them to construct meaningful
projectible kinds.
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With this notion of reconstitution at hand, I then argued that in the case of emo-
tions, reconstitution is best thought of in terms of explicating folk-emotion concepts.
In other words, I claimed that folk-emotion concepts can be used as such ostensive
device that allows us to make reference to the phenomenon we wish to recharacterize.
This called for a clarification of what the relation between folk concepts and their
scientific counterparts should be. Against Strawson’s objection against explication, I
argued that some degree of mismatch between folk terms and scientific concepts is to
be expected, but need not lead to a change of subject. As long as scientific constructs
are constrained by their folk counterparts, without them being identical, we can avoid
changing the subject while constructing useful scientific concepts. Lastly, I explored
Scarantino’s claim that folk terms and scientific concepts of emotion should be kept
separate, and claimed that in order to avoid changing the subject while producing
useful scientific theories, we must be keep maintain a robust degree of similarity be-
tween folk emotion concepts and scientific ones while picking scientific concepts by
their projectibility, even with some degrees of freedom so as to allow healthy degrees
of mismatch.
In the last chapter, I applied these observations about reconstitution and expli-
cation to emotion concepts. I presented evidence that folk emotion concepts involve
properties that allow us to pick between the different frameworks for scientific kinds
presented in chapter 4. Accommodating these features, I submitted, was best done by
a functional model in which emotions are understood as relations between inputs, other
mental states, and outputs. Specifically, I claimed that emotions should be cashed out
in terms of situational aspects, objects and events as inputs, and behavioral disposi-
tions as outputs.
Now, I will consider some consequences of the approach I have been defending in
this work. First, I will revisit the challenges presented in Part I and clarify how my ac-
count overcomes the Theoretical Challenge while dissolving the Empirical Challenge.
This means that it is possible to offer a scientifically interesting theory of emotions,
and that we can do that without recourse to specific and consistent correspondences
between emotions and neural and physiological patterns. Regarding behavioral pat-
terns, as I will clarify below, correspondences must be taken as empirical hypotheses,
so as to prevent emotion taxonomies from falling into conceptual truths. After clari-
fying the application of these arguments to the challenges at hand, I will then present
some final remarks on future avenues of research based on this account.
7.1 Responding to the challenges
7.1.1 Revisiting the Theoretical Challenge
At last, let us go back to the challenges driving our discussion. In Part I, I presented
two challenges that the literature on the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of
emotions have raised regarding the prospects of a scientific theory of emotions. These
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are the Theoretical Challenge and the Empirical Challenge. If we adopt a functional
model, as I have recommended, how does this help us tackle these challenges?
Let us start with the Theoretical Challenge. As I formulated it, the Theoretical
Challenge was to provide a systematic theoretical framework that provides empirically
testable hypotheses and explains all phenomena under the vernacular term “emotion”
under the same explanatory resources and under an overarching concept of emotion.
On a functional framework, this challenge can be met.
When presenting and updating the Theoretical Challenge, I claimed that none of
the current theories of emotions were able to overcome this challenge. Generally speak-
ing, this was because most contemporary theories of emotions are based on dubious
constructs such as “core affect” or “basic emotion,” or because they could not explain
emotion taxonomies in a non-arbitrary way. Regarding the first problem, proposing a
sound theory of emotions will depend on which constructs are invoked, and as I have
explained before, I will not attempt to propose a specific theory at the moment. The
argument I have been putting forward, however, does say something about the second
problem.
In my view, functional characterizations, interpreted as I have suggested, do allow
us to cash out emotion taxonomies non-arbitrarily. This is because in the picture I
have proposed, what makes emotion categories projectible is their functional unity,
which in turn is discovered through empirical means. As a result, emotion taxonomies
depend on empirical facts about how we categorize emotions and, most importantly,
how these emotions lead to common patterns of behavioral dispositions. Not just any
state will count as part of an emotion, and not any functional characterization will
be successful. This renders emotion taxonomies scientifically interesting, avoiding the
pitfalls that other theories ran into.
Additionally, a functional model of emotions is well-suited to overcome other prob-
lems that pertain particular theories of emotions. First, consider the objection against
basic emotion theories claiming that these theories are not well-suited to explain higher
order emotions such as social or moral emotions. The reason alluded was that basic
emotion theories endorsed a very primitive view of emotions which, although well pre-
pared to handle basic cases, could not be projected onto more cognitively sophisticated
ones.
On a functional model, however, we need not run into such a problem. Given that
functional descriptions allow for complexity, we can offer a description of emotions
ranging from simple cases such as fearing snakes to more complex cases such as moral
and social emotions. Furthermore, this can be done using the same explanatory re-
sources, since all of the emotions are couched in the same functional terms. In the
list of emotions offered above, for example, we can see emotions ranging from fear
and anger to pride and shame, emotions with varying degrees of complexity but all
individuated in functional terms. Even within an emotion category, we can cash out
a range of instances from the simpler to the more complex ones. Consider the char-
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acterization of fear as a reaction to facing an immediate and overwhelming danger.66
Objects satisfying the description of being ‘an immediate and overwhelming danger’
can be as simple as the presence of a snake, but also as complex as the risk of failing
an important job interview. Insofar as these objects can be fit into a common ab-
stract description, we can capture simple and complex instances of the same emotion
category in the same functional vocabulary.
Second, concerning appraisal theories, functional accounts also display some ad-
vantages. As I explained above, functional accounts do not render emotion taxonomies
a matter of conceptual truth, avoiding the issues that were presented against discrete
appraisal theories. Additionally, functional descriptions need not lead to the explo-
sion of emotion categories that dimensional appraisal theories led to. On the account
I have proposed, emotion categories are limited to those we can construct based on
folk-psychological categories without sacrificing projectibility. Given the constraints
I have argued for in terms of the possible mismatch between scientific theories and
folk-concepts, theories of the sort I envisage do not lead to the counter-intuitive and
problematic conclusion that there are infinite types of emotions as dimensional ap-
praisal theorists claim.
Lastly, compared to psychological constructionism, functional theories also fare
quite well. Recall that psychological constructionism is based on the idea that emotions
are heterogeneous phenomena, as explained in chapters 1 and 2. While psychological
constructionists take it as their best suit to accommodate variability from the outset,
they do so at the expense of relying on problematic constructs such as “core affect”
and at risk of making emotion taxonomies arbitrary. Functional accounts, in contrast,
can also accommodate variability without running into these problems.
On one hand, functional descriptions allow for multiple realization, making het-
erogeneity at the neural and physiological levels unproblematic. On the other hand,
however, this need not imply that emotions are acts of categorization dependent on
our socially constructed conceptual practices, as Barrett claims. Instead, variability
is accommodated without giving up unity, this time spelled out in terms of how an
emotion contributes to an agent’s overall behavior. Since theories need not give up the
conceptual unity of emotion categories in spite of their heterogeneity at the neural and
physiological levels, we need not invoke dubious processes of construction to account
for emotion taxonomies. What we need is to investigate the commonalities between
different instances of emotions in abstract terms and refine our categories accordingly.
Hence, we can have the main advantage of constructionist accounts without many of
its problems.
In sum, there are good reasons to believe that on a functional framework, we
can propose theories that explain the phenomena under the vernacular term ‘emo-
tion’ using a common set of explanatory resources and under an overarching concept
66 This characterization differs from the one above in that it does not demand a concrete and
physical danger for a fear reaction to obtain. Nevertheless, this is not a problem for the current
account, as I have argued that these characterizations should be refined empirically.
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of emotion. In other words, there are good reasons to be optimistic that we can
overcome the Theoretical Challenge by adopting a functionalist approach.
7.1.2 Revisiting the Empirical Challenge
With regards to the Empirical Challenge, there are a number of interesting conse-
quences. The Empirical Challenge was formulated in terms of finding a set of spe-
cific and consistent mechanisms that corresponded to each emotion kind. Given the
amount of empirical evidence suggesting there were no such mechanisms at the neural
and physiological evidence, the prospects of tackling this challenge seemed bleak. As
I discussed in chapter 2, meeting this challenge required an analysis of the Variability
Thesis, which in turn required an account of how to individuate the candidates for
correspondence for each emotion. These are neural and physiological mechanisms, and
behavioral patterns.
Adopting a functional framework offers clues as to how to analyze variability. First,
with regards to neural and physiological mechanisms, the functional account integrates
them into the picture as the realizers of an emotion’s functional description. They are
part of how we as psychological systems instantiate specific functional patterns. These
functional patterns, in turn, are obtained by explicating folk emotion concepts, which
make reference to patterns of behavior, into a functional vocabulary.
As a result, we have that we individuate behavioral patterns in terms of a common
functional description capturing the commonalities between instances of an emotion in
folk-psychological terms. This functional description acts as the explicatum of the folk
concept and that is allowed to shift in the presence of empirical demands. Once these
functional patterns are individuated (which already enables formulating a number of
empirical hypotheses), we can ask how they are instantiated in our brains and bodies.
In other words, we can ask how mechanisms at the neural and physiological levels
contribute to the overall functional characterization of the emotion.
The upshot of this proposal is that we can now approach variability in clearer terms.
On this view, variability is cashed out in terms of multiple realization. To claim that
an emotion is a heterogeneous phenomenon at the neural and physiological levels is
to say that there are a number of neural and physiological mechanisms realizing a
given emotion. Thus, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the functional
characterization of an emotion and its realizers, but given that functionalism opens
the door for multiple realization, this need not come as a problem for my account.
In other words, the fact that we lack correspondences at the neural and physiological
level is not evidence against the possibility of proposing scientifically fruitful emotion
concepts. As for the Low Coordination thesis, we can spell it out as the claim that these
various mechanisms can combine in a number of ways, precluding clear-cut groupings
of mechanisms. These claims, of course, remain a matter of empirical investigation.
More interestingly for the overall project, however, is that on the functional frame-
work, the Variability Thesis need not entail elimination. Hence, the Empirical Chal-
lenge is dissolved. A theory of emotions on this view need not find specific and consis-
tent mechanisms corresponding to emotion categories. It can integrate various mecha-
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nisms as the various realizers of a common functional profile. This not only alleviates
worries about the Variability Thesis being true, but makes an interesting and provoca-
tive empirical claim. In other words, we can explore the Variability Thesis and the
hypotheses that follow from it without giving up our scientific categories of emotions.
Lastly, in my account of the Variability Thesis and the Empirical Challenge, I
argued that behavioral patterns are also relevant for claims about correspondence and
coordination. I cashed out these behavioral patterns in terms of action tendencies, that
is, as behavioral dispositions. This ties in well with the functionalist framework I have
defended. On this account, emotions can involve behavioral dispositions as outputs.
Furthermore, this yields a number of interesting empirical hypotheses. Given that
I have recommended a psychofunctionalist approach, the presumed correspondences
between emotions and their functional descriptions (which include these behavioral
dispositions) become a matter of empirical fact. This leads to the possibility of offering
fruitful and testable theories of emotions.
7.2 Future avenues for a science of emotions
To come to a closing, let us discuss some open questions and avenues for future research.
To begin, I have only offered a possible functional characterization of emotions in terms
of patterns of dispositional reactions, situations and other mental states. This rough
sketch deserves further refinement, which entails both theoretical development and
contrasting it with empirical findings. Additionally, other functional accounts deserve
attention as rivals to this view. One such model is the aforementioned one proposed
by Adolphs (2016).
Besides the two models mentioned, I believe that some traditional theories of emo-
tions can be formulated using functional vocabulary, thus becoming interesting con-
tenders in the arena. Specifically, I believe that basic emotion theories and discrete
appraisal theories allow for such transformation. Regarding the former, if we under-
stand basicality in functional terms, we can formulate many of the hypotheses of basic
emotion theory using functional kinds. And with regards to the latter, cashing out
syndromes in functional terms and neural and physiological components as realizers,
we can rework the theory to fit it into the functional framework.
Lastly, the functional account of emotion kinds invites a revision of existing em-
pirical evidence. We already know a great deal about how emotions are related to
our brains, our bodies, and their relations to other psychological phenomena. Under-
standing them as functional kinds thus invites a reinterpretation of these results under
the light of functions. For example, we can revisit findings about the different brain
mechanisms underlying emotions and redescribe them according to multiple realiza-
tion. Or we can visit findings about the objects and behavioral outcomes of emotions
to construct functional models of each specific emotion. This is to say, a new model
need not give up previous findings. On the contrary, it calls for a revision of these
findings from a new perspective.
203
Chapter 7. Concluding remarks
Even though I am optimistic about the prospects of a theory of emotions along the
meta-theoretical constraints I have proposed, one issue remains standing, although I
will not attempt to solve it here. Given that my account takes folk emotion concepts as
ostensive devices that provide the basis for reconstitution and explication, one possible
worry is that this will lead to as many theories of emotions as there are different
folk psychological frameworks. If different folk psychologies offer different potentially
untranslatable folk taxonomies, then the question remains on how to pick the proper
taxonomy for a generalizable science of emotions.
With regards to this worry, I will offer two remarks to ameliorate it. First, I believe
that we can find a folk taxonomy that is applicable universally if we keep in mind that
functional descriptions can be quite abstract. By allowing ourselves these degrees of
abstraction, we can approach the most general taxonomy possible, plausibly leading
to a generalizable theory.
Nevertheless, we cannot guarantee that this will always be possible. In this case,
I believe we must accept certain amount of relativity with regards to our scientific
theories of emotions. If we cannot offer a universal taxonomy on which to base the
construction of our theories, then we must accept that our theories apply to a specific
set of phenomena indicated by the taxonomies we pick. However, I do not believe
this to be an argument against a science of emotions. On one hand, even if we could
pinpoint a universal folk-psychological framework, we should always expect shifts as
science progresses and influences folk concepts. What this means is not that a gen-
eralizable theory is impossible, but that our theories will keep changing as science
progresses, a consequence that I find desirable, as it least to progressive research pro-
grams.
On the other hand even if the chosen folk-psychological framework is relative to a
specific group, this need not mean that a theory of emotions along those line is not an
interesting theory. We could still find interesting facts about how we, whichever group
that makes reference to, live our emotional lives. It is then a matter of investigation to
what extent these theories can be generalized. Given the framework I have presented,
I believe there are good reasons to be optimistic.
In sum, I have offered a meta-theoretical account of how to construct scientific
theories of emotions. This account uses a functional framework to construct projectible
scientific kinds based on the explication of folk emotion concepts, and allows us to
overcome the challenges that previous theories of emotions have faced. What is left
is to propose theories along these lines in order to guide scientific investigation and
hopefully find out what emotions are. This is a task that only future research will
validate. What I have done is provide a ground on which to stand and start inquiring
once again.
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